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ABSTRACT
Ideology in American politics is usually measured along a liberal-conservative continuum
depending on a person’s position on issues such as the role of government in the economy and
the regulation of social behavior. This framework has been a poor fit for understanding Latino
political behavior. This dissertation argues that to understand Latino political behavior it is
necessary to understand Latinos’ ideological thinking. I argue that Latinos’ shared cultural traits
and their core beliefs (rooted in a common experience) inform three distinct Ethno-Ideologies:
pan-ethnic, co-ethnic and ethnic. These Ethno-Ideologies sort Latinos depending on how much in
common they think they share with other Latinos. To test the theory, I use data from the 2006
Latino National Survey, the largest nationally-representative survey of Latinos. These data are
supplemented with qualitative insights from focus groups conducted with Latinos in Phoenix,
Arizona. The findings suggest that ideological thinking among Latinos in the U.S. is more rooted
in the experience in which the core beliefs are based than in their shared cultural traits.
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Chapter 1: Ideology in American Politics
The Research Problem
In 2012, 71 percent of Latinos voted to re-elect Barack Obama as President of the United States
(Lopez and Taylor 2012). Four years earlier, two-thirds (67 percent) of Latino voters supported
him in his journey to become the first African American elected to the highest executive office in
the nation (Lopez and Taylor 2012). Latino support for Obama in these elections was similar to
Latino support for previous Democratic candidates for President, with the exception of the
election immediately preceding Obama’s election. In 2004, exit polls reported that 4-in-10 (40
percent) Latinos voted to re-elect Republican President George W. Bush (Lopez and Taylor
2012). Though the majority of Latinos still voted for the Democratic candidate, John Kerry, the
unusually high proportion of the Latino vote for Bush suggested that Latinos’ “natural
conservatism,” as Ronald Reagan once quipped, was coming to fruition. Yet, Latinos’ reversal to
supporting Obama by historically-wide margins in 2008 and 2012 suggests that, on the contrary,
Latinos are becoming a homogeneous group, a cohesive voting bloc.
These electoral margins beg the question: Is this homogeneity a real phenomenon, or are Latino
voting outcomes concealing debates within the Latino community about politics, their place in
American society, and their role in the American political system? Do these debates culminate in
ideologies based on factors other than partisanship or issue positions informing them about their
place in American politics as Latinos? How does latinidad–their shared cultural traits stemming
from a common colonial history and core beliefs rooted in the experience of living in the United
States– shape these ideologies?
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Latino electoral outcomes do not necessarily mean that Latinos are homogenizing politically, but
perhaps they are a reflection of choices that must be made when the system only has two viable
political parties. I posit that Latinos and Latino voters have diverse views regarding the role of
government and their place (as Latinos) in American society, though these views are converging
inside one political party, the Democratic Party.
This project aims to explain Latino political behavior by identifying distinctive ideologies that
inform how Latinos relate to the U.S. political system based on their demographic
characteristics, cultural traits, and core beliefs. I submit four cultural traits that are shared by
many Latinos living in the United States: (1) a Catholic religious identity, (2) transnational
family ties, (3) the Spanish language, and (4) consumption of Spanish-language media. Latino
ideologies are also influenced by five core beliefs, which are informed by their experiences
living in America, about (1) their (cultural) identity, (2) their homelands, (3) other Latinos, (4)
other minorities, and (5) core American values. These cultural traits and core beliefs vary
depending on individual Latinos’ demographic characteristics, national ancestry or origin, time
in the United States, and generations removed from immigration. These cultural traits and core
beliefs will manifest in three distinct Latino Ethno-Ideologies: pan-ethnic, co-ethnic, and ethnic.
These ideologies reflect the diverse views Latinos have regarding their place as Latinos in
American society and how they view Latinos as potential political allies.
These ideologies run counter to the position that the cause for increasing political unity among
Latinos is the result of a pan-ethnic identity formation, meaning that the homogenization of
Latino political behavior is due mostly to Latinos identifying as “Latino” (or “Hispanic”) with a
basis on latinidad or cultural and social commonalities. I argue that a view that consists solely on
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identity betrays the diversity and complexity of Latinos’ political views and my proposed Ethnoideologies offer an alternative view of Latino political behavior.
Latinos with a pan-ethnic ideological outlook have a strong sense of social and political
commonalities with other Latinos. Their sense of commonality is mostly forged by their core
beliefs than by their shared cultural traits. Latinos with co-ethnic ideological views have a
weaker sense of commonality –their commonality may be just political or just social– with
fellow Latinos than those with a pan-ethnic ideology. However, co-ethnic Latinos’ sense of
commonality has a stronger cultural component than for pan-ethnic Latinos, while their core
beliefs are weaker than among pan-ethnic Latinos. An ethnic ideology among Latinos means
that, while they identify as a “Latino” or “Hispanic,” they do not have a sense that they share
much in common with other Latinos. This ethnic ideology suggests that while they acknowledge
their ethnic Latino heritage, it does not instill a feeling of kinship with the larger Latino world.
The growth of the Latino population in the United States raises questions about its potential
political power. In order for this diverse group of nationalities and generations to become a
politically cohesive bloc requires moving away from the regionally-based politics of distinct
identities based on national origin to a politics based on shared ethnicity and a sense of linked
fate among Latino-origin groups, but there is no theoretical framework explaining how this
transition from politics of distinct national groups to a “Latino” politics based on shared ethnicity
may be occurring. I argue that this transition in Latino politics is best explained through the lens
of ideology. Latinos today are more diverse, with several Central American and Caribbean
groups accounting for a larger share of the population than ever before, while also being less
geographically-isolated from each other. In addition to these demographic changes within the
Latino population, there are also national advocacy and media institutions that form the basis of a
3

Latino counterpublic. This counterpublic serves to debate which issues are salient to the
community at large and what actions should be taken. I argue that distinct Latino EthnoIdeologies are surging from these debates as a way of organizing political strategies for
representing the common interests of the Latino population
Plan of the Dissertation
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the study of
ideology in contemporary American public opinion and how the dominant framework of
understanding ideology, the liberal-conservative continuum, does not fit the way Latinos
understand politics. Chapter 2 introduces a new way of understanding Latinos’ political views as
ideologies, these Latino Ethno-Ideologies are rooted in latinidad, a mix of cultural traits and core
beliefs. There are three Ethno-Ideologies, pan-ethnic, co-ethnic, and ethnic, that vary according
to how much in common individual Latinos feel they have with other Latinos. Chapter 3
describes the data that will be used to test the theory of Latino Ethnic-Ideologies and the methods
to conduct these tests. Chapters 4 through 6 empirically test the theory, step-by-step. Chapter 4
tests the influence of cultural traits on the Latino Ethno-Ideologies. Chapter 5 focuses on core
beliefs, while Chapter 6 includes the full picture: the combined effects of cultural traits and core
beliefs on Latino Ethno-Ideologies. Chapter 7 consists of a conclusion summarizing the results
and outlining the future research agenda on Latino ideologies.
Ideology in American Public Opinion
Ideology has many definitions in the American public opinion literature, and these definitions are
often diverse and at odds with each other. Gerring (1997) notes
To some, ideology is dogmatic, while to others it carries connotations of political sophistication;
to some it refers to dominant modes of thought, and to others it refers primarily to those most
alienated by the status quo (e.g. revolutionary movements and parties). To some it is based in the
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concrete interests of a social class, while to others it is characterized by an absence of economic
self-interest (Gerring 1997, 957).

What these definitions share in common is that, they agree that ideologies shape a person’s
worldview and, more importantly, his or her political outlook. In this project I will specifically
deal with two definitions of ideology used in the American politics literature. The first definition
concerns ideology, as it is studied in the field of public opinion, and comprises a coherent or
consistent set of opinions on salient policy matters, as defined by (party and other political)
elites. The second definition is experiential concerning beliefs or values based on everyday
experiences that help people make sense of their political surroundings.
In the next section, I discuss the liberal-conservative continuum in American public opinion and
how ideology is defined by elites. This section discusses the liberal-conservative continuum in
preferences for the role of government. Next, I discuss more recent scholarship that argues that
the liberal-conservative continuum consists of two dimensions: one focusing on economic policy
and a second focusing on social and moral policy preferences. In the following sections, I discuss
the relationship between ideologies and political parties with a particular focus on how the social
and economic dimensions emerged, as well as the role of race. Then, later, I discuss the way the
field of African American politics has critiqued the study of ideology in American politics, with
an emphasis on the experiential definition of ideology.
The Liberal-Conservative Continuum
The Role of Government
The first conceptualization of ideology, which is dominant in the study of American public
opinion, is dependent on processing a combination of historical and policy-oriented knowledge
of government functions and placing them in a liberal-conservative continuum. This liberal-
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conservative continuum places policies on a single dimension that ranks them from conservative
(less spending, less government functions) to liberal (greater government involvement, more
spending), as originally espoused by Downs in his seminal work An Economic Theory of
Democracy (1957).
In another seminal work, Converse defined ideology –or belief system– as “a configuration of
ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or
functional interdependence” (2006, 3). Constraint means that an individual’s attitudes toward
issues or policies are predictable based on positions on other issues. For example a person
opposing “Obamacare” (the 2010 Affordable Care Act) on the grounds that government should
not provide social services should also oppose programs such as Medicare or Social Security.
Moreover, according to Converse, attitudes should also be stable, meaning that these positions
should be held over time.
Converse classified Americans in 5 categories” (1) ideologues, (2) near-ideologues, (3) group
interest, (4) nature of the times, and (5) no issue content. The first two categories comprise those
who understand politics in an ideological way, this is that they understand politics in the same
language that elites do. These people tend to be highly educated and comprise just 11.5 percent
of Americans (ideologues only account for 2.5 percent of Americans). The largest group (42
percent) was those who reflected some sort of group interest, mainly favor or opposition to some
particular group such as “business” or “labor.” The next-largest category (24 percent) was
“nature of the times,” comprised by Americans whose political evaluations consisted on blaming
or rewarding the political parties for “their temporal association in the past with broad societal
states of war or peace, prosperity or depression” (Converse 2006, 16). Finally, the “no issue
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content group” focused on policy but on individual qualities of politicians or candidates and
accounted for 22.5 percent of Americans.
Converse’s research led him to conclude that the public showed little constraint and stability. He
reached this conclusion because people’s issues positions were not consistently liberal or
conservative and also shifted over time. Moreover, Converse further concluded that the labels
“liberal” and “conservative” had hardly any meaning for most Americans. This, he found
problematic because the liberal-conservative continuum is what elites use to communicate their
cues to the electorate.
Converse was not the only scholar concluding that the liberal-conservative continuum was
poorly understood. Lane (1962), a contemporary of Converse, also reached a similar conclusion,
with some caveats. Lane’s definition of ideology was broader and included questions dealing
with (1) who are the rulers and (2) how do they rule? (Lane 1962, 14). Rather than relying on
survey data like Converse, Lane conducted in-depth interviews with 15 men in a middle-class
Northeastern city. It was through his conversations with these men that he concluded that people
are not ideological in the sense of being guided by grand overarching ideologies which are
commonly agreed upon (Lane 1962, 351). Instead, people are guided by individual ideologies
which affect their views of politics (Clawson and Oxley 2012, 149). These conclusions, that
ideology matters individually and that people understand politics individually is something that
surprised Lane, who expected ideologies to derive from group attachments.
Although Lane and Converse had different definitions for ideology, their conclusions share some
common ground, particularly that both conclude that most Americans have difficulty identifying
along a liberal-conservative continuum and that the nature of ideology is individualistic. In the
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case of Converse, the individual nature of ideology is central to its understanding because it is at
an individual level that people should experience the political system, as individual preferences.
By contrast, Lane expected ideologies to be rooted in some group identity, but he did not find
this to be the case.
It is in this regard that the mass public is treated as being non-ideological. Since most people
hold views which are not consistent, only elites who define which issues are salient and who
control agenda-setting are deemed capable of ideological thinking. Converse noted that:
[T]he individual lacks the contextual grasp to understand that the specific case and the general
principle belong in the same belief system: In the absence of such understanding, he maintains
psychologically independent beliefs about both. This is another important instance of the decline
in constraint among beliefs with declining information (Converse 2006, 33).

Although Converse writes in the 1960s, the public’s lack of constraint is still evident today, even
in this era of polarized politics. Some authors argue that the public is truly ambivalent about
many issues and do not hold strong positions on many of them, leading to a lack of constraint
between their issue positions and their ideological identification (Fiorina 2005). Others consider
that the public’s lack of ideological constraint is the result of social preferences over the
definition of the terms “liberal” and “conservative” that lead people to pick one over the other for
reasons that are independent of political preferences (Ellis and Stimson 2012; Page and Shapiro
1992).
Under the issues-based definition of ideology, elites are the important conveyors of cues and
define which issues are salient and whether these issues fit in a liberal or a conservative
ideology. In the case of Zaller (1992), in his R(eceive), A(ccept), S(ample) model, (liberal or
conservative), elites convey information that the mass public receive and form their opinions,
which is later used to respond to public opinion surveys (Zaller 1992, 190–191). In this case,
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opinion elites (often partisan) set the ideological agenda, and people need to follow elite’s cues
in order to stay current regarding which issues are salient. Thus the RAS model consists of the
process of receiving the information –dependent on the flow of information,– accept it and
incorporating the information to their knowledge base, and finally sampling this information
Against any competing information in order to make a decision (Zaller 1992, 58; 190-191)
Moreover, as Carmines and Stimson (1989) claim, issues evolve both in the sense that they can
become more or less salient over time and in the sense of how they fit into the dominant liberalconservative ideological paradigm.
Issue salience matters, because elites may be out of step with the preferences or concerns of
swaths of the public. Hajnal and Lee (2011) argue that this is the case for racial and ethnic
minorities whose leaders are not, by and large, part of the issue-framing elites. Thus, many of
their concerns go unattended by party elites at the national level. In the case of Latinos, this
means that issues such as immigration or bilingual education, which tend to be discussed by
Latino elites, are oftentimes not part of a larger national discussion, and even when the issues are
discussed the community’s voices are not an important part of such discussion. As ideological
cueing misses large segments of the electorate -segments that are expected to increase as a share
of the population- its utility as a heuristic, a shortcut, helping people sort political information is
diminished.
The Two-Dimensional (Economic/Social) Liberal-Conservative Continuum
Ellis and Stimson (2012) echo Hunter (1991) and Frank (2004), when they argue that today’s
debates in American politics are not only about matters of spending and resources, as suggested
by the traditional liberal-conservative continuum. Instead, there is a social and moral dimension
of ideology, regarding policies that deal with the family, sexual behavior and other aspects that
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are related to religious belief. Indeed, Ellis and Stimson (2012) argue that much of what they call
ideological “mismatching” is the result of people who hold liberal policy positions but call
themselves conservatives for religious reasons.
Recent scholarship by Noel (2014) pinpoints the origins of the current American ideological
spectrum to the early-to the mid-twentieth century. This process was slow, but it consisted of the
convergence of different streams of American political thought. As a reaction to growing
corporate power, the Progressive Movement proposed some ideas regarding using the power of
government to help people (Noel 2014). While the idea was not necessarily novel, this idea
blossomed during the beginning of the twentieth century and eventually led to the New Deal,
which used the power, and the resources, of the government to mitigate the effects of the Great
Depression and establish a permanent safety net for people in need. Noel's narrative also fits
Ellis and Stimson's (2012) theory that to understand contemporary ideology in American politics,
it is necessary to explore it in two dimensions — economic and social.
Noel (2014) argues that there are different kinds of conservatism and liberalism. The usual
debates about the role and size of government, as well as its involvement in the economy now
have a second dimension regarding moral and social politics. Being a “liberal” in contemporary
American politics not only means being in favor of using the power of government to improve
the material lives of people. It also means supporting an array of social policies under the flag of
civil rights that include equal rights for racial and ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians, and
reproductive rights for women. As Carmines and Stimson (1989) demonstrate, issues of civil
rights, as they relate to race started to become a “wedge” issue in the 1960s as partisan elites
debated these issues in the national spotlight and racial issues became salient for masses to take
into account in their political preferences.
10

Being a “conservative” in America today not only means favoring a smaller government with
lower taxes and little spending on services (as well as a strong military) but also means opposing
the application of equal rights to some or all the aforementioned groups on the grounds of
tradition, often religious tradition, which views the behaviors of some groups like gays and
lesbians as anathema to religious moral tradition. This conflation of issues in different
dimensions has consequences for the ideological views of the mass public, who may not have
constrained ideologies because they may be liberal on one issue domain and conservative on
another. In the case of Latinos, they are assumed to have issues conflated in different
dimensions, as their religiosity pulls them in a conservative direction on social and moral issues,
but their socioeconomic conditions push them in a liberal direction on economic matters
(Abrajano, Michael Alvarez, and Nagler 2008). Latinos’ ideological mismatching in turn will
affect how their partisan preferences are interpreted as partisan elites become more ideologically
homogenous.
Ideology and Political Parties
The contemporary definition of ideology brings together different kinds of liberalism and
conservatism under the flag of the two major political parties, which serve as intermediary
groups that link citizens to government by providing policy options linked to ideological goals
(Aldrich 1995). It was possible in the not so far past to hold conservative views on social or
moral issues and want a greater role of government in the economy, or vice versa. Thus, Richard
Nixon could be simultaneously in favor of conservative “law and order” measures to deal with
issues of civil rights, while also supporting the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency,
a favorite target of contemporary conservatives as a business-crushing regulator. The ideological
ambiguity of parties was, according to Downs (1957), the result of party competition, in which
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the preferences of the median voter were crucial as a way of winning elections, which is the
raison d’être of political parties.
For example, to the New Deal coalition established during the 1930s, issues of civil rights were
of secondary importance, since their discussion could break up the Democrats' hold in the South
because white southerners overwhelmingly supported segregation (Lowndes 2008). When the
Democratic Party lost its Southern stronghold in 1964 due to its embrace of civil rights,
eventually the Republican Party garnered its current hold on the region by way of elite and mass
opinion change, what Carmines and Stimson (1989) attributed to a partisan realignment.
The transition from the Democratic “Solid South” to Republican stronghold was due, in part, to
the role of Republican elites in exploiting the rising racial tension in the South over segregation
and civil rights. The first salvo was the defection of South Carolina’s Strom Thurmond –a former
governor and then-US Senator– from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party following the
passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The bill was also opposed by the eventual Republican
Presidential nominee that year, Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater (Black and Black 2009, 33).
The partisan realignment in the South was further cemented by Richard Nixon’s 1968 campaign
based on the “Southern Strategy” of courting disaffected Southern voters over the issues of Civil
Rights and “law and order” (Black and Black 2009; Lowndes 2008; Perlstein 2010).
The rupture of the Solid South away from the Democratic Party and into the Republican Party
was instrumental in consolidating the liberalism and conservatism into each party, respectively,
as it is currently comprised. In other words, this consolidation was possible due to an “issue
evolution” (Carmines and Stimson 1989). When civil rights, initially for African Americans and
other racial and ethnic minorities, became a point of contention and debate in the American
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political discourse, these issues added a layer of complexity to the already complex ideology
debate. Liberalism and conservatism, hence, also entailed whether one was liberal (accepting) or
conservative (oppositional) about civil rights policies.
This ideology-party merge was possible thanks to elites driving the change and taking positions
that brought different kinds of liberalism and conservatism together (Noel 2014; Zaller 1992).
Race was not the only issue realigning the parties. The moral/social dimension also surged
thanks to the emergence of a Christian fundamentalist constituency within the conservative
coalition (Hunter 1991; Wilcox 1996). Led by figures such as Virginian pastors Jerry Falwell
and Pat Robertson, who founded the Moral Majority and the Christian Coalition, respectively,
Christians concerned about the legalization of abortion, the advancement of women’s rights, and
in more recent times, gay and lesbian rights, flocked to a Republican Party that catered to these
concerns. Particularly, white evangelical Protestants concentrated in the South became newer
members of the Republican party’s coalition (Green 2007; Martin 2005).
At the mass level, these elites communicated their position changes to their voters (Hetherington
2001). This means that elites have constrained ideologies because they define the issues that are
salient, and the masses do not process information in the same way; rather, the masses follow
cues from elites, as opposed to initiating them, because their ideological thinking functions
differently (Campbell et al. 1980; Zaller 1992).
Elites may be constrained in their ideology because they are the ones defining which issues are
salient, but this clarity is not present among the general public. Ellis and Stimson make the case
that, while elites have more consistent ideological views, the “nature of ideology is more
complicated” at the individual level (2012, 10). They argue that the complication occurs because
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many Americans “cling to conservative symbols while advocating liberal policies” (Ellis and
Stimson 2012, 11–12). For example, one of Ellis and Stimson’s explanations is that there is a
bias in favor of conservative identification, particularly among religious Americans, who see in a
conservative label a way of attaching themselves to the stability and timeliness of religion, but
whose political policy preferences do not necessarily align with those of conservative elites (see
Ellis and Stimson 2012 chapter 6; Feldman and Johnston 2013). This means that the onedimensional assessment of ideology along a liberal-conservative continuum is incomplete and
that, to account accurately for ideology, it is necessary to look at two dimensions—social and
economic domestic policy preferences. Many people are not consistent in their preferences along
a conservative and liberal continuum, and instead, have preferences that are liberal on one issue
and conservative on another issue.
To test their hypotheses Ellis and Stimson use trends from the General Social Survey, comparing
Americans’ responses on symbolic (or self-described) ideology and operational (or issues-based)
ideology. They find that only 15 percent of the public are consistent conservatives, meaning that
their symbolic ideology matches their operational ideology; interestingly, twice as many are
consistent liberals (30 percent) and a similar percentage, roughly 30 percent of Americans, are
ideological “mismatchers”: symbolically conservative but operationally liberal (Ellis and
Stimson 2012, 95–96). This is important, because, as shown in Figure 1.1 based on a 20-year
trend of ideological self-identification by Gallup, 38 percent of Americans identify as
conservative, but only 23 percent consider themselves to be liberal (J. M. Jones 2014)1. This

1

Although Gallup does not use the term symbolic, these figures are akin to a symbolic ideological identification in
Ellis and Stimison's definitions (2012).
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means that more people express their ideologies via liberal issue preferences than express their
identification as "liberal."
Figure1.1. Ideological Self-Identification among Americans 1993-2013
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Taking into account this context in which conservative identification is more popular than having
conservative positions on policy issues, Ellis and Stimson argue that “[a] conservative
identification thus indicates a belief in conservative religious traditions and a conservative
lifestyle, not necessarily a “conservative” political worldview” (Ellis and Stimson 2012, 133).
This bias toward conservative identification is combined with a bias against liberal
identification.
As their analysis shows, people are less willing to call themselves liberal even when holding
"liberal" positions on issues (Ellis and Stimson 2012, 96). As I discuss later with respect to
Latinos, the high levels of religious identification may influence how Latinos understand what it
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means to be a “conservative.” However, Ellis and Stimson’s conceptualization does not account
for how race affects racial and ethnic minorities' worldviews.
Race and Ideology Conceptualization: A Critique
The second definition of ideology is experiential. This definition focuses on how people interpret
their social and political surroundings and determine, to paraphrase Dawson (2001), who are
their allies and opponents and who should be assigned blame or credit, as far as addressing racial
disparities. Examples of this literature include Dawson (1994, 2001), Hajnal and Lee (2011), and
Harris-Lacewell (2004). This literature addresses ideology, as it is experienced by racial and
ethnic minorities in the United States, for whom the liberal-conservative continuum may be
irrelevant, as their main issues of concern are not often discussed by mainstream political elites,
especially from their frames of reference (Hajnal and Lee 2011).
One of the major limitations in the deconstruction of ideology undertaken by Ellis and Stimson
(2012) and Noel (2014) is that they do not address how race influences ideology. Noel
acknowledges the importance of race in the development of the contemporary ideological
cleavages in American politics and the different positions taken by conservatives and liberals in
the area of civil rights (Noel 2014, 45) but ignores the role that racial minorities played in those
debates and why specific issues regarding race made it into a mainstream ideological agenda.
Noel (2014) pinpoints the emergence of race as a major cleavage in American politics,
particularly the Democratic Party coalition after World War II, as previous analyses of the
historical development of ideology have pointed out (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Lowndes
2008; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006), but falls short of explaining how racial issues
become part of these cleavages, especially from the perspective of racial and ethnic minorities.
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Neither Ellis and Stimson (2012) nor Noel (2014) explore how this ideological disconnect affects
minorities, though they hint that minorities may be especially prone to have mismatched
ideological identities. As Carmines and Stimson (1989) explain, “[Senator Barry] Goldwater
combined opposition to federal activity in civil rights with the self-description “conservative.”
Gov. George Wallace clearly linked racial advocacy with “liberalism” in both elections”
(Carmines and Stimson 1989, 137). They find that ideological “[m]ismatchers are also
substantially younger, more likely to be in blue-collar professions, and more likely to be foreignborn” (Ellis and Stimson 2012, 106, emphasis added). Not surprisingly, these are characteristics
that identify many Latinos, who tend to be younger than the general population and who
comprise the bulk of the foreign-born population in the United States. 2
Latinos and Ideological Self-Identification
Latinos also possess other characteristics that make them more likely to be ideological
mismatchers. For one, they have higher levels of religious identification than Americans, overall
(Kosmin and Keysar 1995; Navarro-Rivera, Kosmin, and Keysar 2010). The religious bias
toward conservative identification may explain why Latinos, who by and large prefer
Democratic Party candidates, tend also to prefer a conservative or moderate label to a liberal one.
Figure 1.2 shows that Latinos are similarly likely to prefer a conservative identification to a
liberal one (27 percent vs. 23 percent). However, while half (50 percent) of Latinos identify as
Democrats, only 15 percent prefer the Republican Party (R. P. Jones, Cox, and Navarro-Rivera

2

According to an analysis by the Pew Research Center (Motel and Patten 2013), as of 2011, 36 percent of Latinos
are foreign-born, while 47 percent of all foreign-born residents of the United States are of Hispanic origin. Another
study by the Center (Motel and Patten 2012b) finds that Latinos (median age: 27 years) are significantly younger
than the general U.S. population (median age: 37 years).
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2013).3 These numbers suggest that many Latinos may have mismatched symbolic ideological
identification and issue preferences, given that their ideological identification does not neatly
overlay with the expected outcomes for their partisanship.

Figure 1.2. Ideological Self-Identification of Latinos, 2013
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Figure 1.2 also shows that nearly half (45 percent) of Latinos prefer the “moderate” label. This
preference for a “moderate” label may be because most Latinos identify religiously as Catholics
(Navarro-Rivera, Kosmin, and Keysar 2010; Pew Research Center Religion & Public Life
Project 2014), a group likely to feel cross-pressures between their views on social issues such as
same-sex marriage or abortion and their views on economic issues such as government aiding the
poor. These are issues in which the Catholic Church takes positions that cut across the
conventional liberal-conservative continuum (Matovina 2012) and suggests that ideology among

3

Although most Latinos vote Democratic, there is variation between groups. For example, according to Latino
Decisions in the 2012 Election 95 percent of Dominicans voted for Barack Obama, highest among all Latinos.
Majorities of Latinos of all nationalities voted for Obama with the exception of Cubans, 55 percent of whom voted
for Mitt Romney http://www.latinodecisions.com/2012-election-eve-polls/.
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Latinos could be better understood if measured in two distinct dimensions, as Ellis and Stimson
(2012) and Feldman and Johnston (2013) exhort.4
This may be due to Latinos having cross-pressures. On the one hand, Latinos have economic
interests that make them prefer a larger role of government in the economy, especially a strong
social safety net. On the other hand, Latinos’ religious beliefs tend to be conservative on
moral/social issues. Although recent evidence points out that while Latinos, especially religious
Latinos, are morally opposed to issues such as same-sex marriage and abortion, this moral
opposition does not mean they are opposed to others having those rights, since a majority of
Latinos favor allowing gays and lesbians to marry, and a plurality favors legal abortion (R. P.
Jones, Cox, and Navarro-Rivera 2013).
The electoral context is also important for understanding Latino political behavior. Latinos
participate in an American political system that oftentimes does not cater to their needs (Hajnal
and Lee 2011). This means that issues of importance to Latinos are not necessarily being
discussed by the two major political parties, and party elites or solutions to their unique problems
are not addressed in “mainstream” discourses.
Considering the importance of elites in shaping ideology (Noel 2014), this lack of representation
should affect what issues are relevant to Latinos and which ones make it onto the political
agenda. It also means that when Latinos overwhelmingly choose candidates of one party
(Democratic) over the other (Republican), it does not necessarily mean homogeneity of opinion.
Instead, it means that they have to choose from the limited options of a two-party system.
D’Antonio, Dillon, and Gauthier (2012) analyze the Catholic vote and partisanship and find that, as a group,
Catholics, while once a solid Democratic constituency, are now a “swing group.” However, there are major
differences between White and Latino Catholics, the latter slightly leaning toward Republicans and the latter solidly
Democratic.
4
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Moreover, understanding why Latinos behave like a voting bloc with a homogeneous opinion
requires moving away from a growing paradigm in Latino politics: the assumption of panethnicity—latinidad—because this view largely ignores internal debates in the community and,
possibly, dissenting views (Beltran 2010).
It is important to note that even taking a two-dimensional ideology model into account, there
may be issues relevant to Latinos (other than same-sex marriage, abortion, and religion) that may
be overlooked in the literature or in the extant public opinion research. This dearth of research
also may miss important information for assessing the relationship between Latinos and
partisanship. Most importantly, to date, there are no known studies on the substance of Latinos’
ideological thinking. Therefore, there is a dearth of information about what such thinking
comprises and its broader implications for Latino political behavior and politics.
Hajnal and Lee (2011) argue that the lower levels of partisan affiliation and the ideological
inconsistencies among Latinos may be due to a lack of familiarity with the political debates,
particularly among recent immigrants. These lower rates of party affiliation may be also due to
the two major political parties not addressing issues that Latinos care for, such as immigration, or
particular issues important to specific Latino groups, which may make it difficult for Latinos to
place themselves ideologically in the American political system (Hajnal and Lee 2011, 23–24).
In other words, because minority groups do not define the agenda-setting of parties or have a
strong influence on party elites, many feel left out and possibly detached from the two-party
system. Without elites ideologically framing issues that appeal to Latinos’ political and policy
preferences, Latinos also become further alienated from the political process in ways that can
affect how they process political information pertinent for ideological sophistication. This view,
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however, also proves problematic because it assumes that Latinos require ideological cueing
from mainstream elites to form their political opinions.
Hajnal and Lee’s arguments (2011) echo Dawson’s (2001). According to Dawson, an elite view
of ideology, thereby, considers that “the only groups capable of ideological thinking are the
educated and dominant elites” (Dawson 2001, 63–64, emphasis in original). The elite conception
of ideology is problematic for Dawson, since the abstract way in which ideology works in his
criticism of public opinion research renders the masses incapable of ideological thinking.
Dawson (2001) argues that the elite view of ideology renders most Americans, particularly
minorities, incapable of thinking ideologically.
In the case of Latinos, the elite view of ideology discounts the role of their life experiences with
the political system in shaping their political views. Otherwise, from the perspective of Latinos,
they may be thinking and organizing political information in experientially relevant ideological
frames, however, the elites have not yet responded to their ideological framing. In other words,
political elites may not be current enough on their constituents’ political demands to be
politically relevant and complex enough to capture Latinos’ worldviews.
Another problem with the traditional (liberal-conservative) view of ideology is that group
identification is not relevant to it. People are supposed to be liberal or conservative based on the
salient issues of the day. It seems as if policy preferences are taken only on their merits as far as
how they benefit people at an individual level without regard to who proposes them and how
they affect others. This is important because elites and the mass public have not only formed
different intellectual cues and abilities but also have acquired different resources that inform
their preferences.
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When race is added as a layer to these differences, it becomes clear that, as Ellis and Stimson
(2012) note, people and elites think about different things in regards to ideological labels. People
think about group identification: religion, society, traditions. As Pamela Conover notes “[p]eople
react to explicit and implicit group cues, group identification and consciousness influence on
how an individual structure its political thinking sympathy” (Conover 1988, 75). Conover and
Feldman (1984) also suggest that certain groups become readily identifiable with the politics of
specific policies and vice versa. This includes the nexus between social groups—especially racial
groups—and the political parties. Elites, however, think solely about policy.
And, there is evidence that ideological thinking among minorities does not fit the liberalconservative paradigm. Dawson (1994, 6–7), focusing on African Americans, argues that there
are ideological divisions within the African American community, which occur within the
context of African American history and politics. These debates include discussions about
integration toward the larger American society and how to pursue those goals politically and
economically. Moreover, these ideologies are not static, as they shift with and evolve according
to the times. In subsequent work Dawson (2001) explained black political behavior as stemming
from ideologies that, then, form political identity, next opinions, and subsequently, political
action. Furthermore, in a polis where race and racial conflict is an everyday reality, leaving race
outside the realm of ideological thinking leaves blacks, and in the case of Hajnal and Lee's
research (2011), Latinos and Asian Americans, incapable of ideological thought, at least in the
conventional sense of the concept.
Discerning how underrepresented groups in the United States understand American politics
requires researching how different groups think about American politics. Harris-Lacewell (2004)
follows up Dawson’s (2001) work by identifying four ideologies indigenous to contemporary
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black political thought (see Harris-Lacewell 2004, Chapter 3). These four ideologies (black
nationalism, liberal integrationist, black conservatism, and black feminism), while not exhaustive
(Harris-Lacewell 2004, 19) account for most of the different currents of debate within the
African American community, as far as solving socioeconomic disparities, that some may argue,
are oriented in American race and politics.
The study of distinctive black ideologies becomes particularly relevant in the context of the
American two-party system and its binary outcomes. As Harris-Lacewell (2004, 79) notes:
Overwhelming Democratic partisanship masks the internal contestation within black political
thought that is not discernable [sic] through the binary choices available in American elections,
making the heterogeneity within black opinion rarely visible. Black political diversity is unlikely
to emerge in electoral contexts; it is embedded instead in the politics of the black counterpublic.

This context is also relevant to Latinos, who increasingly show affinity for the Democratic Party.
However, in some ways, the political history of Latinos is different from the history of African
Americans in the United States. Latinos, for the most part, do not share a common history of
arrival to the U.S. (Gonzalez 2001). Moreover, their means of arrival or incorporation of the
populations into U.S. territory also vary as different immigration policies regulate how different
national groups are welcomed or rejected into the U.S. (Bedolla 2009). Nevertheless, African
American political ideologies become illustrative for studying ideologies because even with
these different origins, Latinos in every region of the country have experienced a history of
exclusion and discrimination and similar struggles to have their political and civil rights
recognized by the state.
With this reasoning, we should be guided by several inquiries: Is the predominate affinity
towards the Democratic Party evidence of Latino political homogeneity, or similar to Africans
Americans, do Latino voting patterns mask complex debates within the Latino community over
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politics, their place in American society, and their role in the American political system? These
inquiries are ones that guide my thoughts about explaining ideology among Latinos.
The Latino Counterpublic and the Contexts for Latino Political Ideology
I submit that these complex debates occur within the boundaries of what may be considered a
Latino counterpublic. This counterpublic is a “parallel discourse arena” (Fraser 1989, 123),
where Latinos espouse their views and alternative explanations regarding the society they live
based on their own experiences. This Latino counterpublic conveys messages about who is a
Latino, what issues are important to Latinos, and what it means to be a Latino. The messages of
the Latino counterpublic are transmitted through a Latino public sphere that include the Latino
media–legacy print newspapers and radio and television broadcasters and newer online platforms
in Spanish and English– and the everyday interactions of Latinos.
An interesting aspect of the Latino counterpublic, particularly of its media institutions, is their
role in reinforcing the multiple identities that Latinos have (Mora 2014). For example, listening
to a news broadcast in a Spanish-language radio or television station a Latino may be subjected
to three identity-related messages almost simultaneously. First, Latinos hear/watch news about
immigration or bilingual education, which sets the tone for a larger Latino political agenda and
stresses the salience of these issues to Latinos. Second, there is a roundup of news from Latin
American countries, meant to keep Latinos informed about the whereabouts in their home
countries. Finally, there may be a human-interest story about Latino homeowners, business
owners, or veterans, which transmits a message that Latinos belong in America and that Latinos
are also American with similar dreams, work ethnic, and patriotism expected of all Americans.
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These three aspects show that Latinos simultaneously receive messages that tell them that they
have (1) common interests, (2) that they have different origins, and (3) that they are a collectivity
as “Americans.” Depending on how Latinos assimilate these concurrent messages will emerge in
three Latino Ethno-Ideologies—pan-ethnic, co-ethnic, and ethnic—which relate to the extent of
attachment that Latinos have to one another and the American political system. In the next
chapter I provide a discussion of the theory that supports my study of Latino Ethno-Ideologies,
which I assert, are based on Latinos' shared culture and experiences in the complex world of the
Latino counterpublic and the navigation of latinidad.

25

Chapter 2: The Diversity of Latino Ideology: Culture, Beliefs, and Ideology
The previous chapter briefly reviewed the study of ideology in the contemporary American
political behavior. The focus of the chapter was introducing the reader to the problem of
measuring mass ideologies in American politics, especially when to many groups, such as racial
and ethnic minorities, these ideologies have little meaning in translating issues of major
importance to them in a political focal platform . In this chapter I continue that discussion by
focusing on how scholars of Latino politics have explained the increasing homogeneity of Latino
electoral politics through the lens of identity politics. Specifically, I criticize the view that the
cause for increasing political unity among Latinos is the result of a pan-ethnic identity formation,
in other words, that the homogenization of Latino political behavior is the result solely of most
Latinos identifying as “Latino” (or “Hispanic”) with a basis on latinidad or cultural and social
commonalities. In addition, I propose that Latino’s political behavior is informed both by
identity ideology (or ideologies) rooted in latinidad. I elaborate on my theory about this in this
chapter.
This chapter is divided into five main sections. The first section discusses the ideologypartisanship disconnect among African Americans and Latinos and the necessity of
understanding Latino politics through ideological lenses that are more sensitive to their
sociopolitical experiences. The second section introduces the concepts of latinidad, panethnicity, and Latino cultural homogeneity. The third section explains the importance of studying
ideology among Latinos. The fourth section consists of a critique of using identity as a harbinger
of a “unified” Latino politics. Finally, the fifth section introduces Latino Ethno-Ideologies and its
component parts: cultural traits, core beliefs, as well as demographic variation.
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Ideology, Partisanship, and Race in America
One of the examples of the disconnection between partisanship and ideology is the African
American vote. Black Americans have the highest levels of support for the Democratic Party of
any racial or ethnic group in the United States. According to a 2013 Gallup report, about twothirds of African Americans (64 percent) identify as Democrats (Newport 2013). According to
the 2012 Presidential Elections exit polls, 93 percent of African Americans voted to re-elect
Barack Obama (Ramirez 2012). Yet, a 2010 Gallup poll found that a significant share of African
Americans (29 percent) identify ideologically as conservative (J. M. Jones 2010). Such
ideological identification, ordinarily, would lead us to predict that approximately the same
percentage of African Americans would identify as “Republican” But in reality, just 2 percent do
(Newport 2013).
Scholars of African American politics have long been aware of this contradiction. It is clear that
when African Americans call themselves "conservatives," they are not thinking of “small
government” conservatism. Although conservatism refers to an ideology of black politics with a
very specific meaning rooted in long-standing debates about political action and the social and
political uplifting of African Americans (Harris-Lacewell 2004), conservatism may also mean
religious conservatism. The Black Church has a central place in African American social life,
and it is one of the spaces of the black counterpublic, where black people also have contested
exclusion and discrimination in broader society (Dawson 2001; Harris-Lacewell 2004). On many
issues related to human behavior, the church’s leaders have taken traditionalist positions that in
contemporary terms may be translated into conservative positions on social/moral matters,
particularly regarding sexuality (Berger 2006; Cohen 1999; Harris-Lacewell 2004). Thus, when
many African Americans say that they are conservative they may mean that they are religious
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traditionalists. This conflation of religious traditionalism is consistent with the findings by Ellis
and Stimson (2012) regarding “conservative identification” for Americans in general, who tend
to conflate religious traditionalism with ideological conservatism. This religious traditionalism,
however, has had little effect on their electoral preferences for the Democratic Party. This
contrasts with white evangelical Protestants, whose religious conservatism makes them the
largest cohort in the Republican coalition (Green 2007)
The Latino vote, however, is not as skewed toward the Democratic Party as the African
American vote. Still, 71 percent of Latinos voted for Barack Obama in 2012 (Ramirez 2012),
making it clear that Latinos are a heavily Democratic-leaning group. One important difference
between Latinos and African Americans is that Latinos have lower levels of Democratic Party
identification. Gallup also finds that Latinos are half as likely as African Americans (32 percent
vs. 64 percent) to identify as Democrats (Newport 2013). Latinos have slightly higher levels of
conservative self-identification (34 percent) than African Americans (29 percent) (J. M. Jones
2010). Yet, these higher levels of “conservatism” have not translated into stronger support for
Republican candidates or into a significant increase in Republican identification among Latinos.
This leaves an interesting puzzle to determine: How, if any, role does ideology play in
contemporary Latino political behavior?
Latinidad, Pan-ethnicity and Latino Cultural Homogeneity
As a result of these partisan voting trends and the rise in the numbers of Latinos running for and
being elected to political office, the scholarship on Latino political behavior has moved away
from the traditional understanding of Latino politics and moved toward an understanding of
Latinos’ terms of identity politics: as a distinct group with a collective pan-ethnic consciousness
rooted in latinidad.
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Pan-Ethnicity, the traditional study of Latino politics focused on the differences between the
various major Latino ethnic groups in the United States (L. R. Fraga et al. 2006; García Bedolla
2009) and an approach in which Latino-origin groups were treated as separate political
constituencies. Because of each group’s unique history and their geographical concentration in
particular parts of the country, it made sense to approach Latino politics as regionally-based
struggles (Marquez and Jennings 2000; Uhlaner and Garcia 1998). This means that the study of
Puerto Ricans was mostly about those in the Northeast, especially, the New York City metro
area; the study of Cubans concentrated in South Florida; and research about Mexican-Americans
confined to the Southwestern states.
In addition to the differences based in country of origin and ancestry, there are also differences in
the immigration status, socioeconomic characteristics such as class and voting patterns of these
different groups (García Bedolla 2009). For example, Puerto Ricans are US citizens by birth, not
subject to the travel restrictions required of travelers from other Latin American nations, with the
exception of Cubans who have benefitted from various preferential immigration policies as
refugees from Castro Communist-regime (García Bedolla 2009; Jennings 1988; Torres 1988). In
addition, Latinos vary considerably in their educational attainment, income, and other sociodemographic indicators. For example, while less than 1-in-10 (7 percent) Salvadorans living in
the U.S. have a college degree, nearly one-third (32 percent) of Colombians are college
graduates (Motel and Patten 2012a). Given this diversity, it made sense understanding Latino
politics as the study of different groups under an umbrella term, “Latino.”
The umbrella term, “Latino,” has become a more unifying way of understanding the interactions
among these groups, many from different nations of origin. As the Mexican, Puerto Rican and
Cuban populations have spread to other geographical areas, contact among different groups has
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increased, leading to potential political coalitions between members of the different nationalities
(Gutiérrez 2013; Manzano and Ura 2013; Mora 2014). The increase in the numbers of national
origin groups such as Salvadorans, Guatemalans and Dominicans (Lopez and Gonzalez-Barrera
2013; Motel and Patten 2012b), who have established themselves in areas where previous Latino
groups had previously settled, has also increased the need for understanding how Latinos interact
with each other, especially in the building of coalitions.
The rising numbers of Latino voters are also contributing to the increasing number of Latinos
elected to political office (M. Barreto 2010; Casellas 2010). The creation of national
organizations such as the National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO) and the
Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC) fostered an environment in which a national Latino
agenda could be debated (Mora 2014). Combining the numbers of all Latino groups seemed like
a great idea strategically speaking, since community and group leaders can use this larger
constituency to demand government action, particularly, at the national level.
The latest wave of scholarship on Latino politics now focuses on the emergence of a pan-ethnic
identity –the formation of a Latino identity that transcends national and ethnic origin and
suggests a sense of kinship and unity among Latinos. Scholars like Abrajano (2010), Barreto
(2010), and Sanchez (Manzano and Sanchez 2010; Sanchez 2006a, 2006b, 2008) have pioneered
the study of Latino political behavior from a pan-ethnic perspective. Borrowing from the African
American politics literature, particularly Michael Dawson’s work on black linked fate (Dawson
1994, 2001), research on pan-ethnicity focuses on the role of Latino identity in their political
behavior, especially in the areas of vote choice and electoral mobilization.
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The body of research focusing on pan-ethnic identity is useful to understand the increasing
visibility of Latino voters in national elections, particularly, given the purported importance of
the Latino vote in presidential and congressional elections (Leal et al. 2005). It also reflects the
apparent creation of a common Latino identity as an outgrowth of different national-origin
groups comprising this diverse ethnic label based on increased contact among different types of
Latinos (Gutiérrez 2013).
One limitation of this literature is its focus on political participation such as turnout in national
elections and voting. For example, Barreto's Ethnic Cues (2010) explores the role of shared
ethnicity in Latino participation and how Latinos use information of candidates’ ethnic
background as a shortcut for political interests. However, there is little focus on behavior such as
attitudes or positions on issues which would be more meaningful for the examination of
ideological subscription among Latinos. This focus on understanding voter turnout and
participation accentuates a stereotype of Latinos as a commonly-grouped "swing vote."
Public opinion data among Latinos show that, on some issues, there is wide agreement. Recently,
the main issue uniting Latinos has been their support for a comprehensive immigration reform
bill. Pollsters, asking questions with varied wording have found that Latinos tend to support a
path to citizenship for immigrants who entered the country as undocumented persons (Latino
Decisions 2014; Public Religion Research Institute 2013). Other issues in which these polls also
find high levels of agreement among Latinos include their support for an increase in the
minimum wage and their worry about the educational system. These are issues that affect
Latinos due to their social class status, their being more likely to have school-age children, and
their being more likely to earn lower wages than most Americans (Fry and Lopez 2012;
Kochhar 2014).
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Latinos may show high levels of agreement on many issues and in their voting patterns in
Presidential Elections, but it does not mean there is no thought diversity among them. For
example, Cuban Americans are more likely to support Republican candidates than Latinos
overall, a link that dates back to the strong anti-communist stances of the GOP regarding the
Castro regime (Geron and Michelson 2008; Torres 1988; Uhlaner and Garcia 1998). In contrast
Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans are more likely to support the Democratic Party, partially
due to their historically stronger support for civil rights and economic rights (Marquez and
Jennings 2000; Meléndez 2003; Uhlaner and Garcia 1998). These differences in socioeconomic
status suggest that Latinos have diverse economic interests. With this diversity of interest, it is
very difficult to fathom why Latinos have such increasingly homogeneous voting behavior, when
an understanding of ideology in the traditional liberal-conservative sense should suggest that
their voting patterns should be more “bipartisan,” and hence, less lopsided toward one party.
These important differences make it hard to reconcile the appearance of a unified Latino identity
with political consequences.
While the literature on Latino political behavior borrowed the concept of linked fate from the
African American politics literature, the focus of the literature has been primarily on Latino
identity –whether Latinos identify themselves as “Latinos” or “Hispanics.” It is worth noting,
that Latinos still prefer to identify with the nomenclature premised upon their countries of origin
or ancestry, and the way Latinos identify themselves should provide clues as to the possibility of
political cohesion (Garcia and Sanchez 2008, 12).
The literature on Latino pan-ethnicity, however, has largely overlooked the example of Dawson
(2001) and Harris-Lacewell (2004), who explore various ideological currents that exist in black
political thought. In other words, although African-American voters form a nearly homogeneous
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voting bloc because of their overwhelming support for Democratic Party candidates, this
electoral homogeneity should not be confused with homogeneity of interests, ideas, or hence,
ideological perspectives. Thus, we should not assume a similar homogeneity of interests or ideas
for Latino voters, either. Instead, I propose that latinidad informs distinct Latino ideologies, and
it is this ideological diversity that helps Latinos navigate the political system.
Why Study Ideology among Latinos?
The nature of a two-party political system blurs the nuances of Latinos’ political decisions as far
as voting behavior and issue preference and salience. In the study of African American ideology,
the importance of allies and enemies is rooted in a common history, first slavery, followed by
segregation and other forms of systemic discrimination (Dawson 2001; Harris-Lacewell 2004).
Thus, these ideologies act as a way of discerning how and with whom to create alliances,
depending on the respective ideologies’ views of cooperation with whites and other groups. For
Latinos, these ideologies comprise common cultural traits shared by many Latinos and core
beliefs based on their experience of life in America, which are the basis of latinidad.
Moreover, given the fact that Latinos’ ideological outlooks are not constrained along the
traditional liberal-conservative continuum, it begs the question of how Latinos make their
political decisions. Considering the increasingly skewed voting margins in favor of Democratic
candidates (Lopez and Taylor 2012), combined with low levels of trust toward both parties –
especially low toward the Republican Party– (R. P. Jones, Cox, and Navarro-Rivera 2013), and
that many issues important to Latinos are not addressed by opinion elites (Hajnal and Lee 2011),
there is a case to be made that Latinos have ideological inclinations based on their common
culture and social experiences.
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Forming a Pan-ethnic Identity
Previous quests for understanding pan-ethnicity tend to focus on identity. Louis DeSipio (1996)
submitted a theory of pan-ethnic identity consisting of several building blocks divided in two
major themes: (1) cultural and economic linkages and (2) mandated common ethnicity and
statutory roles for ethnicity. The cultural and economic linkages affect Latinos in a personal way.
Latinos have a sense of kinship because they share cultural linkages like the Spanish language,
food or religion, and the shared experience of immigration.
Language and Immigration
The principle of the cultural and economic linkages among Latinos is language, in this case
Spanish, which DeSipio thinks brings Latinos together because, even if there are Latinos who do
not speak the language, they still have the experience of dealing with the language and witness
the discrimination that their elders have suffered for its use (DeSipio 1996, 179). In other words,
language serves as a bridge that unites generations.
This is a role that immigration also plays. He argues that most Latinos share the experience of
immigrating to the United States in some way or another. This experience provides a link
between different nationalities within the Latino community, who despite their differences, share
this experience. In addition, Latinos have economic linkages due to the fact that most Latinos
have a similar lower- or working- class background.
Mandated Common Ethnicity
These characteristics are complemented by a mandated common ethnicity and a statutory role for
ethnicity and language. These come from protections for Latinos in the Voting Rights Act of
1975 (which provided voting protections for language minorities), the U.S. Census
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categorization of Hispanics, elite efforts to build a Latino identity, common public policy needs
and concerns, and geographic overlap. The state-mandated common identity has encouraged
Latinos to form a pan-ethnic identity. An official characterization in the Census provided elites
with a larger national constituency on behalf which to advocate and be accountable.
History of Discrimination
DeSipio (1996) argues that experiences of discrimination also lead to a potential political unity.
However, his analysis of the 1990 Latino National Survey does not find evidence that Latinos
feel individually discriminated against. Thus, DeSipio argues that it is the perception of
discrimination, rather than the experience of it that matters (1996, 181–182).
The Limitations of Pan-ethnicity as an Identity
One of the limitations in DeSipio’s (1996) theory is that all of its elements lead to unity. DeSipio
is not alone in this regard. Overall, the quest for pan-ethnicity, as a driver of Latino political
behavior, tends to minimize the well-known nuances as far as national origin, language, and
generations removed from immigration-–to mention some–and to maximize the effect of
perceived common characteristics among Latinos. Yet, aside from this common identity based
on shared culture and history of discrimination, the literature has not examined nor determined
what drives Latinos’ collective identity.
A recent study by Lavariega Monforti (2014) tests the assumptions put forth by DeSipio (1996).
Her analysis consists of understanding the label preferences for Latino identification. These
respondents, from the 2006 Latino National Survey, primarily identify as "Latinos" rather than as
members of a national group or just being “American.” Respondents who identified as "Latinos,"
tend to be persons who speak Spanish, have a mixed racial background, and have a more recent

35

immigration experience. Thus, Lavariega Monforti argues that DeSipio was mostly right in his
prediction and concludes that pan-ethnicity–the terms “Latino” and “Hispanic”– are socially and
politically important concepts because the perception of group identity, she argues, impacts the
building of coalitions among Latinos.
While this is an important step in understanding pan-ethnicity beyond an assumption of its
existence, the existence of this cohort that identifies with a pan-ethnic identity does not
inadvertently explain why the political behavior of Latinos should show signs of pan-ethnic
unity. Moreover, measuring those who mention they identify as Latino or Hispanic can be a little
problematic because many Latinos prefer both the pan-ethnic label and their own national label.
Thus, while admitting that it may be important to have a pan-ethnic identity, this is not a
sufficient condition for having or opposing a pan-ethnic ideology.
The Multiplicity of Latino Identities
The main limitation of this line of research and the theory of pan-ethnicity in general, is that it
places most of its emphasis on the usage of a pan-ethnic identity. Not only is identity the
cornerstone of pan-ethnicity, but an identity that should supersede all other identities. This is
problematic because measuring pan-ethnicity using a pan-ethnic identifier assumes that only by
clinging to the labels “Hispanic” or “Latino” is the way to forge or embrace a pan-ethnic political
agenda.
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Figure 2.1. The Overlapping Latino Identities: Preferred Primary Identity among Latinos and
Percentage of Latinos who Consider each Identity to be “Important” or “Very Important”
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Note: “Pan-ethnic” means identification as “Hispanic” or “Latino,” “National Origin” means identification as
“Mexican,” “Puerto Rican,” “Salvadoran,” etc.

As Figure 2.1 shows, using data from the 2006 Latino National Survey, roughly similar
percentages of Latinos prefer the pan-ethnic labels “Hispanic” or “Latino” as their primary
Latino identity (38 percent) as they prefer a label based on national origin, such as “Mexican” or
“Puerto Rican” (40 percent). To further show how these identities coexist, among the 40 percent
of Latinos who prefer a national origin identifier, 90 percent also consider themselves “Latino”
or “Hispanic.” By the same token, 84 percent of those who primarily identify with the pan-ethnic
labels “Hispanic” or “Latino” also identify with their own national origin labels. This is also true
for Latinos who prefer to call themselves “American.” Eighty-two percent of Latinos who prefer
to call themselves “American” also identify as a “Latino” or “Hispanic.” This means that panethnic labels are not necessarily superseded by national origin labels but that these can coexist
with each other.
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An emphasis on identity considers that a primary identification as a Latino or Hispanic is the
precursor for an identity politics which could be the basis for political action. I argue that using a
pan-ethnic label is not a sufficient condition to have a sense that Latinos share characteristics and
political realities that make them their closest allies in the American political system.
Another example of the variation of ethnic labels and self-identification among Latinos comes
from the Hispanic Trends Project of the Pew Research Center, which has conducted an annual
National Survey of Latinos since 2002. Their most recent survey, conducted in 2013, finds that
only one-in-five Latinos prefer to primarily identify as “Hispanic” or “Latino.” Most Latinos do
not prefer a pan-ethnic label, preferring instead their country of origin label as their preferred
form of ethnic identification. This finding has led to alarmist headlines from Pew itself,
replicated in Latino-oriented media, that Latinos “do not consider themselves to be Latino”
considering that, as mentioned above, the prerequisite of being part of a survey of Latinos is selfidentification as Hispanic or Latino.
The misconception that pan-ethnic identification is a necessary harbinger of pan-ethnic politics
extends to the pundit class. A recent example comes from a 2013 report by Third Way which
argues that “the “Hispanic” and “Asian” labels are not applicable to these communities. Less
than one-quarter of Hispanics primarily use the label “Hispanic” or “Latino.” [...] Rather, they
are likely to identify based on their ancestral country of origin or simply call themselves
Americans” (Diggles 2013, 24).
One takeaway from the manner or the preferred term that Latinos have to identify themselves is
that much of the difference is a matter of emphasis. We do not know the reasons for why people
prefer to use a particular identity. Are they living in mainly homogeneous communities where
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the label you use matters little? Do they live in diverse communities with Latinos from different
origins where a national label provides a marker of pride and difference but not necessarily to
denote disdain for other Latinos? These questions are outside of the scope of this project, but it
should be worth exploring in the future if context, place, or time are related to Latinos’ selfidentification.5
Identity and Culture
While labels and self-identification are ways for measuring Latino pan-ethnic attachments,
cultural attachments are also important. DeSipio's theory of pan-ethnicity (DeSipio 1996)
includes several aspects he considers to be cultural, primarily language and a collective
immigration experience. Yet, the nature of this culture remains fuzzy. Rather than culture, the
literature introduces selected cultural attributes such as a deep religiosity rooted in Catholicism
(Abrajano and Alvarez 2011; Lee and Pachon 2007; Matovina 2012), traditional family values
that stem from those religious values (Abrajano, Michael Alvarez, and Nagler 2008; Garza and
Cortina 2007), and the aforementioned usage of Spanish (DeSipio 1996; Robinson 2002), which
become linking commonalities among Latinos. Or, other times, pan-ethnicity is brought upon by
a network of media sources that cater to them (Abrajano 2010; Mora 2014). What all these
characteristics have in common is that these traits only lead to unity and commonality, without
addressing the pitfalls of defining a common identity based on cultural traits that can vary from
person to person, not to mention from Latino-origin group to group.

5

See Wong, Janelle et al. 2011. Asian American Political Participation: Emerging Constituents and Their Political
Identities. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, where they entertain similar inquiries about ethnicity, race,
immigration and political participation

39

Contesting this search for unity is one of the arguments behind Cristina Beltran’s (2010) pathbreaking book The Trouble with Unity. While scholars of Latino politics are quick to point out
that there are differences within the Latino community, the importance of unity still overshadows
any claim of diversity. Beltran argues “the impulse toward civic Latinidad is based on the belief
that racism, racial identity, and class create ties and obligations that exceed and challenge the
language of self-interest” (Beltran 2010, 127). Politically, Latino identity should supersede any
other identity: national, religious, linguistic, gender, racial. In other words, there is little space for
intersectionality of ethnicity with other identities. Yet, as previously seen in Figure 2.1 (page 36),
primary identification with a pan-ethnic label or with a national label does not eschew other
identities. But how does a Latino identity become politicized? It does so by becoming ideologies
based on Latinos' commonalities and shared experiences.
Identity vs. Ideology
Beyond Beltran’s critiques of unity as a genesis of political incorporation of Latinos, there is
another critique that I put forth as far as “Latino identity” and ideology. While culture is
supposed to unite Latinos, this culture works like an invisible force that binds the community.
We know it is there, we sense it is there. Yet, we do not know how to explain this culture,
especially when culture is only a uniting force that does not take into account the differences in
culture among Latinos. For, example, what happens with Latinos who do not speak Spanish or
those who are not Catholic? Do they somehow fall out of the "Latino" fold?
With regards to language, DeSipio (1996) washes away the concerns about non-Spanish
speaking Latinos not being able to relate to the culture by saying that these Latinos (non-Spanish
speakers) understand the discrimination their ancestors have faced. This line of reasoning
suggests that DeSipio considers discrimination based on language (or perceived discrimination)
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as the binging agent, not the language itself. DeSipio makes a similar argument about
immigration. Despite the diversity of immigration or migration experience, different levels of
reception or legality of travel, this experience should create a bond. However, we know that
language and immigration experiences vary. That there are debates over the importance of
language as a way to keep an identity or to blend into the larger American society (De Genova
and Ramos-Zayas 2004) and that the immigration experience is not the same for all Latinos who
fare different government policies and, hence, different political experiences, given their arrival
to the United States from different nations (Gonzalez 2001).
The “common culture” referred to in the Latino politics literature has its roots in latinidad, or the
cultural commonality that encompasses Latino/Hispanic identity attempting to create a coherent
Latino constituency out of a historically, racially, and nationally diverse group of people (Beltran
2010; Connaughton 2004; Dávila 2001, 2008; Subervi-Velez 2008).
One of the problems of using culture as a way of explaining increasing pan-ethnic behavior in
Latino politics is that, through the lenses of latinidad, Latino voters can be both a homogeneous
bloc and a swing vote. For example, Dávila (2008) argues that in the aftermath of the 2004
Presidential elections, when a record share (44%) of Latinos reportedly voted for Republican
George W. Bush, and in the 2008 Elections when a percentage closer to the historical norm
(31%) voted for Republican John McCain, Latino “values” were invoked as the common cause
for this ebb and flow of Republican support. In 2004 the conservative religiosity of Bush
resonated with the also religiously-conservative Latino voters, while McCain’s, then, antiimmigration stance was perceived as a threat to the community. In other words, latinidad
suggested that Latino voters can be influenced depending on how the political parties push
particular cultural buttons, even though those buttons may be ill-defined (Dávila 2008, 61).
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Those cultural values that bind Latinos together are just platitudes, a narrative that gives an
amorphous group of Americans their own origin story: the Latinos’ Mayflower. Like any origin
story, there is some kernel of truth, but it is subject to exaggeration.
Dávila’s (2008) criticism of the construction of latinidad as an ambiguous concept and Beltran’s
(2010) criticism of latinidad as a political strategy with serious limitations resonate with my
criticism of pan-ethnicity as a tool for understanding Latino political behavior because it papers
over important differences among Latinos. Not only differences are papered over, but also in
some cases, traits such as language and religion can be as divisive as they can unite. In other
words, we have to account for the fact that even with more unified politics, there is still diversity
among Latinos, even in the way that their political choices are made.
For these reasons, following Harris-Lacewell’s (2004) work on African American ideologies, I
posit that Latino electoral outcomes are a reflection of choices made in the context of a binary
party system and not the reflection of an increasing homogenization of Latino interests or points
of view. In other words, I posit that there are distinct Latino ideologies. Latinos and Latino
voters have diverse views on the role of government and their place (as Latinos) in American
society, even if these views increasingly converge within one political party, which in recent
elections has been the Democratic Party. I argue that Latinos’ views on the role of government
and their place (as Latinos) in American society comprise the bulk of Latino ideologies.
The problem lies in disentangling the complexity of a collective identity when there are swaths
of Latinos for which collective identity may not resonate. How can Latinos show a sense of
collective identity and fate based on a culture so abstract that it defies definition and yet, when it
is clearly defined, leaves out swaths of Latinos? I argue that to solve this dilemma we need to
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understand Latino ideology, but untangling this ideology requires moving away from the
traditional conservative/liberal continuum in American Politics. These ideological differences are
rooted in their cultural traits, some of which are shared by many Latinos, but many others of
which are not shared. Some Latinos may possess all of these traits, while some may exhibit none
of them and still call themselves “Latinos.” This diversity of cultural traits will be reflected in
beliefs regarding the importance of their identity, how to relate to other Latinos and other groups,
how they relate to their homelands, and their attitudes toward core American values. The
ideological framing of these beliefs also reflects the extent to which Latinos are more willing to
identify with a larger, Latino group (pan-ethnic), with Latinos but in a selective way, either
politically or socially (co-ethnic—arguably feel closer to their own co-nationals), or just
acknowledge their heritage without feeling close to the larger group (ethnic). Thus, Latino
identity(ies), themselves, comprise ideological perspectives about Latinos' sociopolitical
presence in the United States.
A Theory of Latino Ethno-Ideologies
Borrowing from Harris-Lacewell’s (2004) model of “everyday black talk,” I argue that Latino
ideologies are rooted in Latino culture and beliefs. Unlike the assumptions from the pan-ethnic
model of understanding Latino behavior, I argue that Latino culture is not homogeneous and,
instead, consists of different traits, each of which affect how Latinos think about their place in
American society.
While Latinos may have different opinions about policy preferences and the role of government,
they also understand how their lives in America are intertwined. It is this aspect that allies are
needed, and those with similar struggles make the best allies. Latinos see other Latinos as allies
because they share some cultural affinities that facilitate their communication. But, they also
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share a place in American society, they not only have similar cultural backgrounds, but also
similar socioeconomic backgrounds, and they share beliefs about their place in America.
I argue that there are four main Latino cultural traits: (1) Catholicism (2) language usage (3)
Latino-centered media consumption and (4) the role of family. Alongside these cultural traits
there are five core beliefs: (1) tradition (2) link to ancestry (3) linked fate to other Latinos (4)
attitudes toward other groups in American society, and (5) attitudes toward the United States.
These five core beliefs affect the three distinct Latino Ethno-Ideologies: co-ethnic, pan-ethnic,
and ethnic. I explain this process in more detail below (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1. Latino Ethno-Ideologies
Demographic Controls
1. Sex
2. Age
3. Education
4. Ancestry
5. Immigrant generation
6. Citizenship status

Ethnic

1.
2.
3.
4.

Inputs
Cultural Traits
Catholicism
Everyday language
use
Spanish news media
consumption
Transnational family
connections

Ideologies (Outputs)
Pan-ethnic

1.
2.
3.
4.

Core Beliefs
Importance of
identity
Desire to return
Linked fate
Attitudes toward
other racial
minorities
Attitudes toward
core American
values
Co-ethnic

Demographic characteristics
Characteristics such as country of ancestry, immigrant generation, social class, age, and
education may affect the political views of Latinos, even among those from the same national
background. Some differences should be expected from these demographic characteristics. For
example, it is known that Latinos who live in suburbs and tend to be of higher economic status
tend to support Republicans at higher levels (Leal et al. 2005).
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Cultural Traits
Although there are many traits that can be considered part of Latino culture, there are four that
appear often in the politics literature. These are religion, language usage, media consumption,
and the role of the family. Below, I explain the importance of these four traits to this study.
Catholicism
Catholicism is a trait historically shared by most Latinos, as a result of being colonized by the
Spanish Empire from the 16th to the 19th centuries. For this reason, identification with the
Roman Catholic Church is considered a common trait among Latinos (F. C. Garcia and Sanchez
2008), and it is one of the traits that is most emphasized by Latino marketers and political
consultants as a way to reach Latinos and conjure an image of unified latinidad (Dávila 2001,
2008). Recently, scholarship and public opinion surveys have noted a decline in Catholicism
among Latinos, and this has been attributed to two competing forces: Protestant religions,
especially evangelical Protestantism and a rise in the number and proportion of Latinos who do
not identify with any religious tradition (DeSipio 2007; Jones, Cox, and Navarro-Rivera 2013;
Kosmin and Keysar 1995; Navarro-Rivera, Kosmin, and Keysar 2010). Thus, Latinos are less
alike in terms of religions than often assumed.
The assumption is that Catholicism is a quintessential Latino trait and that non-Catholic Latinos
are influenced by an “Americanization” impulse. In other words, leaving Catholicism is a move
toward “acculturation” and assimilation into American society. This view ignores the fact that,
for generations, many Latinos have practiced other forms of Christianity that are not linked to
Catholicism, and there are others that have never practiced Catholicism yet still consider
themselves to be Latinos (Sánchez-Walsh 2003).
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The religious differences among Latinos are not only limited to identity: they are also political.
While most Latinos identify as Democrats, Latino Protestants, especially those who identify as
born-again or evangelical Christians, are more likely to identify as Republican than other Latinos
and to vote for Republican Presidential candidates than Latinos, overall (R. P. Jones, Cox, and
Navarro-Rivera 2013; Lee and Pachon 2007; Martinez, Hernandez, and Peña 2012).
In a survey of religion among Latinos of the same ethnic identification, the Pew Research Center
(Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life and Pew Hispanic Center 2007) asked whether Latinos
prefer to identify themselves based on their country of origin, Americanness, or a pan-ethnic
identifier but also included an option to say whether Latinos preferred their religion as a primary
identifier. Only 16 percent of Latinos mentioned their religion as their main identifier, compared
to other national or ethnic ones.
The distribution of that 16 percent who preferred the religion identifier is telling. More than onequarter (27 percent) of Latino evangélicos preferred their religion as their primary identification- nearly twice as likely as Latino Catholics (14 percent) and nonreligious Latinos (nine percent).
Overall, 25 percent of those who preferred the religious label were evangélicos, although only 15
percent of Latinos were evangélico at the time of the survey. This further shows the complicated
nature of Latino identity. For many, a religious label may take precedence sometimes over a
national one and still feel part of a larger Latino community.
Differences in religious identification and practice should not be considered signs of
acculturation among Latinos, but rather another layer of cultural diversity. It should not be
assumed that religion is only a unifying aspect of Latino culture, but we must acknowledge that
there are important and significant differences between Latinos in this area. These differences
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should affect how Latinos view other Latinos and affect Latino linked fate, particularly, if they
worship in churches where most congregants are from the same nationality, or mostly Latinos, or
a diversity of races.
Religious differences can also cause disunion and resentment. This was a common theme among
Protestant and Nonreligious Latino participants in the focus groups that were part of the 2013
Hispanic Values Survey. 6 One of the topics of discussion in the focus groups was which
characteristics they considered important to their identity as Latinos. Religion was among these
characteristics, and Catholics gave religion a higher ranking as part of their Latino identity than
both Protestants and the Nonreligious. Protestant and Nonreligious Latinos resented the fact that
many people expected them to be Catholic. Some Protestants belonging to Pentecostal churches
and who believe that Catholicism is a “false religion” were adamant in their rejection of religion
as part of their Latino identity. Thus, it is necessary to consider that religion can also create
tensions that affect visions of latinidad, especially when one of those religions (Catholicism) is
considered the authentic view of Latino identity. This means that religion–Catholicism–may not
be a major cultural force fostering Latino unity, especially feelings of commonality.
Everyday Language Use
The Spanish language is considered a thread that keeps families together across generations (F.
C. Garcia and Sanchez 2008). According to DeSipio (1996), it is the cornerstone of panethnicity. Yet, many Latinos do not speak the language, a fact that is more pronounced among
younger Latinos (Lopez and Gonzalez-Barrera 2013b), and this suggests that the language may
not be a completely unifying force.

6

Public Religion Research Institute, Hispanic Values Survey, September 2013.
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In this regard bilingual Latinos become an important bridge in fostering latinidad between those
who are Spanish monolinguals and those who are English monolinguals. Negrón (2014) shows
how latinidad is forged in conversations among Latinos of different national backgrounds.
Latinos who are uncertain of the background of other Latinos invoke latinidad as a way to signal
a “non-specific Latino identity” (Negrón 2014, 4). This means that Latinos use latinidad as a way
of letting other Latinos know that they have similarities, whether it is for participating in
organizations, or for business purposes. Negrón argues that, while the focus of the latinidad
literature is on its potential political repercussions, little is known about how it is forged. Her
research shows that unity and familiarity must be built and negotiated before it can presume any
alliance with political overtones, and while that language can serve as a force for unity, it is a
complex process. In other words, language unites not just because people speak or understand it
but also because people can use it for a common purpose.
Yet, language can also prove to be divisive. Younger Latinos are less likely to use the language.
This suggests that Latinos could have differences in their beliefs about their place in American
society and to whom they should relate to, according to their use of the language, which should
also affect how important they consider this trait as part of their Latino identity. Research by
DeGenova and Ramos-Zayas (2004) shows that not only knowing the language is important, but
also knowing it well. Their research identifies conflict between Latinos (Puerto Rican and
Chicano) in Chicago between those who are fluent in Spanish and those who are not. The nature
of the conflict is partially the definition of who is a “legitimate Latino.” Hence, Spanish language
use sometimes can be recognized as a form of “Latino authenticity.”
Thus, in the same way that religion can be divisive so can be language. If language is considered
part of a tradition worth keeping among those who are fluent in Spanish and make those who do
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not speak Spanish feel less Latino, it will not work only as a force fostering latinidad, but one
that can bring disunion, as well. This disunion could affect the core beliefs, particularly, of
keeping traditions such as speaking Spanish and the potential translation of those beliefs into
political action. This means that it should be expected to find ideological differences between
Latinos who communicate in Spanish and those who primarily use English: the former will be
more likely to have a pan-ethnic ideology, while the latter will subscribe more co-ethnic and
ethnic ideologies because those who communicate in Spanish should value more the role of
Spanish unifying the community, particularly as they receive messages from the Spanishlanguage media.
Spanish Media Consumption
Spoken language is not the only way that Latinos use language to communicate. The language in
which Latinos consume their media, (particularly, radio and television, but also increasingly the
Internet) affects what Latinos think of each other. This media also affects which values Latinos
stress when making political decisions (Abrajano 2010). Latino-centered media has been
essential in the construction of latinidad (Dávila 2000, 2001; Mora 2014). It has been in
television and radio stations and in ethnic print media where many of the internal debates of the
Latino community take place, but one debate is essential to the Latino media: defining latinidad.
Mora (2014) narrates how in the late 1970s, Latino/Hispanic media such as the television giant,
Univision, were crucial in creating awareness among U.S. residents of Latin American-descent
that a new census category existed and why they should choose it. The same impulse for creating
a Hispanic/Latino market for statistical and marketing purposes led to targeted political
marketing to Hispanics/Latinos (Dávila 2008; Connaughton 2013; Abrajano 2010; SuberviVelez 2008).
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Spanish-language media is politically relevant for Latinos, since most of the political campaigns
aimed at attracting Latino voters are conducted in Spanish (Abrajano 2010; Dávila 2008).
Moreover, oftentimes these campaigns instead of addressing issues of importance to the country
are rife with platitudes and cultural cues (e.g. values such as faith, religiosity, and patriotism;See
Dávila 2008)). These culturally-laden political messages suggest that Latinos are a perennial
swing vote, always up for grabs, if the right cultural buttons are pushed (see Dávila 2008). This
means that political parties and candidates focus on appealing to values rather than politics:
policy does not attract Latino votes, but vague statements about values and family do.
Furthermore, the usage of Latino media affects how Latinos view other Latinos, a way of
fostering unity among those who consume these types of media.
Latino-oriented media has been instrumental in fostering latinidad, such as publicizing the
Hispanic/Latino option in the U.S. Census forms (Mora 2014) and providing political
information to Latinos who do not speak English (Abrajano 2010; Eshbaugh-Soha 2014). But, its
function in the fostering of latinidad is limited to the fact that many Latinos do not tune in to
their messages, in part, because of their being mostly English speakers who do not primarily
consume Spanish-language media (Pew Research Center 2012). It is in this context that language
usage and the language in which Latinos use media become important to Latino politics.
However, only a fraction of Latinos (18 percent) regularly consume Spanish-language media to
keep in touch with public affairs and news (Lopez and Gonzalez-Barrera 2013a). This means that
we should find variation among Latinos and major differences in ideology between those who
get their news from sources in Spanish and those who only get their news in English.
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Family Values
A cultural trait that is often mentioned as particularly "Latino" is the role of the family in
peoples' lives (Dávila 2001). Latinos are supposed to feel closer to their extended family and to
support relatives outside the country (Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation 2002). The
importance of family for Latinos has also been linked to their support for traditional family
values such as opposition to same-sex marriage (Ellison, Acevedo, and Ramos-Wada 2011),
which have been cited as reasons that Latinos could be potential swing voters between the two
parties (Dávila 2008; DeFrancesco Soto 2013). However, as with other traits, such as religiosity,
the impact of these values has been widely exaggerated. Latinos are as likely as the general
public to support same-sex marriage (R. P. Jones, Cox, and Navarro-Rivera 2013), and their
opposition to abortion is moderated by partisan identification (Navarro-Rivera 2012).
What does it mean to have strong “family values”? The term is often used by conservative
activists opposing policies such as allowing the legalization of same-sex marriage and abortion
(Abrajano and Alvarez 2011; Ellison, Acevedo, and Ramos-Wada 2011). The phrase is also used
to imply connections between different family generations across time and distance, and there is
some evidence to back this up. For example, Latino families are more likely to live in
multigenerational households than other Americans (Landale, Oropesa, and Bradatan 2006, 138).
Many Latinos also keep constantly in touch with family and friends back in their country of
origin (Tamaki 2011).
Participants in the PRRI focus groups in Arizona mentioned as very important the subject of
family values. To respondents, the importance of family was an important cultural trait because
Latino families are more tightly bound than Americans, in general, or at least, they give that
impression.
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Instead, another way of looking at the impact of family is by considering Latinos' connections
abroad: who they visit, how often, and where they visit. Recent research (Gershon and Pantoja
2013, 2014; Pantoja 2005), who finds some evidence that connections to family abroad, mainly
through travel may enhance political incorporation of Latinos in U.S. politics and encourages
political participation. However, links to the homeland likely hinder incorporation because
people who hope to return to their home countries may not incorporate politically into the U.S.
system (as citizens) (Jones-Correa 1998). Keeping strong transnational ties should make Latinos
feel closer to those like them and reduce feelings of commonalities with other Latinos and
suggests that those who have stronger ties abroad should have a co-ethnic or ethnic ideology
more than a pan-ethnic ideology, since co-ethnic Latinos should have a sense that their own
national group, not Latinos in general, are those closest to them socially and politically.
Core Beliefs
The relationship between beliefs and ideology is a matter of discussion in the political science
literature. For example, Converse defined ideology as an interdependent belief system. But as
Carmines and D’Amico (2015) point out “Converse’s work excluded personality and social
structure,” while these aspects were important to Lane (44). Likewise, in the study of African
American ideologies, beliefs about the group, the role of history shaping group consciousness,
and the role of race in helping discern friends and enemies are central to the understanding of
these ideologies and African Americans’ understanding of American politics. In the case of
Latinos, beliefs regarding their place in the U.S., their social standing in the country and how
attached they feel to the country and to people like them should influence the ideological
inclinations of Latinos.
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The cultural traits affect how Latinos place themselves in American society and how they relate
to each other. Some traits may lead Latinos to believe that they have many things in common,
while others lead them to believe that Latinos have little in common. Core beliefs ultimately
affect how Latinos view their role in American life and politics; these beliefs also shape their
ideologies.
The five core beliefs that I argue are shaped by cultural traits include the following: (1)
importance of identity, (2) desire to return to country of origin, (3) subscription to Latino linked
fate, (4) attitudes toward other (non-Latino) groups, and (5) belief in core American values. Each
of these beliefs contributes to the formation of Latino ideologies, which I describe in the next
section. The core beliefs refer to attitudes toward the different traits of Latino culture, and these
attitudes should bring them closer or farther from other Latinos.
Importance of Identity
The core belief of identity refers to how important Latinos consider it is to keep a distinct Latino
culture within American society. This could be by preserving traits such as speaking Spanish or
other characteristics that show that they embrace their unique identity in American society rather
than being absorbed into the mainstream culture. Research on Latino identity has a long history
in the field and shows that their shared characteristics and experiences add to the building of a
common identity. Padilla’s (1985) research on Mexican American and Puerto Rican
communities in Chicago demonstrates that stressing a common identity can produce fruitful
cooperation on political matters among Latinos of different national origins.
This level of pan-ethnic cooperation and ties based on a common identity is further strengthened
by mobilization. Zepeda-Millán and Wallace (2013), using immigration rights marches as a
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reference point, argue that Latino perceptions of racialization –that Latinos are a distinct group–
has an impact in steering them into actions for a common goal. Thus, considering that a Latino
identity is individually important should serve as a building block for a pan-ethnic ideology,
while those who do not think this identity is important will be more likely to have an ethnic or
co-ethnic ideology because these ideological cohorts see less commonalities among Latinos.
Desire to Return
Nostalgia for the land of origin or ancestry should also affect the ideological tendencies of
Latinos. Jones-Correa’s (1998) research on Latino political incorporation shows that, for many
Latinos, the allure of returning someday provides a disincentive to participate in American
politics. These Latinos not only decide not to participate in American politics but also have the
desire of returning someday to their homelands. For example, many Latinos send remittances to
their homelands (Orozco 2002). Sending remittances is a sign of attachment to the homeland,
particularly, if investing in land or property, as “a bequest motive on the part of the emigrant,
who may wish to lay claim on family assets when returning home” (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo
2006, 939). Moreover, those in sending communities in the U.S. often become political actors in
their home countries as a result of their advocacy and leadership gained from their remittances
(Wiltberger 2014). These attachments could foster a sense of nostalgia, of wanting to return,
especially if accompanied by constant travel back to their homelands for political activism or by
family ties that include regularly sending remittances in order to prepare for an imminent return.
Feelings of nostalgia should be associated with co-ethnic or ethnic ideologies. Latinos who do
not have feelings of nostalgia –a desire to return back to their homelands– should feel closer to
other Latinos because they consider the United States to be their permanent and only home, thus
establishing permanent roots and allegiance with the community.
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Linked Fate
A belief in Latino linked fate means that a person thinks that what happens to other Latinos
affects them personally. In other words, the fate of the individual depends upon how Latinos fare
as a group. This concept is well understood in the study of African American politics, as it was
developed by Dawson: “the historical experiences of African Americans have resulted in a
situation in which group interests have served as a proxy for self-interest” (Dawson 1994, 77).
The main scholar for the study of linked fate among Latinos is Gabriel Sanchez. In several
articles (Sanchez 2006a, 2006b, 2008; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010), he has explored the
existence of linked fate among Latinos and its salience to Latino political behavior. He finds that
there is evidence of linked fate; yet, it is hard to untangle it from other factors such as ancestry,
generations removed from immigration, and class, among others. Moreover, the “[r]esults
suggest that linked fate for Latinos may be a temporary phenomenon, as linked fate for Latinos
appears to be based on marginalization derived from economic status and immigration
experiences” (Sanchez and Masuoka 2010, 519). The main reason for this conclusion is because
the authors find that the notion of a “Brown utility heuristic” based on linked fate is rooted in
“social integration to American society” (Sanchez and Masuoka 2010, 519). Yet, as American
society becomes racially polarized and the growth of Latinos continues to be framed as an
“invasion” narrative, it is unlikely that Latinos will have “smooth sailing” incorporating into
American society.
Regardless of how rooted the concept is among Latinos, what matters is that Latinos who have a
sense of linked fate with other Latinos should exhibit a propensity for a pan-ethnic ideology,
feeling that their closest allies are other Latinos, while those who do not have a sense of linked
fate with other Latinos will tend to subscribe to an ethnic or a co-ethnic ideology.
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Attitudes toward Other Minorities
Latinos in contact with other groups should feel closer to them, especially when they are in
collaborative situations such as in community organizations or political coalitions. In contrast, if
Latinos consider they have a conflicting relationship with other groups, they will have negative
opinions and feelings toward them (McClain et al. 2006).
There is a wide literature on the potential of conflict and competition between African
Americans and Latinos (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; McClain and Karnig 1990; Meier et al.
2004; Vaca 2004). Yet, Latinos and other groups (such as African Americans) share a history of
discrimination and have oftentimes similar socioeconomic backgrounds. How much do Latinos
stress these commonalities in their political options? I argue that Latinos who feel close or that
share characteristics in common with African Americans should enhance their feelings of
closeness to Latinos, as well. In other words, a sense of commonality with minorities such as
black Americans should also strengthen the sense of commonality with other Latinos.
For example, Orr, Morel, and Gamble find that “Latino linked fate and Latino-Black linked fate
are positively correlated with perceptions of political and economic commonality” (2014, 165).
This finding confirms those from Sanchez (2008) of the role of group consciousness among
Latinos and how those with high levels of linked fate also have a sense of commonality with
black Americans. Thus, a sense of commonality with minorities should also be associated with
an ideology that links Latinos together.
Core American Values
Equal opportunity, personal responsibility, and the American Dream are values that many
Americans cherish. Latinos are no exception; surveys find that Latinos, despite their lower
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income and educational levels, or perhaps because of these characteristics, are among the groups
most strongly to believe in these values (Constable and Clement 2014; R. P. Jones, Cox, and
Navarro-Rivera 2013), even when the general American population has become more skeptical
about the realities of these beliefs (R. P. Jones and Cox 2012). Research on Latinos’ belief in
American “core values” has also debunked the myth that Latinos do not follow the liberal values
of individualism and hard work. For example, in their analysis of the 2006 Latino National
Survey, Fraga, Hero and Garcia (2011, 74) find that Latinos are more likely to believe in
individual responsibility instead of blaming the system and believe in the value of hard work to
have progress in America. Yet, they also find that on values such as personal responsibility or
equality of opportunity, Latinos’ beliefs are more complex. This means that, while Latinos
overwhelmingly believe in the American Dream, in America as a land of opportunity, they are
more conflicted regarding whether everyone has similar access to this dream and the fairness of
American society. Thus, beliefs about American society refer to how Latinos think life in the
United States is fair and whether it provides better opportunities for them. Yet, there is evidence
that these beliefs are much stronger among foreign-born than among U.S.-born Latinos,
suggesting that differences in these beliefs are associated with experiences of living in the
country, such as discrimination (R. P. Jones, Cox, and Navarro-Rivera 2013). The effects of
these beliefs on ideology should be negatively associated with pan-ethnicity. This means that
agreeing with these core American values should decrease a sense of commonality with other
Latinos because agreement suggests a more individualistic view of success in America that
should be more in line with an ethnic ideology, because this Ethno-Ideological cohort should not
share a sense of group consciousness and commonality, instead having a more individualistic
view of success.
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The Latino Ethno-Ideologies
The study of Latino politics has largely ignored ideology as a way for understanding the political
behavior of Latinos in the United States. If we understand ideology as a concept that explains
how the world works and provides a shortcut into who are people's allies and who are people's
enemies, then Latinos’ political behavior is ideological (and perhaps even how people relate to a
nation that may not be their nation of origin).
Latino Ethno-Ideologies are the result of the combinations of cultural factors and core values. I
submit three ideologies (1) pan-ethnic, (2) co-ethnic, and (3) ethnic. Each of these ideologies
differs on how close individual Latinos feel toward each other and the extent of this connection:
social and political. Social closeness means that Latinos believe they share many social
characteristics in common, while political closeness means that those commonalities extend to
common political goals. Ultimately, these ideologies consist of whether Latinos consider other
Latinos as their allies for political struggles, or if they do not see Latinos as their natural allies.
Pan-ethnic
Latinos with this ideological inclination feel strong social and political attachments with other
Latinos. Pan-ethnic Latinos' sense of commonality comes mostly from their core beliefs than
from their cultural traits. This means that the main sources of pan-ethnicity as an ideology are the
beliefs in linked fate with other Latinos, their belief in commonality with other minorities, their
skepticism of core American values, the importance of their Latino identity, and their
commitment to the U.S. without a desire to return "home" (U.S. is home). This group is less
likely to be Catholic or primarily Spanish speaker or consumers of Spanish media. As a group,
pan-ethnic Latinos should be younger, and more likely to be second or third generation U.S.born Latinos. This pan-ethnic ideology suggests that, politically, this group will be very
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suggestible to appeals to Latino unity and to behave as a bloc. They should also be more open to
coalitions with other minorities.
Co-ethnic
These Latinos consider that they have social and political commonalities with other Latinos but
not both simultaneously. The cultural traits of the co-ethnic ideology include a high Catholic
identification, consumption of Spanish media and Spanish speakers, these are the most likely to
have strong transnational ties. Their core beliefs are weaker than pan-ethnic Latinos, especially
the ones on the importance of a Latino identity, linked fate with Latinos, and commonalities with
other minorities. They have the weakest beliefs about American core values and are the most
likely to prefer to return back home. Because its members should feel closer to those of their own
ethnic or national group, this ideological cohort will be more likely to be comprised of foreignborn, first generation immigrants than the others. The impact of co-ethnic Latinos in Latino
politics is mixed. To the extent that they feel their closeness to other Latinos is political, they
will be open to pan-ethnic solidarity appeals.
Ethnic
Latinos who subscribe to an ethnic ideology have weak or no sense of social or political
commonalities with other Latinos. This is due partly to their low cultural attachments, as well as
their lower levels of solidarity based on core beliefs. This group will have weaker levels of
Catholic identification, Spanish speakers and Spanish media consumption, as well as
transnational ties. Those with an ethnic ideology have the strongest attitudes toward American
core values and a weak sense of attachment to a distinct Latino identity. These persons are not
nostalgic about returning. Demographically, this group will be a combination of older immigrant
Latinos and younger (second or third generation) Latinos. They will also have the weakest sense
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of linked fate commonality. Their politics should be very individualistic, or at least, they should
be informed by other group attachments independent of Latino background. Table 2.3 shows the
strength of the relationship of the cultural traits and core beliefs with each of the ideologies.
Table 2.2. Expected Effect of the Different Cultural Traits and Core Beliefs on Latino Ideology
Ideology
Pan-ethnic Co-ethnic
Ethnic
Cultural Traits
Spanish
Weak
Strong
Weak
Catholic
Weak
Strong
Weak
Media
Weak
Strong
Weak
Family
Weak
Strong
Weak
Core Beliefs
Linked Fate
Strong
Weak
Weak
Attitudes toward minorities
Strong
Weak
Weak
Identity
Strong
Weak
Weak
Core American Values
Strong
Weak
Weak
Desire to return
Weak
Strong
Weak

Summary and Conclusion
This chapter explained the understanding of Latino identity politics rooted in latinidad. I argue
that a view that consists solely on identity betrays the diversity and complexity of Latinos’
political views. To fill this gap I propose an ideological view of Latino politics in which latinidad
works as a heuristic utility informing Latinos. In the next chapter, I will explain how I will
measure these cultural traits, core beliefs, and ideologies.
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Chapter 3: Measuring the Latino Ethno-Ideologies
This chapter explains the data, variables, and methods used to test the Latino Ethno-Ideologies.
The theory states that the cultural traits and core beliefs produce three ethno-ideologies – panethnic, co-ethnic, and ethnic. These ideologies are not based on a Liberal-Conservative
continuum grounded in policy or the role of government in people’s lives. Instead, the ethnoideologies’ origins in cultural traits and core beliefs vary according to how strong Latinos believe
their social and political links are with other Latinos: The more Latinos feel they have in
common with other Latinos, the greater the likelihood that they will subscribe to a pan-ethnic
ideology. On the opposite end lies the ethnic ideology in which Latinos, while admitting to a
Hispanic or Latino heritage, do not extend this heritage into a political or social commonality
with other Latinos. In the middle lie those subscribing to a co-ethnic ideology in which
individuals feel that they have some social or political commonalities, but do not hold both of
these ideas simultaneously.
The chapter is divided into 6 sections. The first section discusses the data sources to be used in
the analysis. The second section describes the variables used to construct the dependent variable
(Latino ethno-ideologies). The third section explains the independent variables measuring the
cultural traits, core beliefs, and the demographic characteristics of respondents. The fourth
section describes the statistical analysis and how the variables fit in these models. The fifth
section describes how the focus groups will enrich the statistical analysis. Finally, a conclusion
serves as a preview of the empirical chapters 4, 5, and 6.
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Data Sources
To test the theory, I draw from quantitative and qualitative sources. The selection of the
quantitative data source required a study with two main assets. First, it is necessary to include a
large sample of Latino respondents because that will produce robust statistical analysis instead of
using oversamples that are commonly available in surveys. Second, an asset required of the
dataset is that it includes variables that could serve as direct measures or proxies for the cultural
traits and core beliefs. The qualitative data complement the quantitative data by providing
insights as to what Latinos think about their shared culture and beliefs and how they influence in
their view of politics.
Quantitative Data: 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS 2006)
Based on the requirement discussed above, the most appropriate data come from the 2006 Latino
National Survey (LNS 2006). The LNS 2006 contains a large sample of adult Latinos ages 18
and older (N = 8,646), the largest of any potential survey database. Moreover, the LNS 2006 was
conducted in English and Spanish by bilingual interviewers in the major metropolitan areas with
Latino population and states with growing numbers of Latinos. Overall, the 2006 LNS sample
covers 87.5 percent of Latinos in the United States (L. R. Fraga et al. 2008). The LNS includes
measures for religious identification, batteries of questions about language use at home and of
language preferences for media, as well as questions about frequency of contact with family
abroad. Although nowadays many surveys have large subsamples of Latinos and several survey
organizations such as the 2010 Hispanic Sample of the Cooperative Congressional Election
Study, Latino Decisions, Pew Research Center, and Public Religion Research Institute conduct
surveys specifically with Latino populations, these do not have all the variables necessary within
the same poll to measure all the different elements of this study. Surveys such as the 2012

62

American National Election Study (ANES) include important questions related to race in
America and oversamples of Latinos that can provide a more contemporary context but lack
other questions related to transnationalism and latinidad which are necessary for exploring my
theoretical framework.
Table 3.1 Summary of Quantitative and Qualitative Data Sources
Latino National Survey
Sample size

Hispanic Values Survey

8,646
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(6 groups, 2 of each religious
tradition)
Sample type
National Latino adults
Catholic, Protestant, and
religiously unaffiliated
Latinos age 18-65 in
Phoenix, AZ
Study dates
11/17/2005 – 8/4/2006
August 10-11, 2013
Researchers
Fraga, Garcia, Hero et al.
Public Religion Research
Institute
Type
Survey
Focus groups
Sources: 2006 Latino National Survey, Fraga et al. (2008); Public Religion Research Institute

The 2006 LNS also includes variables that measure the core beliefs such as the importance of
Latino identity, as well as specific questions about Latino linked fate and the political, cultural,
and social relationships between Latinos and about cooperation and competition with other racial
groups in American society. These items can serve as measures for belief in Latino linked fate
and about attitudes toward other groups in the United States. There are questions about returning
to the country of origin (or ancestry) and links to the country of origin such as sending
remittances, having close relatives abroad, and traveling to visit the country. Finally, there are
measures about attitudes about the United States, for example about feeling discriminated
against, the opportunities available in the country, and how the United States compares to the
home country. Moreover, the LNS survey includes demographic information such as country of
origin and ancestry, including the country of birth of parents and grandparents, which are
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necessary for measuring immigrant generation. Table 3.1 (above) includes a summary of the
characteristics of the LNS as well as of the two focus groups, which are described below.
Qualitative Data: Focus Groups from Public Religion Research Institute (2013)
The qualitative component of the analysis comes from focus groups. The focus groups were
conducted by Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI), which conducted these in August 2013,
as part of the 2013 Hispanic Values Survey (HVS 2013) in Phoenix, Arizona. There were a total
of 6 groups, which were divided by religious affiliation. Two groups consisted of Latinos who
identified as Catholic, 2 groups of Latinos who identified as Protestants or “Christians” (not
Catholic), and 2 groups of Latino “nones” or without religious affiliation (atheists, agnostics, or
who had no religion in particular). The subject matter of these focus groups explored the cultural
links and values that Latinos share and how these relate to their political inclinations. A division
by religious affiliation provides insights as far as how much a shared culture matters to Latinos,
when many do not exhibit the traits that Latinos are supposed to have (such as Catholicism).
Dependent Variable: Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale
The dependent variable, the Latino Ethno-Ideological scale, was created combining four
variables measuring how much in common Latinos feel they have with other Latinos and how
much they feel their own national subgroups has in common with other Latinos. All four
questions belong to the same battery, which were included in the 2006 Latino National Survey to
measure pan-ethnicity. Since the dependent variable indicates commonality, the combination of
these four variables will produce a scale ranging from no commonality (ethnic), some
commonalities (co-ethnic), to high commonality (pan-ethnic).
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These commonalities are divided into two types—social and political. The social commonalities
questions are RGCOMM and LATCOMM while the questions about political commonalities are
RGPCOMM and LATPCOMM.
Table 3.2. Question Wording and Coding of Variables Used to Build the Ethno-Ideological Scale
Nothing

Little

Some

A lot

DK/NA

Original Codes

1

2

3

4

5

Recoded Values

-2

-1

1

2

N/A

Categories/Questions

Frequency Distribution of Recoded Variables

LATCOMM: Thinking about issues like job
opportunities, education or income, how much do
[YOU] have in common with other
[LATINOS/HISPANICS]?
LATPCOMM: Now thinking about things like
government services and employment, political
power and representation, how much do [YOU]
have in common with other
[LATINOS/HISPANICS]?
RGCOMM : Thinking about issues like job
opportunities, educational attainment or income,
how much do [R’s NATIONAL GROUP] have in
common with other [LATINOS/HISPANICS]?
RGPCOMM: Now thinking about things like
government services and employment, political
power, and representation, how much do [R’s
NATIONAL GROUP] have in common with other
[LATINOS/HISPANICS]?

4.7

15.3

35

45

-

6.7

22.5

38.3

32.5

-

6.1

17.8

38.2

38

-

15.4

23.9

37.8

24

-

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey
Note: Numbers represent percentages and may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

Table 3.2 (above) shows the wording and coding of these questions, as well as the values used to
recode them in order to use them in the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale. The table also includes
the frequencies of each response category.
The original coding of the response categories ranges from “1” to “5.” Values ranging 1-4
indicate if the respondent thinks Latinos have “nothing in common” to “a lot in common.” The
responses coded as “5,” the highest possible value, includes refusals and “don’t know”
responses.
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To create the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale the variables were recoded to range between -2
(“nothing” in common) and +2 (“a lot” in common). Cases in which respondents answered
“don’t know” and refusals are coded as missing. When added in a scale, these four variables
indicate the intensity of the feelings of commonality, if respondents feel that commonalities are
more social or political and at a personal or collective level. The highest possible score is +8.
The lowest possible score is -8. The scale was further recoded to range from 0 to 16 by adding an
8 to all the values as a way of avoiding negative values. The final variable is the result of
dividing all the values by 16 in order to constrain the values from “0” to “1.” This way the final
ideology scale ranges from "0," (indicating that the respondents do not think Latinos share
anything in common), to "1"(indicating that the respondents believe there are a lot of
commonalities between Latinos in all the questions).
This scoring system is similar to those in analyses conducted by Ellis and Stimson (2012) to
measure issues-based ideologies among Americans and Abramowitz (2006) to identify groups of
respondents along a policy-item scale. Mondak and Canache (2014) have also used the rescaling
of values on ideology and personality scales. The value of coding the dependent variable in this
manner is that is allows us to visually show how changes in each of the independent variables
increase or decrease in a standardized way, such as percentage changes.
These four questions of commonalities fit well together as a scale. A factor analysis shows that
the four variables load on one factor. A subsequent reliability analysis shows a 0.692 Cronbach's
alpha for an analysis using the recoded variables.
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Figure 3.1 Ideological Score Distribution among Latinos
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Figure 3.1 shows a histogram of the ideological scale. The scale ranges from “0” to “1.” The bars
are color-coded to indicate the range comprising each of the ideology categories. The black bars
indicate that respondents in that particular range subscribe to an ethnic Ethno-Ideology, the white
bars indicate that respondents subscribe to a co-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. The gray bars indicate
that respondents in those higher values subscribe to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology.
As Figure 3.1 shows there are very few Latinos at the low end of the scale. Cumulatively, only 8
percent of Latinos believe that they share little or nothing at all socially or politically with other
Latinos (range: 0-0.25). Only 1 percent of Latinos, have the lowest possible score “0,” believing
that they or their own groups share nothing at all in common with other Latinos. Instead, the bulk
of Latinos are located ideologically on the second half of the scale, with most Latinos leaning
toward the higher values (pan-ethnic ideology).
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The mean score of .666 confirms that Latinos overall lean toward the higher ideology scores.
The most common score is .750, with 14 percent of Latinos. This score falls at the lower end of
the scores indicating a pan-ethnic ideology. Respondents, thus, said that they share some
characteristics in common in all four questions. One-in-ten (10 percent) Latinos scored the
highest possible ideological value of 1, meaning that these respondents believe that Latinos share
a lot in common in all four commonality questions. Below, I describe the logic of the category
breaks in the Ethno-Ideologies scores.
Pan-ethnic ideology (Score Range from .750 to 1)
At the high end of the scale are those who feel strongly close to Latinos personally and who also
feel that their group shares a lot in common with other Latinos. Moreover, Latinos with scores at
the higher end of the scale (between .750 and 1) not only feel personally and collectively tied to
other Latinos, they also feel that these connections are political and social. Latinos with a high
ideological score have a pan-ethnic ideology.
Co-ethnic Ideology (Score Range from .313 to .688)
In the middle are those who feel close to Latinos on only one of the social or political aspects.
For example, they may say that they share a lot in common with Latinos on social characteristics,
but also that they have nothing in common with other Latinos in terms of politics. They may also
feel that their commonalities with other Latinos are only between them as individuals or only
between their own group and other Latinos. Those who score on this middle-range which is .313
to .688 are considered to have a co-ethnic ideology because their feelings of commonality do not
extend to all Latinos in all aspects. Latinos with a co-ethnic ideology may feel that in social
aspects such as income and education, Latinos share a lot in common but that these
commonalities do not extend to political aspects. Coethnics may also have a sense that their own
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ethnic or national groups share a lot in common with Latinos but that they, as individuals, do not
share much in common with other Latinos.
Ethnic Ideology (Score Range from 0 to .250)
At the other end of the scale (scores between 1 and 5) are those who feel that they individually
(and people from their own Latino national-origin groups) share nothing in common politically
or socially with other Latinos. Latinos who score low on the ideological scale have an ethnic
ideology. Ethnic Latinos cans still admit a Latino or Hispanic ethnic origin, this heritage does not
translate into a commonality with other Latinos, since the Latino-Ethno ideologies score is on the
lowest score range.
Figure 3.2 Ethno-Ideologies Distribution among Latinos
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Ethnic
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Source: 2006 Latino National Survey
Note: Numbers represent percentages

Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of the ideologies among Latinos. Only 8 percent of Latinos
subscribe to an ethnic ideology (scores between 0 and .250). Ethnic Latinos identify as having a
Hispanic or Latino origin but consider that they or people from their national group have little or
nothing in common socially or politically with other Latinos. An additional 43 percent of Latinos
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have a co-ethnic ideology (scores between .313 and .688). Co-ethnic Latinos generally consider
that Latinos have some characteristics in common socially or politically but little or not at all on
one of these aspects. The largest ideological group, with nearly half of Latinos (49 percent)
subscribing to it, is among those who subscribe to a pan-ethnic ideology (scores between .750
and 1). Latinos with an ideological score with this range are considered pan-ethnic because they
think that Latinos have –at least– some commonalities socially and politically.
Because the dependent variable consists of a linear progression from no social and political
commonalities (ethnic ideology) to high commonalities (pan-ethnic ideology), the independent
variables predict to what extent they influence the development of a pan-ethnic ideology among
Latinos. This means that a positive association with the dependent variable indicates that the
independent variables measuring the cultural traits, core beliefs, and demographic characteristics
will move toward a pan-ethnic ideology. A negative association indicates a move away from a
pan-ethnic ideology, toward an ethnic ideology. The next section introduces the variables that
will measure the cultural traits, core beliefs, and demographic characteristics.
Independent variables
The independent variables measure two distinct aspects of Latino life related to their ideology—
their cultural traits and core beliefs. The cultural traits consist of characteristics that many (or
most) Latinos share, while the core beliefs are attitudes born out their experience of living in
America. I expect to find that, while both aspects will be important to the development of the
ideologies, most of the weight will fall in the core beliefs.
The Latino Ethno-Ideology Theory posits that there are four cultural traits and five core beliefs
serving as building blocks of the ideologies. The cultural traits are religion, language use,
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Spanish language media consumption, and family values. The five core beliefs are the following:
importance of identity, desire to return to one’s nation of origin, linked fate with Latinos,
commonalities with other racial minorities, and beliefs about core American values.
Measuring Cultural Traits
Table 3.3 (page 71) shows the original coding and recodes for the different variables measuring
the cultural traits (Catholicism, language use, Spanish media consumption, and family values)
and Table 3.4 (page 72) shows the distribution of the cultural traits variables among Latinos.
These traits should be positively associated with the formation of a pan-ethnic ideology because
these traits are supposed to unite Latinos.
Catholicism
Catholicism is the religious cultural link among Latinos, the result of four centuries of Spanish
rule in the Americas. Although Latinos' identification with Catholicism has declined in recent
years, Table 3.4. (page 72) shows that Catholic identification among Latinos in the 2006 LNS is
71 percent.
To measure Catholicism, I use a dichotomous variable indicating if the respondent is Catholic
(coded "1") or not (coded "0"). I expect that Catholicism will be more prevalent among Latinos
with a co-ethnic ideology because it is a trait closely aligned with national identity, whereas
Catholicism as a cultural trait should be less prevalent among ethnic and pan-ethnic who should
be more religiously diverse
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Table 3.3. Variables and Coding of Cultural Traits
Variable
Catholicism
RELIGION

Language Use
INTLANG
SPANPROF

ENGPROF

Wording

Responses

Recoding

Stop me when I get to the
correct one. What religious
tradition do you most
closely identify with?

(0) Jehovah’s Witness
(1) Catholic
(2) Assemblies of God
(3) Southern Baptist
(4) Pentecostal
(5) Other Protestant
(6) Mormon
(7) Jewish
(8) Don’t identify with any
religious denomination
(9) Other

(1) Catholic
(0) Not Catholic

Language in which
interview was conducted
Would you say you can
carry on a conversation in
Spanish (both
understanding and
speaking)
Would you say you can
carry on a conversation in
English (both
understanding and
speaking)

(1) Spanish
(2) English
(4) Very well
(3) Pretty well
(2) Just a little
(1) Not at all
(4) Very well
(3) Pretty well
(2) Just a little
(1) Not at all

Spanish Dominant
(1) If interview
conducted in Spanish
and speaks “just a little”
or “not at all” English.
(0) Otherwise
Bilingual
(1) If respondent can
carry on a conversation
“very” or “pretty well”
in English or Spanish
(0) Otherwise
English Dominant
(1) If interview
conducted in English
and speaks “just a little”
or “not at all” Spanish.
(0) Otherwise

(1) English more
(2) Spanish more
(3) Both equally

(1) Spanish or Both
equally
(0) English

Spanish Media Consumption
RELYMED
For information about
public affairs and politics,
would you say you rely
more heavily in Spanishlanguage television, radio,
and newspapers, or on
English-language
television, radio, and
newspapers?
Family Values
TRVISIT
How often do you How
often do you visit [Country
of Origin/Ancestry]?

(1) More than once a year
(2) Once a year
(3) Once in the past three
years
(4) Once in the past five
years
(5) More than five years
ago
(6) Never
(7) DK/NA
Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

(0) Never
(1) More than five years
ago
(2) Once in the past five
years
(3) Once in the past
three years
(4) Once a year
(5) More than once a
year
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Table 3.4. Frequency Distribution of Cultural Traits Variables
Cultural Traits
Catholicism

Percentage

Catholic
Not a Catholic
Primary Language
Spanish
Bilingual

71
29

English
Media Consumption
Spanish
Only English
Family Values
(Frequency of Travel Abroad)
Never
More than five years ago
Once in the past five years
Once in the past three years
Once a year

8

41
51

More than once a year

69
31

33
13
7
15
20
13

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

Everyday Language Use
Language, particularly spoken language, has been associated with pan-ethnicity for a long time,
DeSipio (1996) argues that Spanish is the main cultural characteristic that brings Latinos
together. It should be expected that pan-ethnicity is positively associated with Spanish speaking
Latinos.
The variable measuring language use indicates if the respondent is primarily a Spanish
monolingual, bilingual, or English monolingual. To measure language usage, I use the variables
SPANPROF and ENGPROF which asks respondents their proficiency with English or Spanish
(see Table 3.3 page 71). Respondents who answered the questionnaire in English were asked
about their Spanish proficiency, while those who answered in Spanish were asked about their
proficiency in English. After combining the three variables INTLANG (interview language),
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SPANPROF, and ENGPROF, I created a variable that measures primary language use. Those
who answered in Spanish but report that they are not proficient in English are classified as
primarily Spanish monolinguals and account for 41 percent of Latinos. Latinos who claim to be
proficient in English or Spanish are classified as bilingual. This trait is shared by 51 percent of
Latinos. Finally, those who answered the survey in English but reported they are not proficient in
Spanish are classified as English monolinguals, comprising 8 percent of the Latino population.
Spanish Media Consumption
Media, particularly Spanish language television, has been associated with fostering a sense of
community among Latinos from different national backgrounds. Media companies such as the
television giant, Univision, were instrumental in the creation of the "Hispanic" category in the
U.S. Census and were invested in the idea that there was a unique Latino market (Mora 2014).
For this reason, consumption of Spanish language news media should be associated with panethnicity. To measure media consumption, I use the language in which Latinos prefer to consume
their news media indicated in the variable RELYMED. This variable indicates if a person prefers
to consume news media in English, Spanish, or both. This variable was simplified to indicate if
the respondent consumes media in Spanish (only in Spanish or in Spanish and English) or only in
English. Nearly 7-in-10 (69 Latinos) consume news in Spanish, while 31 percent consume news
solely in English.
Family Values
The final cultural trait is family values. One of the defining stereotypes of Latinos is how
important family is to them. This belief is echoed in political advertisements where Republican
and Democratic candidates attempt to appeal to Latinos (Dávila 2001). Since there are no
variables that directly measure concepts such as “importance of family,” I measure family values
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using “transnational family,” a variable measuring how often the respondent visits family in
his/her country of ancestry. The reason for using this variable is that, contrary to another variable
asking Latino whether they send remittances abroad, this variable was asked to the whole sample
and not just to Latinos born outside of the United States. The variable ranges from 0 (never) to 5
(more than once a year).
Overall, one-third (33 percent) of Latinos say they never visit their nation of origin, while
another third percent say they visit once a year (20 percent) or more often (12 percent). I
hypothesize that the closest the family connections abroad, the less likely a Latino will exhibit a
pan-ethnic ideology. The reason for this is that stronger links in the homeland could mean less
attachment to the U.S., a life or life in this country. Moreover, constant travel to the ancestral or
home country may weaken feelings of commonality between the respondent and other Latinos
because constant travel reminds the subject of his/her own heritage distinctiveness from other
Latinos’ heritage.
Measuring Core Beliefs
According to the Latino Ethno-Ideologies, along with the four cultural traits, there are five core
beliefs affecting Latino ideology. These five core beliefs are importance of identity, linked fate,
desire to return, commonalities with other minorities, and belief in core American values. Table
3.5 (page 76) shows the coding and recoding of the variables.
Importance of Identity
Latinos who place a lot of importance on their identity as Latinos in America should have a more
pan-ethnic ideology. The usage of a pan-ethnic label, such as Hispanic or Latino, has been
associated with feeling that their identity as Latinos is important (Lavariega Monforti 2014).
Importance of identity is measured using DISTINCT, a variable that asks how important it is for
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Latinos to keep a distinct culture. I expect that the greater the importance placed on culture will
have a positive association with a pan-ethnic ideology. Overall, 78 percent of Latinos said it was
very important, while only 3 percent said it was not important. Table 3.6 (pages 78-79) displays
the frequencies for the variables measuring the core beliefs.
Linked Fate
Linked fate, the belief that Latinos well-being is connected to the well-being of other Latinos (or
Latinos overall), is an important concept of pan-ethnicity. The concept, borrowed from Dawson
(1994, 2001), by several Latino politics scholars (Lavariega Monforti and Michelson 2014;
Sanchez 2006a, 2006b), is considered the building block of pan-ethnicity for its implications of a
sense of unity among Latinos.
Two variables measure linked fate: The first one relates to a personal sense of connection with
other Latinos, a belief that the data show is shared by roughly two-thirds (68 percent) of all
Latinos. The second one measures how connected the respondents think his/her own group's
(ethnic/national) fate is linked to other Latinos. Latino linked fate is measured with the variables
LATFATE, which asks if a Latino/a believes that what happens to him personally is related to
what happens to other Latinos, and, RGFATE, which asks if what happens to their own
nationality group is related to happens to all Latinos. These variables are recoded as indicating
whether the respondent believes in Latino linked fate “a lot” (3) or “nothing” (0). Overall just
over three-quarters (77 percent) of Latinos share this belief about their own group. A sense of
linked fate should be positively associated with a pan-ethnic ideology.
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Table 3.5. Variables and coding for the core beliefs
Linked fate
LATFATE

How much does [Latinos/Hispanics]
doing well depend on how other
[Hispanics/Latinos] also doing
well?
RGFATE
How much does your doing well
depend on how other
[Hispanics/Latinos] also doing
well?
Attitudes toward other groups
AACOMM
Thinking about issues like job
opportunities, educational
attainment or income, how much do
[LATINOS/HISPANICS] have in
common with [AFRICAN
AMERICANS?
AAPCOMM
Thinking about things like
government services and
employment, political power and
representation, how much do
[LATINOS/HISPANICS] have in
common with [AFRICAN
AMERICANS?
Importance of Identity
DISTINCT
How important is for
[Hispanics/Latinos] to maintain
their distinct cultures?
Desire to Return
TRGOBACK
Do you have plans to go back to
[Country of origin/ancestry] to live
permanently?
Core American Values
AHEAD
American Dream
“Latinos can get ahead in the United
States if they work hard”
SYSBLAME

CHANCE

(4) A lot
(3) Some
(2) Little
(1) Nothing
(4) A lot
(3) Some
(2) Little
(1) Nothing

(0) Nothing
(1) Little
(2) Some
(3) A lot
(0) Nothing
(1) Little
(2) Some
(3) A lot

(4) A lot
(3) Some
(2) Little
(1) Nothing

(0) Nothing
(1) Little
(2) Some
(3) A lot

(4) A lot
(3) Some
(2) Little
(1) Nothing

(0) Nothing
(1) Little
(2) Some
(3) A lot

(3) Very important
(2) Somewhat important
(1) Not important

(2) Very important
(1) Somewhat Important
(0) Not important

(1) Yes
(2) No

(0) Yes
(1) No

(4) Strongly agree
(3) Somewhat agree
(2) Somewhat disagree
(1) Strongly disagree
Personal Responsibility
(4) Agree
“Most people who don't get ahead
(3) Somewhat agree
should not blame the system, they
(2) Somewhat disagree
have only themselves to blame”
(1) Strongly disagree
Equal Opportunity
(4) Agree
“Is not really a big problem if some
(3) Somewhat agree
people have more of a chance in life (2) Somewhat disagree
than others”
(1) Strongly disagree
Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

(3) Strongly agree
(2) Somewhat agree
(1) Somewhat disagree
(0) Strongly disagree
(3) Strongly agree
(2) Somewhat agree
(1) Somewhat disagree
(0) Strongly disagree
(0) Strongly agree
(1) Somewhat agree
(2) Somewhat disagree
(3) Strongly disagree

Desire to Return to Nation of Origin
Latinos who feel more attracted to their land of origin should think they have less in common
with other Latinos since their hearts lie in other lands and with their respective ancestral nation
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of origin. Attachment to homeland is measured with the variable TRGOBACK and indicates if a
person is interested in returning to his or her country of origin or ancestry. The variable is
recoded as binary to indicate those who answer this question in the affirmative and who want to
return (0) and those who do not want to return (1). Overall, more than three-quarters (76 percent)
of Latinos say they do not want to return, compared to 24 percent who indicate they want to
return.
Commonalities with Other Racial Minorities
The fourth core belief is commonalities with other racial minorities. This sense of connection
should be associated with pan-ethnicity, since Latinos who feel that other groups in America
have common characteristics and goals may also feel that connection with other Latinos, as well,
and could be the building blocks for inter-racial coalitions. Previous literature has found mixed
evidence for potential inter-racial coalitions, depending on economic threat and competition,
perceived common experiences of discrimination, and residential and social proximity (McClain
et al. 2006; McClain and Stewart 2001; McKenzie 2014; Wilkinson 2014).
Commonalities with other groups are measured by two variables. These ask if respondents think
that Latinos have a lot in common socially or politically with African Americans. Attitudes
toward other groups in America are measured with the variables AACOMM (socially) and
AAPCOM (politically). These variables ask if the respondent thinks that Latinos have a lot in
common politically or socially with African-Americans, another underrepresented group in
American politics. The variable is recoded to indicate if a person feels close to blacks (1) or not
(0). Overall 6-in-10 (60 percent) Latinos say they have social characteristics in common with
African Americans and a majority (56 percent) say they have political commonalities with
African Americans.
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Table 3.6. Frequency Distribution of Core Beliefs Variables
Core Beliefs
Distribution (%)
Identity (Importance of keeping a distinct culture)
Very Important
Somewhat Important
Not Important
Desire to Return to Country of Origin
No

78
18
3
76

Yes
24
Linked Fate
“How much does you doing well depend on how other Latinos also doing
(sic) well?”
A lot
43
Some
25
Little
16
Nothing
16
“How much does Latinos doing well depend on how other Latinos also doing
(sic) well?”
A lot
49
Some
28
Little
14
Nothing
9
Commonalities with Other Minorities
“Thinking about issues like job opportunities, educational attainment or
income, how much do Latinos have in common with African Americans?”
A lot
23
Some
37
Little
24
Nothing
16
“Thinking about things like government services and employment, political
power and representation, how much do Latinos have in common with
African Americans?”
A lot
20
Some
36
Little
30
Nothing

15
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Table 3.6. Frequency Distribution of Core Beliefs Variables (Continued)
Distribution (%)
Core Beliefs
Core American Values
American Dream:
“Latinos can get ahead in the United States if they work hard”
Strongly Agree
77
Somewhat Agree
19
Somewhat Disagree
2
Strongly Disagree
2
Personal Responsibility:
“Most people who don't get ahead should not blame the system, they have
only themselves to blame”
Strongly Agree
50
Somewhat Agree
22
Somewhat Disagree
15
Strongly Disagree
13
Equal Opportunity:
“Is not really a big problem if some people have more of a chance in life than
others”
Strongly Agree
36
Somewhat Agree
22
Somewhat Disagree
19
Strongly Disagree
23
Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

Core American Values
These attitudes are measured using these variables that tackle these concepts: The American
Dream, personal responsibility, and equal opportunity. Latinos who believe in these American
attitudes should have a higher probability of pan-ethnicity, as they are embedded in the
mainstream of America. The variables measuring attitudes toward the United States are
CHANCE which asks the respondent to agree or disagree with the statement, “It is not really a
big problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others.” SYSBLAME asks
respondents to "agree" or "disagree" with the statement, “Most people who don’t get ahead
should not blame the system, they have only themselves to blame.” Finally, AHEAD, asks
Latinos about their beliefs in the American Dream, asking them if they "agree" or "disagree"
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with the statement, “Latinos can get ahead in the United States if they work hard.” These
variables have been recoded to indicate if a person strongly disagrees (3) or strongly agrees (0)
with the statements, with the exception of CHANCE. This variable was recoded in reverse: a
score of "3" means that the respondent strongly agrees with the statement that people have more
of a chance and a score of "0" that the respondent strongly disagrees. Belief in the American
Dream is almost universal, as 95 percent of Latinos believe in it. Seventy-seven percent of
Latinos say they believe in personal responsibility and 43 percent in equality of opportunity.
Demographic variables
In addition to the cultural traits and core beliefs, there are important demographic differences
between Latinos. A consistent finding in the literature is the differences in policy preferences and
attitudes between Latinos of different national-origin groups, as well as differences by immigrant
generation. Therefore, I control for these measures. In addition, I add controls for the
respondent’s sex, age, and educational attainment. I also control for the respondent’s citizenship
status, if the respondent is foreign-born but also a naturalized citizen.
Table 3.7 (page 81) summarizes the original coding and the recodes or combinations used to
generate new variables. The age variable was generated by subtracting the respondent’s birth
year from 2006 (the year the survey was taken). The sex variable was recoded to indicate if the
respondent is a man (0) or a woman (1). Respondents with ancestry from Central American or
South American countries were recombined into a “Central America” or “South America”
category, respectively, because some ancestries had few respondents. For example, if a
respondent’s ancestry is from Panama that person was assigned to “Central America.” The
“Other Latino” category which combines persons who indicated their ancestry is from countries
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outside Latin America. Respondents from the 4 largest ethnic groups –Mexicans, Puerto Ricans,
Cubans, and Dominicans– were not recombined into larger categories.
Table 3.7. Variables and Coding of Demographic Characteristics
Variable
Age
BIRDATE

Sex
GENDER

Wording

Responses

Recoding

What year were you born

4-digit year
(9999) Don’t
know/Refused

2006 - BIRDATE

(1) Male
(2) Female

(1) Woman
(0) Man

(1) Argentina
(2) Bolivia
(3) Chile
(4) Colombia
(5) Costa Rica
(6) Cuba
(7) Dominican Republic
(8) Ecuador
(9) El Salvador
(10) Guatemala
(11) Honduras
(12) Mexico
(13) Nicaragua
(14) Panama
(15) Paraguay
(16) Peru
(17) Puerto Rico
(18) Spain
(19) Uruguay
(20) Venezuela
(21) Don’t know
(22) Refused
(23) USA (Don’t read)

Dichotomous variables
indicate each
nationality:
(1) Each of these
origins
Mexico
Puerto Rico
Cuba
Dominican Republic
Central America:
[Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua,
Panama]
South America:
[Argentina, Bolivia,
Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Paraguay,
Peru, Uruguay,
Venezuela]
Other Latino:
[Spain, USA, Don’t
know, Refused]
(0) If respondent does
not have the ancestry

Are you male or female?
(Ask only if necessary)
Latino Origin/Ancestry
ANCESTRY
Do you trace your Latino
heritage, however many
generations back, to any
country other than the
U.S.?
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Table 3.7. Variables and Coding of Demographic Characteristics (Continued)
Variable
Wording
Generations Removed from Immigration
BORNUS
Were you born in the
mainland United States,
Puerto Rico, or some other
country
PARBORN
Where your parents were
born, where they both born
in the US, was one born in
the US, and were both born
in another country?

Naturalized Citizen
NATUSCIT
Are you a naturalized
American citizen? [If
BORNUS = 3]
Educational Attainment
REDUC
What5 is your highest level
of formal education
completed?

Responses

Recoding

(1) Mainland US
(2) Puerto Rico
(3) Some other country

First Generation
(1) Born in “some other
country”
(0) Otherwise
Second Generation
(1) Born in the
mainland USA or
Puerto Rico AND
neither parent born in
the US.
(0) Otherwise
Third Generation
(1) Born in the
mainland USA or
Puerto Rico AND at
least one parent born in
the US
(0) Otherwise

(1) One parent born in the
US
(2) Both parents born in
the US
(3) Neither parent born in
the US
(4) Don’t know
(5) Refused

(1) Yes
(2) No

(0) No
(1) Yes

(0) None
(1) Eight grade or below
(2) Some high school
(3) GED
(4) High school graduate
(5) Some college
(6) 4-year college degree
(7) Graduate or
Professional degree

(0) None
(1) Eight grade or
below
(2) Some high school
(3) GED
(4) High school
graduate
(5) Some college
(6) 4-year college
degree
(7) Graduate or
Professional degree

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

To determine generations removed from immigration, I used two variables: USBORN and
PARBORN. These two variables indicate where the respondent and their parents were born,
respectively. First generation Latinos are those who are born outside of the United States (or
Puerto Rico). Second generation Latinos are those born in the United States or Puerto Rico and
whose parents were born outside the United States. Finally, third generation Latinos are nativeborn (USA or Puerto Rico) children of at least one U.S.-born parent. Another control variable
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related to generation is naturalization, asked of persons born outside the U.S. or Puerto Rico. The
variable was recoded to indicate if the person is a naturalized citizen (1) or not (0).
The final variable is educational attainment, which runs from “0” (no formal education) to “7”
(advanced graduate/professional degree). This variable was not recoded for analysis.
Table 3.8 Frequency Distribution of Demographic Characteristics
All Latinos
Demographic Characteristics
Age (Means)
Educational Attainment
None
Eight grade or below
Some high school
GED
High school graduate

34.3
2
17
17
3
26

Some college
4 year college degree
Graduate/Professional Degree
Sex
Men

21
8
5

Women
Generation
First (born outside the U.S.)
Second (immigrant parents)
Third+ (U.S.-born parents)

53

Citizenship of Foreign-born
Naturalized Citizen
Not Naturalized
Latino Ancestry/Origin
Mexican
Central American

47

65
16
19
19
81
70
9

Puerto Rican
8
South American
4
Cuban
4
Dominican
4
Other/Don’t know/Refused
2
Source: 2006 Latino National Survey
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The distribution of the variables is shown in Table 3.8 (above) The mean age of Latino adults is
34.3 years old, and there is a slight gender imbalance as the majority of respondents are women
(53 percent), compared with 47 percent who are men.
Over one-third of Latinos (36 percent) have less than a high school education, 29 percent have a
high school degree or GED, while 34 percent have at least some college education. Nearly twothirds of respondents were born outside the United States, while 35 percent were born in the U.S.
Of these 16 percent are children of immigrant parents, while 19 percent are third generation —
children of at least one U.S.-born parent. Roughly 1-in-5 respondents (19 percent) are naturalized
citizens, meaning that more than half the sample is U.S. citizens (19 percent naturalized and 35
percent born in the U.S. or Puerto Rico).
The national origin or ancestry of Latinos is heavily Mexican, such that Mexican Americans
comprise 70 percent of the total sample. Nine percent of the sample is of Central American
origin, such as Guatemalan or Panamanian. Eight percent of respondents have Puerto Rican
ancestry. Cubans, Dominicans, and South Americans such as Argentineans or Peruvians, each
comprise 4 percent of the sample, while an additional 2 percent have other backgrounds.
Distribution of Cultural Traits, Core Beliefs, and Demographic Characteristics by the
Latino Ethno-Ideologies
This section shows how the cultural traits, core beliefs, and demographic characteristics are
distributed among Latinos depending on their ethno-ideological orientation. It is divided in three
sub-sections, one each for the cultural traits, core beliefs, and demographic characteristics. The
frequency distributions are shown in Tables 3.9.1 to 3.9.3.
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Cultural Traits and Latino Ethno-Ideologies
Table 3.9.1 (below) shows how the different cultural traits are distributed among Latinos
subscribing to each of the three Ethno ideologies. For references purposes the table also shows
the distribution of these variables among the Latino sample as a whole.
The distribution among Latinos subscribing to these different ethno-ideologies shows that on
several occasions, there is little variation among them while on others, the differences are
striking and illustrative of how the ideologies develop.
Table 3.9.1. Cultural Traits by Ethno-Ideology
All Latinos

Pan-ethnic

Co-ethnic

Ethnic

71
29

72
28

70
30

69
31

41
51
8

36
58
7

45
45
10

55
37
9

69
31

72
28

35

41

13
7
15
19

13
5
14
20

12

7

Cultural Traits
Catholicism
Catholic
Not a Catholic
Primary Language
Spanish
Bilingual
English
Spanish Media Consumption

Spanish
69
69
Only English
31
31
Family Values (Frequency of Travel to Visit Family Abroad)
Never
33
30
More than five years ago
13
13
Once in the past five years
7
8
Once in the past three years
15
15
Once a year
20
21
More than once a year
13
14
Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

The cultural trait of Catholicism shows very little variation. The most Catholic Ethno-Ideology is
"pan-ethnic" (72 percent), while the "ethnic" is the least Catholic (69 percent). Although the
expectation was to find major differences, especially expecting that the most Catholic cohort
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would be those who subscribe to a co-ethnic ideology. However, the differences are not
significant.
The variable measuring the respondent's language proficiency shows that more than half of
Latinos are bilingual (51 percent), about four-in-ten (41 percent) Spanish dominant with little
English proficiency, and just under nine-in-ten (8 percent) primarily communicate in English
with little proficiency in Spanish. Pan-ethnic Latinos have a lower proportion of subscribers who
are primarily Spanish speakers (36 percent), while a strong majority (58 percent) is bilingual.
However, the ideological cohort that has more primarily Spanish speakers is the ethnic cohort: a
majority (55 percent) speaks mostly Spanish. Co-ethnic Latinos are evenly divided between
those who are primarily Spanish speakers and those who are bilingual (45 percent each).
The media consumption variable has a similar distribution to the Catholicism variable. There are
no major differences in consumption of Spanish-language media, though Latinos subscribing to
an ethnic ideology are the most likely to report they watch news in Spanish. The difference is not
significant.
The family values variables, frequency of travel abroad to visit family, exhibits major
differences. The most likely group to travel to visit family abroad is pan-ethnic Latinos. Just over
one-third (35 percent) report they travel at least once a year. By contrast, ethnic Latinos are the
least likely to travel frequently (27 percent) and the most likely to report that they almost or
almost never travel (54 percent).
The distribution of cultural traits shows that on two of them, there is little variation among
Latinos by ideological inclination; yet on two of these cultural traits, the differences are
significant and unexpected. Ethnic Latinos, contrary to expectations are not populated
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disproportionately by English-dominant Latinos, but by Spanish-dominant Latinos. Moreover,
the family values variable, measured as travel frequency shows that, ideologically, ethnic Latinos
are the least likely to travel frequently and the most likely to report they travel little. While this
is not surprising, their travel frequency is significantly different from pan-ethnic Latinos, who
were also expected to have weak family corrections. Pan-ethnic Latinos have the strongest
connections, as they are the most likely to travel frequently and the least likely to never travel.
Core Beliefs and Latino Ethno-Ideologies
The core beliefs (in Table 3.9.2 on pages 88-89) have findings more consistent with theory
expectations. In the core belief of identity, the distribution shows that nearly eight-in-ten (78
percent) Latinos consider it is very important to being a distinct group in America socially.
Those subscribing to a pan-ethnic ideology are the most likely (81 percent) but, while
statistically significant, these differences are not substantial since vast majorities of Latinos
indicate that being a distinct group is important to them. 7
There are no statistical differences between Latinos of these Ethno-ideologies on the core beliefs
of desire to return. At least three-fourths of Latinos of all ideological subscriptions do not have a
desire to return.

7

Statistical differences are determined using a chi-square analysis, and it is available upon request.
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Table 3.9.2. Core Beliefs by Ethno-Ideology
All Latinos
Core Beliefs
Identity (Importance of keeping a distinct culture)
Very Important
78
Somewhat Important
18
Not Important
3
Desire to Return to Country of Origin

Pan-ethnic

Co-ethnic

Ethnic

81
17
2

76
20
4

75
17
8

No
76
77
75
Yes
24
23
25
Linked Fate
“How much does YOU doing well depend on how other Latinos also (sic) doing
well?”(Personal linked fate)
A lot
43
50
37

76
24

25

Some
25
28
24
7
Little
16
11
20
31
Nothing
16
11
19
36
“How much does LATINOS doing well depend on how other Latinos also (sic) doing
well?” (Group linked fate)
A lot
49
55
45
27
Some
28
32
26
11
Little
14
8
19
34
Nothing
9
5
10
28
Commonalities with Other Minorities
“Thinking about issues like job opportunities, educational attainment or income, how much
do Latinos have in common with African Americans?”
A lot
23
27
18
18
Some
37
39
37
24
Little
24
20
27
36
Nothing
16
14
18
22
“Thinking about things like government services and employment, political power and
representation, how much do Latinos have in common with African Americans?”
A lot
20
24
16
17
Some
36
39
34
22
Little
Nothing

30
26
15
12
Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

34
17

35
26
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Table 3.9.2. Core Beliefs by Ethno-Ideology (Continued)
All Latinos

Pan-ethnic

Core American Values
American Dream:
“Latinos can get ahead in the United States if they work hard”
Strongly Agree
77
77
Somewhat Agree
19
18
Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Co-ethnic

76
19
2

Ethnic

76
18
3

Strongly Disagree
2
2
2
4
Personal Responsibility:
“Most people who don't get ahead should not blame the system, they have only themselves
to blame”
Strongly Agree
50
49
50
59
Somewhat Agree
22
22
23
16
Somewhat Disagree
15
15
15
12
Strongly Disagree
13
13
12
12
Equal Opportunity:
“Is not really a big problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others”
Strongly Agree
36
34
36
46
Somewhat Agree
22
22
21
18
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree

19
19
23
24
Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

20
23

18
19

On the core belief of linked fate, Latinos have major differences depending on their ideological
views. Moreover, the directions and extent of these differences are consistent with the theory’s
expectations. Latinos who subscribe to a pan-ethnic ideology are the most likely to believe that
their own well-being depends on other Latinos’ (78 percent) or that their groups’ well-being
depends on other Latinos doing well (87 percent). On the other hand, Latinos subscribing to an
ethnic ideology are less likely to believe their own personal well-being and the well-being of
their own ethnic groups are related to the well-being of all Latinos. About two-thirds (67 percent)
of Latinos subscribing to an ethnic ideology believe that their personal well-being has little or
nothing to do with other Latinos and a majority (52 percent) says the same about their own
national origin groups. On both measures, Latinos who subscribe to a co-ethnic ideology fall in

90

the middle, though a strong majority agrees on both the personal (61 percent) and group (71
percent) measures of linked fate.
The same types of differences are found on the core belief of commonality with other minorities,
in this case, African Americans. Consistent with expectations, pan-ethnic Latinos think they
share the most in common socially (66 percent) and politically (63 percent) with African
Americans. Similarly, a majority of Latinos subscribing to an ethnic ideology does not believe
that Latinos have social (58 percent) or political (61 percent) commonalities with African
Americans.
The beliefs of Latinos subscribing to a co-ethnic ideology regarding commonalities with African
Americans fall in the middle of pan-ethnics and ethnics and follow a similar pattern to the results
concerning Latino linked fate. A majority (55 percent) of co-ethnic Latinos believe that Latinos
share “a lot” or “some” social commonalities with African Americans, while half (50 percent)
believe they have political commonalities with African Americans.
Finally, beliefs on core American values mostly fall in line with the theory’s expectations. There
are no significant differences regarding the American Dream —more than three quarters of
Latinos, regardless of ideological inclination, agree that Latinos can get ahead if they work hard.
On the other two core beliefs there are some significant differences, though these differences are
not particularly strong. Although more than 7-in-10 Latinos of all ideologies agree “people
should not blame the system if they do not succeed,” the extent to which they strongly agree to
the statement varies according to expectations. Latinos subscribing to an ethnic ideology are the
most likely to strongly agree with the statement measuring the value of personal responsibility,
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while pan-ethnic Latinos were less likely to agree with the statement than ethnic-subscribing
Latinos (49 percent vs. 59 percent).
Belief in the final core value (equal opportunity) is also widely shared among Latinos. On this
value the difference is also a matter of intensity. Latinos subscribing to a pan-ethnic ideology are
the least likely to agree “that it is not a big problem that some people have more of a chance in
life than others (34 percent),” while more than 4-in-10 (46 percent) of ethnic Latinos strongly
agree with the statement. This difference in intensity may indicate dissatisfaction with their
experiences in American society being higher among groups who exhibit the strongest levels of
commonalities with other Latinos.
Demographic Characteristics and Latino Ethno-Ideologies
There are also some demographic differences by ideological subscription, shown in Table 3.9.3
(page 92). Those subscribing to a pan-ethnic ideology are the youngest (33.8 years), not very
different from Latinos subscribing to a co-ethnic ideology (34.3 years). Latinos who subscribe to
an ethnic ideology are the oldest, on average, with a mean age of nearly 37 years (36.7), more
than 3 years older than the average pan-ethnic subscriber.
Latinos subscribing to a pan-ethnic ideology and an ethnic ideology also differ on educational
attainment. Nearly half (47 percent) of Latinos subscribing to an ethnic ideology have less than
high school education. Only one-third (33 percent) of Latinos subscribing to a pan-ethnic
ideology have less than a high school education and tend also to have the highest levels of
education. Nearly 4-in-10 (38 percent) of pan-ethnic Latinos have at least some college
education, 10 percentage points higher than the rate for ethnic Latinos (28 percent).
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There are no major differences regarding the gender composition of the group, though Latinos
who subscribe to a co-ethnic ideology have the greatest gender imbalance (54 percent are
women, 46 percent are men).
Table 3.9.3. Demographic Characteristics by Ethno-Ideology
Demographic Characteristics
Age (Means)
Educational Attainment
None
Eighth grade or below
Some high school
GED
High school graduate
Some college
4 year college degree
Graduate/Professional Degree
Sex
Men
Women
Generation
First (born outside the U.S.)
Second (immigrant parents)
Third+ (U.S.-born parents)
Citizenship of Foreign-born
Naturalized Citizen
Not Naturalized
Latino Ancestry/Origin
Mexican
Central American
Puerto Rican
South American

All Latinos

Pan-ethnic

Co-ethnic

Ethnic

34.3

33.8

34.3

36.9

2
17

2
14

2
20

5
24

17
3
26
21
8

17
3
26
24
9

16
3
27
18
8

18
2
23
18
6

5

5

5

4

47
53

48
52

46
54

50
50

65

64

65

70

16
19

18
19

15
20

11
19

19
81

21
79

17
83

16
84

70
9
8

71
7
9

70
10
6

67
10
7

4

4

5

5

4
4
2

6
2
3

Cuban
4
4
Dominican
4
4
Other/Don’t know/Refused
2
2
Source: 2006 Latino National Survey
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Latinos of all ethno-ideological inclinations are similarly likely to be third-generation
Americans, meaning that they are children of parents who were also born in the United States.
However, Latinos subscribing to an ethnic ideology are the most likely to be first-generation
immigrants (70 percent), although about two thirds of co-ethnic (65 percent) and pan-ethnic
Latinos (64 percent) are also first-generation.
Latinos who subscribe to a pan-ethnic ideology are the most likely to be U.S.-born children of
immigrant parents (18 percent), compared to 15 percent among co-ethnic and 11 percent among
ethnic Latinos. While there are some minor differences among Latinos by country of origin,
these are not significant.
The descriptive analysis of the variables measuring the cultural traits and core beliefs suggests
that language use, linked fate, commonalities with African Americans, will have the greater
impact on promoting a pan-ethnic ideology. This will be tested in several statistical models that
are described in the next section and will be explored on chapter 4, 5, and 6.
Description of Statistical Analysis
OLS Regression
The analysis will consist in ordinary least squares OLS regressions. This method, though simple
compared with other statistical methods in use today is perfectly suited to test dependent
variables based on scales such as the ideology scale tested in this project.
The dependent variable, ideology, ranges from 0 to 1 (on a scale, see initial part of this chapter)
where 0 indicates that the respondent has an ethnic ideology, this means, that people have no
feelings of social or political commonalities with other Latinos. At the other end of the spectrum
(1) is the pan-ethnic ideology. It is important to remember that the dependent variable is a scale,
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and it is not a binary variable that only has values of “0” and “1.”Those who exhibit a pan-ethnic
ideology feel socially and politically closer to other Latinos. Those with ideological scores
toward the middle are classified as co-ethnic.
A negative association between the independent and dependent variables means that the higher
the value of the independent variable, the lower the expected ideology score of the dependent
variable. By contrast, if an independent variable is positively associated with the dependent
variable, this means that the higher the score of this particular variable, the higher the panethnicity score also will be8.
The analysis follows a series of OLS models built in order to highlight the progress of the
analysis and the test of the relationships of the cultural traits and core beliefs on ideologies. The
baseline model will include only the control variables of sex, age, and educational attainment,
respondent’s citizenship status and if the respondent is a naturalized citizen. The next steps then
is to add the set of variables related to cultural traits to the baseline model (Chapter 4), the set of
variables related to core beliefs to the baseline model (Chapter 5) and then to present a full
model including cultural traits and core beliefs. The change in the coefficients in the cultural
traits and core beliefs accounts for the change in the relationship of the independent variables
and the dependent variables and the robustness on the models’ explanatory power, as indicated
through the R squares (for a similar analysis using nested models see Carrigall-Brown, Wilkes
2014, 413).

8

In addition to the OLS regression, these different methods were also employed: multinomial and ordinal
regressions. The basic relationship between the dependent and the independent variables did not change
substantially in the three models. For this reason, I decided to use the simplest and most straightforward of them.
The results of the multinomial and the ordinal models are available in Appendix 3.1 for review.
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Logistic Regression Analysis
In addition to the OLS models, I include logistic regression analyses exploring how the cultural
traits, core beliefs, and demographic characteristics affect the three Latino-Ethno Ideologies
(pan-ethnic, co-ethnic, and ethnic) individually. These analysis allow a more nuanced view of the
variables influencing the Ethno-Ideologies in ways that the OLS analyses cannot. The logistic
analysis take into account the existence of the discrete Ethno-Ideologies rather than just
exploring a negative or positive relationship between the independent variables and the scale.
To construct the Ethno-Ideologies, I divide the scale into dichotomous variables in which the
Ethno-Ideology of interest is coded “1” and the other two ethno-ideologies “0”. There will be
three dependent variables, one for each Ethno-Ideology (pan-ethnic, co-ethnic and ethnic). The
dependent variable in the pan-ethnic model indicates a coding of “1” if the Latino EthnoIdeological score ranges from 0.750 to 1 and “0” for lower scores. The co-ethnic model’s
dependent variable is coded as “1,” when the scale has a range between 0.313 and 0.688, and “0”
for those subscribing to the other Ethno-Ideologies. Finally, Latinos subscribing to an ethnic
ideology are coded “1” if they score between 0 and 0.25.
Focus group analysis
I complement the analysis of the LNS with qualitative data from focus groups conducted in 2013
by Public Religion Research Institute. The conversations in these focus groups include
informative discussions about the role of the cultural traits such as religion and family in Latino
identity. Moreover, participants also discussed the role that their identity as Latinos plays in their
political decisions.
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The 2013 focus groups were conducted in Phoenix, Arizona among Catholic, Protestant, and
nonreligious Latinos (two groups of each), for a total of 12 groups, as part of PRRI’s 2013
Hispanic Values Survey. Phoenix, located in a southwestern border state with a historic Latino
population, helps understanding how this old Latino community interprets what binds them
together and how much it matters politically.
These focus groups included specific discussions about Latino unity and linked fate, the
importance of particular cultural traits such as religion, family, and language. The discussions in
these groups provide insights about the importance of particular traits and beliefs in the
construction of the Latino ideologies. 9
The focus groups will provide qualitative evidence in the chapters related to the cultural traits
and core beliefs. For example, the focus groups include extensive discussions about the meaning
of family and family values which inform how the operationalization of family values in this
study.
These groups have some limitations. They were conducted in Phoenix, Arizona, which is a good
place, a historical Mexican-American community. But it is not necessarily generalizable to the
experience of Latinos in the nation as a whole. This means that while the information that it
provides can help shed light on the quantitative (survey) findings, these interpretations must be
taken with caution.
Conclusion

9

See Appendix 3.2 for the interview guide of the focus groups.
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This chapter described the process to select and code the variables that will be used to measure
the ideologies in the Ethnic Ideological Heuristic. The dependent variable (ideology) measures
how much Latinos feel they have in common with each other socially and politically.
The independent variables will measure the salience of four cultural traits and five core beliefs
that are hypothesized to affect Latinos’ ideology. In addition to the cultural traits and the core
beliefs, there are a series of demographic characteristics that will work as control variables for
the differences in nationality, citizenship, and generation that exist among Latinos.
Complementing the statistical models will be focus groups conducted among Latinos in 2013,
this will provide context to the statistical findings. The following chapters will consist of the
analyses of the cultural traits and core beliefs and their relationship to ideology.
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Chapter 4. Cultural Traits: The Heritage that Binds
Chapter 3 described the data sources (2006 Latino National Survey, focus groups from Public
Religion Research Institute), variables, and methodology for measuring and testing Latino
Ethno-Ideologies. This chapter explores the influence of cultural traits on the Latino EthnoIdeologies and core beliefs, and it is guided by two research questions: One, how do cultural
traits affect Latinos' Ethno-Ideological subscription? And, two, how does the experience of
living in America (core beliefs) vary according to Latinos’ cultural traits?
The goal of the first question is to understand how the cultural traits affect the Latino Ethnoideologies. I expect to find that three of the cultural traits (Catholicism, primary language use,
and Spanish media consumption) are associated with the development of a pan-ethnic Latino
Ethno-Ideology, as these should foster a sense of kinship or commonality among Latinos. The
fourth cultural trait (family values), should be negatively associated with the development of a
pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology because Latinos who support these values will feel a closer kinship
with people who share their own national origin, which should produce a differentiation between
them and other Latinos. The closer Latinos feel with family values of their own ethnic group
should make them feel disconnected to the idea of sharing the values of “an imagined pan-ethnic
Latino family” (Zazueta Martínez 2010, 163).
The goal of the second question is to explore the relationship between the cultural traits and the
core beliefs. I expect to find variation in agreement with the different measures of core beliefs
depending on Latinos’ cultural traits. For example, Latinos who identify as Catholic should have
different opinions than non-Catholics on the core beliefs that enhance feelings of commonalities
among Latinos. Thus, I am, specifically, interested in knowing if Latinos who exhibit traits
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associated with being Latino are more likely to agree with the core beliefs associated with Latino
unity.
This chapter is divided in four sections. Section 1 consists of a descriptive analysis of the
distribution of the Latino Ethno-Ideologies by different values of the cultural traits: Catholicism,
primary language use, Spanish media consumption, and family values. This analysis should find
substantial differences in the distribution of their Ethno-Ideological subscription depending on
their cultural traits. The second section consists of a regression analysis exploring the effect of
the cultural traits on the Latino Ethno-Ideologies. The regression analysis includes controls for
the demographic characteristics of Latinos in order to gauge the isolated effect of the cultural
traits. The purpose of this regression is to understand the predictive power of the cultural traits
on Latino Ethno-Ideologies.
The third section consists of a descriptive analysis of the distribution of the core beliefs among
Latinos, depending on their respective cultural traits. For example, I will show how Latinos who
are primarily Spanish speakers, bilingual, or English speakers differ on their core beliefs. The
chapter’s final section is a conclusion summarizing the findings and a preview of Chapter 5.
The Relationship between Cultural Traits and Ideology
In Chapter 3 I explained the construction of the Latino Ethno-Ideologies, which consists of a
scale that ranks Latinos according to how much in common they think they have with each other.
Using the 2006 Latino National Survey, I developed a Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale using
questions that ask Latinos about how much in common they have on two respects: political (such
as representation and participation in government) and social (such as income, educational
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attainment, and employment). These variables produced a scale that ranges from “0” (no
commonalities) to “1” (agree that Latinos have “a lot” in common on all dimensions).
From the scale I divided Latinos into three distinct Ethno-Ideologies that vary according to the
extent that Latinos think they share commonalities. A majority (53 percent) of Latinos subscribe
to a pan-ethnic ideology (score: 0.750-1), meaning that they think Latinos share “some” or “a
lot” in common. An additional 39 percent subscribe to a co-ethnic ideology (score: 0.313-0.688),
which means that they think that Latinos have “some” or “a lot” in common in some aspects but
not in others. Finally, 8 percent of Latinos subscribe to an ethnic ideology (score: 0-0.250).
These respondents think that Latinos share “almost nothing” or “nothing” in common with each
other. The Latino Ethno-Ideologies Theory predicts that cultural traits that bind Latinos together
are associated with fostering a pan-ethnic ideology.
The four cultural traits binding Latinos are (1) Catholicism, (2) the use of Spanish language, (3)
consumption of Spanish-language media, and (4) family values. I expect that Latinos who have
the most distinctive “Latino” cultural traits like speaking Spanish, consuming Spanish-language
news media, and identifying with the Catholic religion are more likely to develop a pan-ethnic
ideology. By contrast, family values—measured as transnational ties by keeping constant contact
with family and friends through recent travel to their country of origin or ancestry—should be
less likely to feel a sense of commonality between Latinos of different nationalities because of
how recent they stay in touch with their ethnic roots which makes them see more distinctions
between Latinos of different national origins.
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Descriptive Analysis
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of Latino Ethno-Ideologies by cultural traits. The ideology
scale ranges from "0," which indicates that the respondent does not think Latinos share anything
in common, to "1" indicating that the respondents believe there are a lot of commonalities
between all Latinos. Depending on their score, Latinos are grouped into three distinct EthnoIdeologies: ethnic, co-ethnic, and pan-ethnic. Overall, as shown in Figure 4.1, a majority (53
percent) of Latinos have a pan-ethnic ideology, about 4-in-10 (39 percent) have a co-ethnic
ideology, and less than one-tenth (8 percent) have an ethnic ideology. There is no major variation
among Latinos with different cultural traits with some exceptions.
Figure 4.1. Distribution of Ideology by Cultural Traits
All Latinos
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39

53

Catholic

8

38

54

Not a Catholic

8

Primarily Spanish

40

10

Bilingual

52
43

6

47

34

60

Primarily English

9

Spanish Media

8

38

53

English media only

7

39

54

Last visited more than five
years ago or never visited

47

9

Visited within the last 3 years

40

7
0

44

51
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Ethnic

20
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30

Coethnic

40
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70

80

90

100

Panethnic

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey
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Catholicism
Catholicism should be associated with a pan-ethnic ideology because it is a trait that many
Latinos share regardless of national origin or ancestry, a legacy of Spanish colonial heritage
(Garcia and Sanchez 2008, 41). Yet, according to Figure 4.1 (above), Catholic Latinos do not
differ substantially from non-Catholic Latinos in their Ethno-Ideological subscription. Both
Catholic and non-Catholic Latinos are equally likely to subscribe to an ethnic ideology (8 percent
for both). Non-Catholic Latinos are slightly more likely to subscribe to a co-ethnic ideology than
Catholics (40 percent and 38 percent, respectively). Catholic Latinos have a slightly higher
percentage of pan-ethnic subscription than non-Catholics (54 percent vs. 52 percent). These
findings suggest that identifying with the Catholic religion is a cultural trait that, although
produces a slightly higher propensity for pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideological subscription, is not
substantially different from the Ethno-Ideological subscription of non-Catholics.
Everyday Language Use
Language is a trait also expected to be positively associated with a pan-ethnic ideology, as it
binds Latinos through generations and countries. The results from Figure 4.1 (on page 100) show
that language is an important building bloc of the ethno-ideologies, but the results are mixed. It is
expected that those who communicate in Spanish should be more likely to subscribe to a panethnic ideology. This is partially the case. A majority of bilingual Latinos (60 percent) subscribe
to a pan-ethnic ideology, the highest among cultural traits. By contrast, Latinos whose dominant
language is Spanish are significantly less likely to subscribe to a pan-ethnic ideology. Instead, 47
percent of Latinos whose dominant language is Spanish subscribe to a pan-ethnic identity.
Moreover, Latinos compared to all other cultural trait categories, who primarily speak Spanish
are the most likely to subscribe to an ethnic ideology (10 percent), in which Latinos think they
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share nothing in common, though this difference is not significant when compared to the 9
percent of English-dominant Latinos, who also subscribe to an ethnic ideology.
This means that bilingual respondents have greater commonalities and feel closer to Latinos in
all social and political aspects. The impact of speaking Spanish does not necessarily produce a
pan-ethnic ideology all the time. The expectation that language binds Latinos and produces a
pan-ethnic ideology is true among bilingual Latinos but not among monolingual Latinos of either
language.
Spanish Media Consumption
Figure 4.1 (on page 100) also shows that Latinos who consume news in Spanish are no more
likely to subscribe to a pan-ethnic ideology than Latinos who only consume their news in
English (53 percent vs. 54 percent). While the birth and growth of Spanish-language media
targets an ample public of Latinos who prefer news and television delivered in Spanish, the use
of Spanish language media does not seem to motivate the feeling that Latinos shared a lot of
commonalities in a way that deviates from the percentages of Latinos overall. This suggests that,
despite being predicted as a cultural trait that should foster feelings of commonality among
Latinos, Spanish-language media consumption does not play a substantial role in increasing
those feelings of political and social commonalities, compared to Latinos who only consume
English-language media.
Family Values
The final cultural trait, family values, is measured using how recent was the last visit to their
home countries in Latin America. In Figure 4.1 (page 100) the variable is collapsed into two
categories: recent travel (within the last three years) and those who last visited 5 years or more
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ago or have never visited. Latinos who traveled within the past three years to their country of
origin are more likely to subscribe to a pan-ethnic ideology than those who last visited 5 years or
more ago or have not traveled at all. A majority (56 percent) of Latinos who have traveled
recently to visit family and friends in their country of ancestry subscribe to a pan-ethnic
ideology, whereas only 51 percent of Latinos who report to have last visited 5 years or more ago
or never have a pan-ethnic ideology. These differences are surprising because, contrary to the
theory’s expectations, they suggest that family ties and more recent connections to the old
country do not strengthen Latinos’ identification with their own group and do not undermine a
sense of commonality with other Latinos. Instead, recent contact with family and friends through
travel abroad enhances the feelings of commonality with other Latinos and more likely to
subscribe to a pan-ethnic ideology than originally expected.
Overall, the descriptive analysis of the cultural traits and their relationship with ideology
suggests that only two of the four cultural traits –language use and family values- have a positive
association with a pan-ethnic ideology. Given the expectation that the usage of the Spanish
language should lead to a perception of commonality among Latinos, the fact that those who
primarily speak Spanish are less likely to be ideologically pan-ethnic than Latinos overall
suggests that Spanish language alone may not be the main linguistic driver of pan-ethnic
ideology. It must be noted, however, that 60 percent of bilingual Latinos subscribe to a panethnic ideology, the most likely of any group. This suggests that, while Spanish monolingualism
is not necessarily a harbinger of pan-ethnic ideology, the Spanish language still has a role in the
development of pan-ethnicity as an ideology.
The unique profile of bilingual Latinos in combination with the also distinctive profile of Latinos
who traveled recently to visit relatives in the country of ancestry, 56 percent of whom also have a
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pan-ethnic ideology (Table 4.1 in page 107), suggests that being in contact with one’s roots may
be important for the development of a pan-ethnic ideology. These two findings put forward the
idea that an ability to move across worlds, literally through travel and figuratively through
language, is an important aspect of nurturing the perceptions of commonalities among Latinos of
different national origins and backgrounds.
Whether these prominent relationships will remain as strong in a multivariate statistical analysis
is the goal of the next part of this section, which consists of a regression analysis to calculate the
effect of the cultural traits on the Ethno-Ideologies.
Multivariate Analysis
To assess the effects of the cultural traits on the Latino Ethno-Ideologies I will use two OLS
regression models. The dependent variable, Ethno-Ideology, consists of a scale that ranges from
“0” to “1” and indicates how much Latinos think they have in common with each other on social
aspects such as education and income, as well as in political aspects like representation. Latinos
scoring closer to “0” think that Latinos do not share any of these characteristics, while those
scoring closer to “1” think Latinos share all of them10.
The model includes measures for the cultural traits and demographic characteristics. The
baseline model includes only the demographic characteristics, while the cultural model includes
the demographic characteristics along with the cultural traits. This way it is possible to assess
first how much of the variance in Ethno-ideologies is due to the demographic differences
between Latinos and then how much of the variance is explained by the cultural traits.

10

The dependent variable as currently construed is interpreted as an understanding of how close or separated
individual Latinos feel toward other Latinos. In Chapter 6, I include logistic analyses that explain how the
independent variables relate to each of the three Latino Ethno-Ideologies.
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Measuring Cultural Traits
The variables measuring the cultural traits are as follows. Catholicism is measured by a
dichotomous variable that indicates if the respondent identifies as Catholic (1) or not (0).
Everyday language use is measured by two dichotomous variables. The first variable indicates if
the respondent is bilingual (1) or not (0), the second variable if the respondent is primarily a
Spanish-speaker (1) or not (0). These variables are compared to the baseline, which indicates if
the respondent is primarily an English-speaker.
The third cultural trait, Spanish media consumption, is also a dichotomous variable that indicates
(1) if the respondent consumes news in Spanish (or in Spanish and English), or (0) that the
respondent only consumes media in English. Finally, family values, consists of a continuous
variable indicating how recent the respondent traveled to his or her home country to visit. The
lowest possible value is “0” and means that the respondent “never travels” to the home country.
The highest possible value is “5” indicating that the respondent reports traveling “more than once
a year.”
Measuring Demographic Characteristics
The models include controls for selected demographic. The sex variable indicates if the
respondent is a woman (1) or a man (0). The age variable indicates the age of the respondent in
years. The education variable is continuous and indicates the respondent’s educational
attainment which ranges from (0) “no formal schooling” to (7) “graduate or professional degree.”
Naturalized citizen is a dichotomous variable indicating if the respondent is foreign-born but
became a U.S. citizen through naturalization. Generation indicates how many generations
removed from immigration respondents are, and it is measured using three dichotomous
variables. First generation indicates that the respondent was born outside the U.S. or Puerto
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Rico (1) or not (0), second generation indicates that the respondent was born in the U.S. or
Puerto Rico of parents born outside the U.S. (1) or not (0). The baseline for these variables is
third generation, indicating if respondents are U.S.-born children of parents born in the U.S. (1)
or not (0). Finally, Ancestry indicates if the respondent was born in or has ancestry from the
following countries or regions: Puerto Rico, Cuba, Dominican Republic, South America, Central
America, or has any other Latino ancestry with the exception of Mexican ancestry, which is the
baseline category. All of these ancestry variables are dichotomous and indicate if the respondent
is of a particular national origin (1) or not (0).
Baseline Model Results
Model 1 in Table 4.1 (page 107) shows the baseline model, which only controls for the
demographic characteristics. Because the continuous scale ranges from 0 (ethnic) to 1 (panethnic) a positive coefficient in the independent variables indicates a positive association with
the Ethno-Ideologies, suggesting that such a variable is associated with a greater association with
a pan-ethnic ideology. A negative association of the covariates indicates a decrease in the EthnoIdeology score, suggesting that such a variable moves away from a pan-ethnic ideology and
towards an ethnic ideology. For example, when a respondent has a characteristic indicated by an
independent dichotomous variable, such as being a woman, the Ethno-Ideological score will
increase (or decrease) according to the coefficient. In the case of a continuous variable like
education, an increase (or decrease) in one unit is associated with an increase or decrease in the
Ethno-Ideological score. Because the dependent variable’s score ranges from “0” to “1” on a
continuous scale, the changes can be interpreted as a percentage increase or decrease in the
score.

108

Table 4.1 OLS Regression Analysis Effects of Cultural Traits and Demographic Characteristics
on Ethno-Ideologies
[2] Addition of Cultural
Traits to Model
Coeff.
(SE)

[1] Baseline Model
Coeff.
(SE)

Variables
Cultural Traits
Catholicism
Everyday language use
Spanish
Bilingual
Spanish media consumption
Family Values
Demographic Controls
Sex (Woman)

0.007

Age
Education
Naturalized citizen
Generations removed from immigration
First generation
Second generation
Latino ancestry
Puerto Rican ancestry
Cuban ancestry
Dominican ancestry
Central American ancestry
South American ancestry
Other ancestry
Constant
R2
Number of Observations

(0.006)

-0.001

(0.000)

0.008

(0.002)

0.037

(0.008)

-0.004
0.021

(0.009)
(0.010)

0.023
-0.012
0.026
-0.028
-0.034

(0.011)
(0.015)
(0.014)
(0.011)
(0.014)

-0.076

(0.021)

0.672

(0.014)

0.02
7,090

**
*
**
*
**
*

*
*

*
*
**
*
**
*

0.014

(0.006)

*

-0.012
0.042
0.033
0.005

(0.014)
(0.012)
(0.008)
(0.002)

***
***
**

0.007

0.006

-0.001

0.000

**

0.007

0.002

***

0.017

0.008

*

-0.003
0.007

0.011
0.010

0.021
0.011
0.022
-0.023
-0.034

0.011
0.015
0.014
0.011
0.014

*
*

-0.066

0.022

**

0.618
0.03
6,928

0.016

***

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

The baseline model in Table 4.1 shows that sex has no significant effect on ethno-ideologies,
while age is negatively associated with the Ethno-Ideological scale (p≤0.001). This means that
an increase in age (or the older the respondent) corresponds with a negative impact on pan-ethnic
ideology, and that, everything else being equal, younger Latinos are more likely to subscribe to a
pan-ethnic ideology than older Latinos. Educational attainment is positively associated with the
ethno-ideology (p≤0.001). This means that the ethno-ideological score of a Latino with a law or
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medical degree is 5.6 percentage points higher than the ethno-ideological score of a Latino with
no formal education, everything else being equal, and corresponds also to an increase in the
ethno ideological scale.11
Being a naturalized U.S. citizen is associated with an increase of 3.7 percentage points in a
respondent’s ethno-ideological score (p≤0.001). There are also modest generational differences.
A respondent who identifies as a second-generation Latino (U.S.-born child of immigrant
parents) has an ethno-ideology score 2.1 percentage points higher (p≤0.05) than a thirdgeneration Latino (U.S.-born child of U.S.-born parents). However, there are no significant
differences between third-generation Latinos and first-generation immigrants.
Finally, on the ancestry identification variables, having a Puerto Rican ancestry is associated
with a modest, but significant increase in the ethno-ideological score, compared to Latinos of
Mexican ancestry (p≤0.05). By contrast, reporting a Central American, South American, or other
Latino ancestry is negatively associated with the ethno-ideological score, compared to those of
Mexican ancestry.
The coefficient of determination (R2) of the baseline model is 0.02. This value indicates that the
baseline model containing only demographic variables explains 2 percent of the variance in the
ethno-ideological scale, dependent variable.
Cultural Traits Model
Model 2 in Table 4.1 (page 107) includes the variables measuring the cultural traits as well as the
demographic variables. Once again, the dependent variable is the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale

11

Since the dependent variable is based on a scale that ranges from 0-1, the changes in the coefficients of the
independent variables can be interpreted as percentage changes.
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and runs from “0” to “1,” as a categorical variable. The lowest value means that Latinos do not
think they share any social or political characteristics and is associated with an ethnic, EthnoIdeology. The highest value indicates that the respondent thinks that Latinos share a lot in
common politically and socially. This is associated with a pan-ethnic, Ethno-Ideology.
The results from Model 2 in Table 4.1 (page 107) show that all of the cultural traits have a
positive and significant association with the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale. The descriptive
analysis in the previous section (Figure 4.1 in page 100) shows that the differences between
Catholics and non-Catholics in their Ethno-Ideological distribution were very small, as both
groups tend to be equally likely to subscribe to a pan-ethnic ideology. However, the results from
Model 2 in Table 4.1 show that, even with this small difference, Catholicism’s effect on the
Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale is positive and significant (p≤0.05). This means that identifying
with the Catholic religion is associated with an increase in the Ethno-Ideological Scale.
The relationship between everyday language use and ethno-ideologies is more complex. Being a
Spanish-speaker should be associated with a greater sense of commonalities among Latinos, but
the coefficient for Spanish-speakers is negative but not significant, meaning that compared to
Latinos who primarily speak English, those who primarily speak Spanish are no different in their
ethno-ideological scores. However, compared to English-dominant Latinos, being bilingual is
positively associated with the Ethno-Ideological Scale. This means that being bilingual increases
a person’s Ethno-Ideological Score by 4.1 percentage points (p≤0.001), all else being equal. The
effect of being bilingual is the strongest of any variable in these models.
Consumption of Spanish-language media, as expected, is positively associated with the Latino
Ethno-Ideological Scale (p≤0.001). This means that Latinos who consume media in Spanish
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have, all else being equal, ethno-ideological scores that are 3.3 percentage points higher than
Latinos who solely consume media in English. This finding also suggests that media
consumption in Spanish serves as a building block of a pan-ethnic ideology, fostering a sense of
commonality among Latinos.
The final cultural trait, family values, also shows a positive and significant association with the
Ethno-Ideological Scale (p≤0.01). Latinos who visit family more than once a year in the country
of ancestry have, all else being equal, an Ethno-Ideological Score 2.5 percentage points higher
than Latinos who have never visited their land of ancestry. Contrary to what I expected, having
transnational family connections also influences positively the development of a pan-ethnic
ideology.
The results of the Cultural Traits Model (Model 2) confirm the hypotheses that the cultural traits
are generally associated with the development of a pan-ethnic ideology. In one case, the cultural
trait of family values positively associated with the Ethno-Ideological Scale. This finding is
contrary to the expectation that Latinos who travel often to their country of origin should tend to
subscribe to a co-ethnic ideology because they should feel a closer kinship to their own ancestry
group rather than the larger Latino community.
In the case of everyday language usage, Latinos who primarily speak Spanish are no different in
their Ethno-Ideological Scores than Latinos whose primary language is English. However,
Latinos who are bilingual have Ethno-Ideological Scores that are significantly higher from
Latinos who primarily speak English.
The results from the statistical test of these two cultural traits (bilingual everyday language use
and family values) suggest that the development of a pan-ethnic ideology is associated with the
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ability of navigating cultures linguistically and with staying in touch with their roots through
frequent travel. Latinos who travel often tend to have, all else being equal, higher ethnoideological scores than Latinos who travel less often; bilingual Latinos have, all else being equal,
higher Ethno-Ideological scores than Latinos who speak only the English language (the
comparison does not account for differences in being bilingual and speaking Spanish). Moreover,
the consumption of Spanish-language media is also a harbinger of a pan-ethnic ideology as it is
also associated with higher Ethno-Ideological scores. Finally, Catholicism is also positively
associated with a respondent Ethno-Ideological score. The combined effect of all the cultural
traits at their highest values increases the ethno-ideological score by 11.4 percentage points.
Comparing the Baseline and the Cultural Traits Models
The addition of the cultural traits (Model 2 on page 102) to the baseline demographic model
impacts the effect of some of the demographic characteristics on the Latino Ethno-Ideological
Scale. For example, the effect of being a naturalized citizen halves from 0.037 (p≤0.001) to
0.017 (p≤0.05). The generational effect (being a second-generation Latino) also reduces
substantially from 0.021 (p≤0.05) to 0.007 and loses its significance. The ancestry effects also
change to a lesser extent. The effect of having a Puerto Rican ancestry loses its statistical
significance. However, although the effects of having a Central American (p≤0.05), South
American (p≤0.01), or other Latino ancestry (p≤0.001) also decline, their relationship to the
Ethno-ideological Scale is still negative and significant.
The coefficient of determination (R2) of the Cultural Traits model is 0.03, is not substantially
higher than the R2 of the baseline model (R2=0.02) though the differences are statistically
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significant.12 Thus, while the effects of the cultural traits are significant and positive, their impact
on the ethno-ideologies is modest, at best, since it explains just 3 percent of the variance in the
Ethno-Ideological Scale compared to the 2 percent explained by the baseline model. This result
calls into question the importance of cultural traits in fostering Latino unity, whether by creating
a pan-ethnic identity as expected from the literature or, as expected from this study, a pan-ethnic
ideology because the explanatory power of the cultural traits is smaller than the explanatory
power of just Latinos’ demographic characteristics.
In the next section, I explore the relationship between the cultural traits and the core beliefs by
looking at the variation in the distribution of the core beliefs by the different cultural traits. This
analysis should show whether Latinos’ variation in cultural traits suggests a variation in Latinos’
core beliefs.
The Relationship between Cultural Traits and Core Beliefs
In addition to the four cultural traits, there are five core beliefs salient to the development of
ideologies among Latinos. These five core beliefs are the (1) importance of identity (2) desire to
return to the country of ancestry (3) a sense of linked fate with other Latinos (4) a belief in
commonalities with other minorities such as African Americans and (5) belief in core American
values such as the American Dream, personal responsibility, and equality of opportunity.
The relationship between the cultural traits and the core beliefs is that they reinforce each other.
The cultural traits represent the reasons why Latinos should see commonalities among them; they
have similar origins, share a language and a religion, and consume similar media content. The
core beliefs are attitudes that are acquired through the experience of living in the United States.

12

The significant is the result of an F-test. Results are available upon request.
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When combined these two concepts produce a sense of commonality among Latinos that develop
ethno-ideologies, sorting Latinos into different camps based on their perceptions of those
commonalities.
Table 4.2 (page 114), shows the cultural traits in columns and the core beliefs in rows. The rows
show concepts in bolded letters, which indicate the core beliefs. For instance, the core belief
importance of identity is measured by the percentage of Latinos who say that keeping a distinct
culture is very important to them. The first column indicates the distribution of the core beliefs
among all Latinos.
For example, 78 percent of Latinos say that it is important to keep a distinct culture in America.
The other columns encapsulate the cultural traits: column 2 shows the percentage of Catholic
Latinos who say that keeping a distinct culture is very important to them (80 percent).
Catholicism (Columns 2-3)
Compared to non-Catholic Latinos, those who identify as Catholic should have attitudes
suggestive of Latino unity, since it is a cultural trait salient to Latino identity. Yet, Table 4.2
shows that on most core beliefs, the differences between Catholic and non-Catholic Latinos are
within 5-percentage points of each other, meaning that their differences of opinion are a matter
of intensity. Catholic and non-Catholic Latinos tend to believe in the core beliefs, but the size of
the majorities who agree varies. The greatest differences, of 5 percentage points, are on
importance of identity and on linked fate. Eighty percent of Catholics believe it is very important
to keep a distinct culture, whereas 74 percent of non-Catholics believe this is very important. On
both measurements of linked fate (personal and group levels) there are differences of 5
percentage points between Catholics and non-Catholics.

115

116

Table 4.2. Distribution of Core Beliefs by Cultural Traits
Religion
[1]
All
Latinos
Core beliefs
Unweighted N=
8,634
Importance of Identity
Very important to keep
78
distinct culture
Desire to Return
Do NOT wants to return
76
Linked Fate
Latinos’ well-being
68
connected*
Ethnic group well-being
77
connected to Latinos’*
Commonalities with other groups
Share social
commonalities with
60
African Americans*
Share political
commonalities with
56
African Americans*
Core American Values
American Dream: Hard
95
work to get ahead**
Personal Responsibility:
People who don’t
73
succeed should blame
themselves**
Equal Opportunity: It is
a big problem that some
43
people have better
chance**

Primary Language Use
[4]
[5]
[6]

Spanish Media
Consumption
[7]
[8]

Family Values
[9]
[10]
Last
Last
Travel ≥
Travel ≤
5 Years
3 years
4,492
3,959

[2]

[3]

Catholic
6,157

Not
Catholic
2,477

Spanish
3, 776

Bilingual
4,205

English
653

Spanish
5,944

English
Only
2,610

80

74

81

78

64

82

71

77

80

75

79

61

85

94

69

91

76

76

69

64

76

65

45

75

52

67

69

78

73

82

75

61

81

68

76

78

59

63

46

67

75

59

72

59

61

55

57

45

61

71

51

65

56

55

96

95

97

94

92

96

93

96

95

73

71

72

73

75

71

76

73

72

41

47

33

48

60

37

54

42

43

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey
*Numbers indicate “some” or “a lot.”
**Numbers indicate “agree” or “strongly agree.”

Sixty-nine percent of Catholic Latinos feel that their well-being is personally connected to
Latino’s well-being, while 64 percent of non-Catholic Latinos feel that their well-being is
connected to all Latinos. There is a similar pattern for the case of ethnic linked fate. Seventyeight percent of Catholic Latinos feel that their ethnic group’s well-being is connected to all
Latinos' well-being, whereas 73 percent of non-Catholic Latinos also feels this connection.
Non-Catholic Latinos are less positive on the core American value of equal opportunity. Nearly
half (47 percent) of non-Catholic Latinos think it is a big problem that some people have a better
chance in life, a sentiment shared by 41 percent of Catholic Latinos. These findings suggest that
Catholicism is not a trait that leads Latinos to interpret, or experience, life in America in very
different ways than non-Catholic Latinos. In sum, Latino Catholics and non-Catholics have some
differences of opinion, but these are mostly a matter of intensity as these groups are not
strikingly apart from each other.
Everyday Language Use (Columns 4-6)
The largest differences between Latinos on the core belief of the importance of being a distinct
group in America are language-related. With the exception of the core American values of the
American Dream and personal responsibility, in which the differences between Englishdominant and Spanish-dominant Latinos are of 5-percentage points and 2-percentage points,
respectively, on most of the other core beliefs the gap between Latinos of different language
proficiency surpasses a 20-percentage point gap. Latinos who are bilingual always fall between
both monolingual cohorts, meaning that the extent of their agreement with the core beliefs falls
between the percentages of Spanish and English monolinguals.

118

Spanish-monolingual Latinos are the most likely to agree that it is very important to keep a
distinct culture (81 percent), while nearly two-thirds (64 percent) of English-monolingual
Latinos also say this is a very important core belief. These language differences indicate that
although on balance most Latinos consider their cultural identity to be important, language may
be a contentious issue in latinidad as far English-monolingual Latinos feeling left out of the
culture.
The second-largest gap –of 31-percentage points– between Spanish monolingual and English
monolingual Latinos is on linked fate, specifically on the belief that the well-being of all Latinos
is connected. More than three-quarters (76 percent) of Spanish-dominant Latinos and nearly twothirds (65 percent) of bilingual Latinos think that Latinos’ collective fate is linked compared to
less than half (45 percent) of English-dominant Latinos. The difference between monolingual
Spanish and English speakers on the other measure of linked fate, that their ethnic groups’ wellbeing is linked to that of all Latinos, is smaller though still wide. In this case, majorities of both
linguistic cohorts agree but differ on the intensity of their agreement: 82 percent of monolingual
Spanish-speakers, 75 percent of bilingual speakers, and 61 percent of English monolingual
Latinos. Simply put, English monolinguals have the lowest levels of agreement with the
measures of linked fate.
Interestingly, on another core belief, the response patterns are reversed. On the core belief of
commonalities with other racial minorities, English-dominant Latinos are the most likely to
agree that Latinos share social or political characteristics with African Americans. Less than half
(46 percent) of Spanish-dominant Latinos say they share social commonalities with African
Americans compared to two-thirds (67 percent) of bilingual Latinos and three-quarters of
English-monolingual Latinos. Similarly, only 45 percent of Spanish monolingual Latinos say
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they share political commonalities with African Americans. By contrast, 61 percent of bilingual
Latinos and 71 percent of English monolingual Latinos say they share political characteristics
with the African American community.
Finally, monolingual English speakers are more likely to say that it is a problem that some
people have a better chance in life (60 percent), nearly twice as likely as Spanish-language
monolingual Latinos (33 percent).
What these differences suggest is that language matters in the way that Latinos experience life in
America. Latinos who primarily speak English and those whose dominant language is Spanish
see life in America in different ways and relate to other Latinos and other groups, and their
countries of ancestry in ways that lead them in different directions.
Interestingly, bilingual Latinos are always in the middle, but their opinions also always align in
the direction that should lead to a pan-ethnic ideology according to the theory. This means that
on the variables measuring the core beliefs, bilingual Latinos’ opinions are constantly in
agreement with beliefs that should enhance a sense of commonality among Latinos.
Spanish Media Consumption (Columns 7-8)
Table 4.2 (on page 114) shows that there are some substantial differences by language of media
consumption that are similar, though not as wide to those experienced by language usage. The
response patterns are similar on core beliefs, where Spanish-dominant Latinos are more likely to
agree or to think they share commonalities with other Latinos, Latinos who consume Spanishlanguage media respond in a similar direction, while the reverse is true for Latinos who only
consume English-language media.
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In this case, however, the differences are matter of intensity. For example, a majority of Latinos
who consume Spanish-language media and only English-language media think that Latinos’
well-being is connected to each other, though to a different extent. While three-quarters (75
percent) of Latinos who consume Spanish-language media believe in Latinos’ sense of linked
fate, a slim majority (52 percent) of Latinos who only consume English-language media agree.
So, Spanish-language media engenders a greater sense of group linked fate among Latinos.
In the case of political commonalities with African Americans, a slim majority (51 percent) of
Spanish-language media consumers think Latinos share these aspects, while 65 percent of those
who only consume English-language media think so, as well. This suggest that Spanish-language
media does not cover issues in the community in a way that engenders a sense of commonality
between Latinos and other groups, such as African Americans. Yet, among Latinos who only
consume English-language media, the agreement of having political commonalities with African
Americans increase. This finding taps into Kaufmann’s (2013, 202) concept of a “pan-minority
affiliation.” The pan-minority affiliation may only be part of the English media based since this
media may treat all minorities as a whole and members of the public who identify with any of
these groups (African American, Asian American, Latinos, etc.) should feel identified with the
portrayal. The differences in media consumption suggest that this trait influences how Latinos
experience their lives in America and affects the extent to which Latinos feel they have common
characteristics.
Family Values
There are no major differences between Latinos who travel often (within the last three years) and
those who rarely or never do. These Latinos are equally likely to agree on the core beliefs. This
lack of difference suggests that staying in touch with family through travel, while having a
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positive and a significant association with the Ethno-Ideologies (as seen in Table 4.1 on page
100), do not lead to different experiences of living in America to the extent that language does.
In summary, Latinos who are Catholic are not much different from non-Catholics on their
agreement with the different core beliefs, the same patterns occurs among Latinos who have
traveled recently and those who have not traveled in the past five years. These results suggest
that these traits do not lead Latinos to experience life in America in different ways.
By contrast, Latinos who primarily speak Spanish and those who primarily speak English, have
divergent views regarding the core beliefs. For example, Latinos who are primarily Spanish
speakers are more likely to believe in linked fate at the personal and collective levels. However,
English-dominant Latinos are more likely to believe that they share political and social
commonalities with African Americans.
Conclusion
This chapter provided descriptive and regression analyses of the relationship between the cultural
traits with ideology. In addition, there was a preliminary descriptive analysis of the cultural traits
and the core beliefs.
The descriptive analysis of the relationship between the cultural traits and the Latino EthnoIdeologies indicate that Latinos conforming to two of the cultural traits, everyday language use
(bilingualism) and family values, have a distinct ideological profile: pan-ethnic.
Contrary to the theory’s expectations, Catholicism does not seem to be a trait that differentiates
Latinos in the development of a pan-ethnic, Ethno-Ideology, as similar majorities of Catholic and
non-Catholic Latinos subscribe to a pan-ethnic, Ethno-Ideology. The same occurs with the
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consumption of Spanish-language media: there are no major differences in ethno-ideological
subscription between Latinos who get their news in Spanish and those who consume news only
in English. This finding places doubt on the purported importance of Latino-oriented media in
bringing Latinos together, fostering sense of commonality between Latinos of different
nationalities.
The usage of Spanish language was also expected to be associated with the promotion of a panethnic Ethno-Ideological subscription, and while bilingual Latinos lend some credibility to the
importance of language on the development of a pan-ethnic ideology, the lack of substantial
differences between monolingual English and Spanish speakers in their distribution of ideologies
suggests that there is more to the Spanish language than just a matter of usage. Finally, while the
Latino Ethno-Ideologies Theory hypothesized that family values, measured as frequent family
contact through transnational connections, will decrease feelings of commonality with other
Latinos the opposite is true: a majority of Latinos who travel frequently subscribe to a pan-ethnic
ideology.
The cultural traits regression model indicates that identifying as Catholic, being bilingual,
consuming Spanish-language media, and traveling more frequently to their country of ancestry
are positively associated with the Ethno-Ideological Scale and are building blocks of a panethnic Ethno-Ideology. This means, that Latinos with these specific traits are more likely to say
that Latinos have some or a lot in common on matters of education and income, as well as on
matters of political representation.
The last section consisted of a descriptive analysis of the distribution of the core beliefs by the
cultural traits. The results show that there are substantial differences depending on Latinos’
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cultural traits, particularly language. English-speaking and Spanish speaking Latinos differ
drastically on core beliefs such as linked fate and commonalities with African Americans.
Monolingual Spanish-speaking Latinos are more likely to agree on core values such as linked
fate and importance of identity that should enhance the sense of commonality among Latinos.
Yet, on others such as commonalities with other groups, English monolingual Latinos are the
ones who feel they have more in common with African Americans. Moreover, although the
differences on core American values between these two groups of Latinos are negligible, on the
core value of equal opportunity, English monolingual Latinos are the most skeptical about it.
In other words, English monolingual Latinos are less likely to believe there is equal opportunity
in society. As Fraga, et al. (2010, 74–75) indicate, the value of equality among Latinos is hard to
disentangle from their support for the values of personal responsibility and the American Dream.
The findings in this chapter indicate that Latinos do not strongly believe that there is an equal
chance in American society, suggesting that they experience inequality in their everyday life.
This feeling should be associated with the development of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology as
Latinos realize that their chances are limited not by their individual characteristics but by their
generally ascribed commonalities.
The differences in core beliefs between Latinos regarding language usage are also present by
language of media consumption. The size of the differences of opinion regarding core beliefs
between English monolingual and Spanish monolingual Latinos and between Spanish-media and
English-media consumers, suggests that Latinos who use different languages experience life in
America in different ways. These two conflicting trends, Spanish monolinguals’ greater sense of
linked fate and the English monolinguals’ stronger sense of commonalities with African
Americans, may be behind the similar ideological subscriptions of both groups. The differences
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in core beliefs by the cultural traits suggest that latinidad’s usefulness as a political tool is limited
because the experiences of Latinos vary so much, particularly on language, which is supposed to
be the greatest unifying force.
In the next chapter I will explore the relationship between the core beliefs and ideology and the
differences in the cultural traits among Latinos who agree with the core beliefs. The analysis in
Chapter 6 will fully explore these relationships and indicate if the descriptive analysis also holds
with a more complex multivariate analysis.
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Chapter 5. Core Beliefs: The Experience of Being Latino in America
Chapter 4 consisted of a series of descriptive and regression analyses exploring the relationship
between cultural traits and Latino Ethno-Ideologies, as well as the variation in agreement with
the core beliefs depending on Latinos’ cultural traits. The main finding of the regression analysis
is that the cultural traits are positively associated with the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale, the
dependent variable that measures to what extent Latinos consider they have social and political
commonalities, although the explanatory power of the cultural traits is rather small according to
the regression analysis, as just 2 percent of the variance in the Ethno-Ideological Scale is
explained by the cultural traits.
The findings from chapter 4 also indicate that there are differences on the belief in the several
core beliefs depending on Latinos’ cultural traits, particularly language. For example,
monolingual Spanish-speaking Latinos are more likely to agree on the importance of linked fate
and on the importance of their Latino identity. Whereas English-monolingual Latinos are the
ones who are more likely to express that they feel commonalities with African Americans.
Bilingual Latinos are also more likely to feel that they have greater commonalities in all social
and political aspects, though to a lesser extent than Spanish-monolinguals.
In this chapter I explore the impact of core beliefs on the Latino Ethno-Ideologies and the
cultural traits. As in Chapter 4, this chapter is guided by two research questions. The first
question is: Do Latinos who agree on the values expressed in the core beliefs differ from Latinos
who do not as far as which Ethno-Ideologies to which they subscribe? The second question is:
How do the cultural traits of Latinos vary depending on their views on the core beliefs?
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The first question’s goal is understanding effect of the core beliefs on the Latino EthnoIdeologies. My expectation is that the core beliefs should be positively associated with the
development of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. For example, when Latinos consider that their
Latino identity is important; when they consider the U.S. to be home and do not have a desire to
return or move to their countries of origin or ancestry; when Latinos sense they have a linked
fate with other [Latinos]; when Latinos think they share commonalities with other racial
minorities; and when Latinos believe in the importance of core American values such as the
American Dream, personal responsibility, and equal opportunity, this will indicate that Latinos
have similar experiences living in American society and that they share these core beliefs.
The goal of the second question is to explore the relationship between the core beliefs and the
cultural traits. The expectation of this analysis is that Latinos will vary in their cultural traits
according to the different measures of core beliefs. I want to know whether Latinos who agree
with the core beliefs associated with Latino unity tend to present cultural traits also associated
with Latino unity or commonality. For instance, those who have a sense of linked fate with other
Latinos should present cultural traits that are associated with Latino commonalities, such as
being Catholic. Thus, I am interested in knowing if Latinos who exhibit core beliefs associated
with Latino unity are more likely to agree with the cultural traits that are associated with being
Latino in America.
This chapter consists of four sections. The first section is divided between a descriptive analysis
of the distribution of the Latino Ethno-Ideologies by different values of the core beliefs
(importance of identity, desire to return, linked fate, commonalities with other racial minorities,
and attitudes toward core American values). The second section consists of a regression analysis
exploring the effect of core beliefs on the Latino Ethno-Ideologies. The regression analysis will
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control for demographic characteristics of Latinos in order to understand effects of the core
beliefs on the Latino Ethno-Ideologies and to know how much explanatory power the core
beliefs model has compared to one that only includes demographic controls.
The third section of this chapter presents a descriptive analysis of the distribution of the cultural
beliefs among Latinos who agree on the different values of the core beliefs. In this section I test,
for example, whether among Latinos who say their well-being is dependent on other Latinos’
overall well-being (linked fate) tend to have cultural traits associated with Latinos such as being
Catholic or speaking Spanish. The fourth section of the chapter is a summary of the findings and
a preview of Chapter 6.
The Relationship between Core Beliefs and Ideology
The Latino Ethno-Ideologies Theory identifies five core beliefs: importance of identity, desire to
return, linked fate, commonalities with other racial minority groups, and attitudes toward core
American values. These core beliefs are associated with the experience of being a Latino in
America. These core beliefs, along with the cultural traits –which represent the common heritage
Latinos share– described in the previous chapter, influence the development of three unique
Ethno-Ideologies: ethnic, co-ethnic, and pan-ethnic.13
Subscription to these Latino Ethno-Ideologies is determined by the Ethno-Ideological Scale. The
scale was built from questions asked in 2006 Latino National Survey, the largest nationallyrepresentative survey of Latinos. The questions ask about how much in common they have on
two aspects: politically (such a representation and participation in government) and socially

13 See Chapter 6 for an analysis of how the independent variables affect each of the individual ethno-ideologies
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(such as income, educational attainment, and employment). The final scale ranges from “0” (no
commonalities) to “1” (agree that Latinos have “a lot” in common on all dimensions).
The Ethno-Ideological scores were collapsed into three distinct Ethno-Ideologies. As noted in
Figure 5.1 (page 129), 53 percent of Latinos subscribe to a pan-ethnic ideology (score: 0.750-1);
this means that they think Latinos share “some” or “a lot” in common. Nearly 4-in-10 (39
percent) subscribe to a co-ethnic ideology (score: 0.313-0.688), meaning that Latinos have
“some” or “a lot” in common in some aspects but not in others. The smallest category is the
ethnic ideology, with 8 percent of Latino subscribers (score: 0-0.250) who think that Latinos
share “almost nothing” or “nothing” in common with each other. Theory predicts that the five
core beliefs (outlined above and listed in Table 3.9.2. in pages 88-89 by ideological subscription)
based on similar living experiences should be associated with fostering a pan-ethnic ideology.
Descriptive Analysis
Below, I highlight some of the major differences in Ethno-Ideological subscription according to
agreement with the different variables measuring the core beliefs. Contrary to the findings of the
Ethno-Ideological distribution of Latinos according to their differences in cultural traits which,
for the most part, were small and focus on language usage and Spanish-media preference,
Latinos with different opinions on the core beliefs vastly differ on their Ethno-Ideological
subscription. The influence of family, language, importance of identity on the Latino Ethno
ideology is not as substantial as expected. The broader implication of these findings is that the
role that the core beliefs play on explaining Ethno-Ideological variation among Latinos is greater
than the influence of the cultural traits. This finding is relevant because culture, or cultural
commonality, is often suggested as the glue that binds Latino commonality, as the root of Latino
identity.
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Figure 5.1. Distribution of Ideology among Latinos who agree on the Measures of Core Beliefs
All Latinos
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Latinos may see culture as part of their identity but prefer to keep it separated from politics. This
point will become apparent when I discuss the findings from the focus groups later in the
analysis. Language is the most prominent trait on explaining commonalities with Latinos and
with other groups but there are nuances. Monolingual Spanish and English Latinos have different
conception of commonalities with Latinos and other groups as well as Bilingual Latinos.
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Importance of Identity
This core belief is measured by a variable that indicates how important Latinos consider that it is
keeping a distinct culture in American society. 14 Figure 5.1 (on page 127) shows that Latinos
who consider that keeping a distinct culture is very important are 7-percentage points more likely
to subscribe to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology than Latinos who say this core belief is not very
important (55 percent vs. 48 percent), suggesting that placing value on having a distinct Latino
identity is important for the development of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology as expected.
Desire to Return to the country of origin/ancestry
Latinos who indicate that they are not interested in returning (or move) to their countries of
origin or ancestry are also more likely to subscribe to a pan-ethnic ideology than Latinos who say
they have a desire to return back to their countries of origin or move to their ancestral lands (55
percent vs. 50 percent), though their differences are smaller than among those who differ on their
views on the importance of identity. These differences suggest that having (or setting) roots in
the United States leads to the development of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology, as it was expected.
Linked fate
The core belief of linked fate is measured using two variables. The first one indicates if Latinos
think that their own well-being is connected to the well-being of all Latinos. The second
indicates if Latinos think that their own ethnic groups’ well-being depends on how well all
Latinos do. As Figure 5.1 (on page 127) shows, the differences between Latinos who think this is
the case (agree that the well-being is connected “a lot” or “some”) and Latinos who think it is not
the case (and say “little” or “nothing”) in their Ethno-Ideological subscriptions are dramatic.

14

For full question wording and coding of variables measuring the core beliefs, please refer to Chapter 3.
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More than 6-in-10 (62 percent) Latinos who agree on the core belief of linked fate for all Latinos
subscribe to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. Only 36 percent of Latinos who do not think this core
belief is important subscribe to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology, the plurality (47 percent) subscribes
to a co-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. Moreover, while 8 percent of all Latinos subscribe to an ethnic
Ethno-Ideology, Latinos who do not share this core belief are more than twice as likely (17
percent vs. 8 percent) to subscribe to an ethnic ideology than Latinos overall and over 4 times
more likely (17 percent vs. 4 percent) than Latinos who share this core belief in their ethnic
Ethno-Ideological subscription.
On the other measure of linked fate (that their own ethnic group’s well-being is connected to
Latinos’), subscription to a pan-ethnic ideology is similar to those in the personal linked fate
measure (61 percent vs. 31 percent pan-ethnic). However, the differences in their ethnic EthnoIdeological subscription are even wider. Over 1-in-5 (21 percent) Latinos who think their groups’
well-being has little or nothing to do with Latinos’ subscribe to an ethnic Ethno-Ideology. This
ethnic Ethno-Ideological subscription is five times greater than among Latinos who say their
groups’ well-being is connected to Latinos’ overall well-being (4 percent). The results of these
two measures of linked fate confirm that this core belief is crucial to the development of a sense
of commonality among Latinos expressed in a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology.
Commonalities with Other Racial Minorities
Latinos also vary in their Ethno-Ideological subscription according to their differences of opinion
on the core belief of commonalities with other racial minorities. When asked if they share
political or social characteristics with African Americans, Latinos who say they share “some” or
“a lot” in common socially (in aspects like education or income) or politically (such as political
representation) are more likely to subscribe to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology than Latinos who
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respond “little” or “nothing.” Fifty-nine percent of Latinos who say they share social
characteristics with African American subscribe to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology compared to 46
percent among those who think there are no social commonalities between African Americans
and Latinos.
The results are similar in regard to political commonalities. More than 6-in-10 (61 percent)
Latinos who think they share political commonalities with the African American community
subscribe to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. Latinos who think they do not share political
commonalities with black Americans are equally divided in their Ethno-Ideological subscription
(45 percent pan-ethnic and 45 percent co-ethnic).
It is worth noting that on both measures of commonality with African Americans, Latinos who
think they do not share social (11 percent ethnic) or political (10 percent ethnic) characteristics
are about twice as likely to subscribe to an ethnic Ethno-Ideology than Latinos who consider that
they have social (5 percent ethnic) and political (5 percent ethnic) characteristics with African
Americans. The results of the analysis of this core belief also confirm that this core belief is
important for the development of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. Latinos who identify with the
African American community are more likely to subscribe to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology, as
this ideology indicates that Latinos also think they share these commonalities with one another.
Attitudes Toward Core American Values
This core belief consists of three American core values: the American Dream, personal
responsibility, and equal opportunity. The variables measuring these concepts are part of a
battery which asks respondents to what extent they agree or disagree with some statements.
Latinos are said to believe in the “American Dream” if they agree or strongly agree that “Latinos
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can get ahead in the United States if they work hard.” Latinos who agree with this core American
value are more likely to subscribe to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology than Latinos who disagree (54
percent v. 48 percent).
Latinos believe in “personal responsibility” if they agree that “[m]ost people who don't get ahead
should not blame the system, they have only themselves to blame.” On this core American value
are some of the smallest differences in Ethno-Ideological subscription at either end of the scale.
Majorities of Latinos who agree (53 percent) and who disagree (55 percent) with the statement
subscribe to pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology.
Small differences in Ethno-Ideological subscription are also evident on the third core American
value of “equal opportunity.” Latinos who disagree with the statement “[It] is not really a big
problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others” are classified as believing in
equal opportunity, while those who agree with the statement are counted as non-believers in this
value. The differences between Latinos who believe and who do not believe in this core
American value have very similar Ethno-Ideological subscriptions. A majority of Latinos who
believe in equal opportunity (54 percent) and Latinos who do not (53 percent) subscribe to a panethnic Ethno-Ideology. Differences of opinion in core American values do not seem to produce
divergent Ethno-Ideological subscriptions among Latinos. In the case of the American Dream,
Latinos who agree with this core value are significantly more likely to subscribe to a pan-ethnic
Ethno-Ideology. However, the differences in Ethno-Ideological subscription between Latinos
who agree or disagree on the other two core American values are very small and not conclusive
to say that these core American values are an important aspect of building a pan-ethnic EthnoIdeology.
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These results of this analysis suggest that the core beliefs most strongly associated with
subscription to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology are linked fate and a sense of commonality with
African Americans. One core belief (desire to return) provides limited evidence of its importance
in fostering a sense of commonality among Latinos, while two core beliefs (importance of
identity and core American values) provide minimal evidence of boosting a pan-ethnic EthnoIdeological subscription. In the next section, I further explore these relationships with a
regression analysis to understand the effect of the core beliefs on Ethno-Ideological subscription.
Multivariate analysis
To determine the effects of the core beliefs on the Latino Ethno-Ideologies, I will employ two
OLS regression models. The dependent variable is the Ethno-Ideological Scale and indicates
how much Latinos think they have in common with each other on social aspects such as
education and income, as well as in political aspects like representation. The scale ranges from
“0” to “1” on an interval scale, meaning that respondents scoring closer to “0” think that Latinos
do not share any of these characteristics, while those scoring closer to “1” think Latinos share all
of them. Although this chapter only concentrates on the core beliefs and the Ethno-Ideological
scale in chapter 6, I include a logistic regression analysis to test the effect of cultural traits, core
beliefs and demographic variables on each of the Latino Ethno-ideologies (pan-ethnic, co-ethnic
and ethnic) and how the cultural traits
Model 1, the baseline model, includes only the demographic characteristics, while Model 2, the
core beliefs model, includes the demographic characteristics along with the core beliefs. This
way it is possible to assess first how much of the variance in Ethno-ideologies is due to the
demographic differences between Latinos and, then, how much of the variance is explained by
the cultural traits.
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Measuring Core Beliefs
The variables measuring the five core beliefs are the following. Importance of identity is
measured by a continuous variable indicating how important the respondent considers it is to
“maintain their distinct cultures,” and its coding ranges from “very important” (2) to “not
important” (0). The core value of desire to return is a dichotomous variable indicating if the
respondent says he or she does NOT want to return or move to his or her country of ancestry (1),
or if such a desire to move is expressed (0).
The core belief of linked fate is measured using two variables. The first one asks: “How much
does Latinos doing well depend on other Latinos also doing well?” The second question asks
“How much does your doing well depend on other Latinos also doing well?” Both variables have
the same coding which ranges from “nothing” (0) to “a lot” (3).
The core belief of commonalities with other racial minorities is also measured by two variables.
The first variable consists of a question that asks, “Thinking about issues like job opportunities,
educational attainment or income, how much do Latinos have in common with African
Americans?” These are considered “socioeconomic commonalities.” The second question asks,
“Thinking about things like government services and employment, political power and
representation, how much do Latinos have in common with African Americans?” These are
considered “political commonalities.” Both variables follow the same coding scheme as the
linked fate variables, which range from “nothing” (0) to “a lot” (3).
Finally, the core belief of core American values is measured by three variables. These variables
indicate the agreement with statements associated with three values: (1) belief in the American
Dream (“Latinos can get ahead if they work hard”); (2) personal responsibility (“most people
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who don’t get ahead should not blame the system, they have only themselves to blame”); and (3)
equal opportunity (“is not really a big problem if some people have more of a chance in life than
others”). The coding ranges from “strongly agree” (3) to “strongly disagree” (0), with the
exception of the “equal opportunity” core value, which has been coded in reverse from “strongly
agree” (0) to “strongly disagree” (3) as a way to show agreement with equal opportunity, since
the question is worded in a rather awkward way of agreeing with a negative statement.
Measuring Demographic Characteristics
Both models include controls for demographic characteristics. The sex variable indicates if the
respondent is a woman (1) or a man (0). The age variable measures the age of respondents in
years. Education is a continuous variable that indicates the respondent’s educational attainment
and ranges from “0” (no formal schooling) to “7” (graduate or professional degree). A
dichotomous variable indicates if the respondent was born outside the United States and is now a
naturalized citizen (1) or not (0). The variable generation consists of three dichotomous variables
that indicate how many generations removed from immigration respondents are. First generation
indicates if a respondent was born outside the U.S. or Puerto Rico (1) or not (0), a second
generation respondent was born in the U.S. or Puerto Rico of parents born outside the U.S. (1),
while those who do not meet this criteria are coded “0.” The excluded variable is third
generation. The final concept, ancestry consists of several dichotomous variables that indicate a
respondent’s birthplace or ancestry in the following countries or regions: Puerto Rico, Cuba,
Dominican Republic, South America, Central America, and other Latino ancestry. Latinos who
indicate that any of these nations is his or her ancestry are coded “1,” while the rest are coded
“0.” Latinos of Mexican ancestry are omitted from the model, as this is the baseline category (0),
to which the coefficients of all other ancestry groups will be compared.
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Baseline Model
Model 1 in Table 5.1 (on page 136) shows the baseline model which only controls for the
demographic characteristics. Since the scale ranges from “0” (nothing in common) to “1” (a lot
in common), when an independent variable shows a positive coefficient this indicates an increase
in the scale score and movement toward a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. If an independent variable
indicates a negative association with the Ethno-Ideology score, it means that such a variable in
associated with a decrease in the Ethno-Ideological score. Thus, the score moves away from a
pan-ethnic ideology and toward an ethnic ideology. Since the score has a range from “0” to “1”
on an interval scale, the coefficients can be interpreted as a percentage increase or decrease in the
score.
The results of the baseline model show that the sex of the respondent is not significantly
associated with the Ethno-Ideological score. In the case of age, it is negatively associated with
the Ethno-Ideological scale (p≤0.001). In other words, all else being equal, younger Latinos are
more likely to subscribe to a pan-ethnic ideology than older Latinos. Higher levels of educational
attainment increase Latinos’ ethno-ideological scores. Being naturalized as a U.S. citizen also
enhances a respondent’s embrace of pan-ethnicity.
The generational differences are modest. Being a second-generation Latino (U.S.-born child of
immigrant parents) increases Ethno-Ideological score by 2.1 percentage points (p≤0.05)
compared to a third- generation Latino (U.S.-born child of U.S.-born parents). However, the
differences between third-generation Latinos and first-generation immigrants are not significant.
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Table 5.1 OLS Regression Analysis of Ethno-Ideologies by Demographics and Core Beliefs
[1] Baseline Model

[2]Addition of Core Beliefs
to Model

Coeff.

Coeff.

(SE)

Freq. visiting family
Imp. Of being distinct in America
Do not want to go back
Personal linked fate
Group linked fate

0.011
0.015
0.042
0.060

(0.006)
(0.007)
(0.003)
(0.004)

*
***
***

Commonalities w/Blacks

0.018

(0.003)

***

Political commonalities w/Blacks
Latinos get ahead w/hard work
People who don't get ahead should blame themselves
It is a problem that others have more of a chance in life
Women

(0.006)

(0.004)
(0.005)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.006)

***
**
*
**

0.007

0.031
0.013
0.006
0.008
0.004

Age
Education
Naturalized citizen
First generation
Second generation

-0.001
0.008
0.037
-0.004
0.021

(0.000)
(0.002)
(0.008)
(0.009)
(0.010)

***
***
***

-0.001
0.010
0.027
-0.019
0.013

(0.000)
(0.002)
(0.008)
(0.009)
(0.009)

***
***
**
*

Puerto Rican ancestry
Cuban ancestry
Dominican ancestry
Central American ancestry
South American ancestry
Other ancestry

0.023
-0.012
0.026
-0.028
-0.034
-0.076

(0.011)
(0.015)
(0.014)
(0.011)
(0.014)
(0.021)

*

*
*
***

0.018
-0.003
0.005
-0.028
-0.043
-0.045

(0.010)
(0.015)
(0.015)
(0.012)
(0.014)
(0.022)

*
**
*

Constant

0.672

(0.014)

***

0.266

(0.032)

***

Variables

(SE)

Catholic
Media Language (Spanish)
Spanish
Bilingual

R

2

Number of Observations

0.02
7090
Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

*

0.21
5216

Among the ancestry variables, being of Puerto Rican ancestry modestly increases a respondent’s
ethno-ideological score, when compared to Latinos of Mexican ancestry (p≤0.05). This is the
only ancestry with a positive and significant association. Three ancestries, Central American,
South American, or other Latino ancestry, are negatively associated with the ethno-ideological
score when compared to Latinos of Mexican ancestry.

139

The coefficient of determination (R2) of Model 1 is 0.02, which means that the demographic
variables explain 2 percent of the variance in the Ethno-Ideological Scale, the dependent
variable.
Core Beliefs Model
Model 2 in Table 5.1 (page 136) consists of the variables measuring the core beliefs and the
demographic characteristics. The dependent variable is the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale,
which is an interval scale that ranges from “0” to “1.” A score of “0” indicates that Latinos do
not think they share any social or political characteristics with each other; this score is associated
with an ethnic Ethno-Ideology. A score of “1” means that respondents think Latinos share a lot
in common politically and socially, which is associated with a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology.
The results from Model 2 in Table 5.1 show that all the core beliefs are positively associated
with the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale, with the exception of one-- importance of identity,
which does not show a significant relationship with the dependent variable. Below is a summary
of the findings of the significant relationships between the independent variables and the
dependent variable. Latinos who indicate that they do not want to return to their countries of
ancestry have Ethno-Ideological scores 1.5 percentage-points higher (p≤0.05) than Latinos who
indicate a desire to return.
The variables measuring the core belief of linked fate have the strongest effect on the EthnoIdeological score. The effect of linked fate is 0.042 (p≤0.001) meaning that a Latino who says
that the well-being of all Latinos has “a lot” to do with the overall well-being of Latinos has an
Ethno-Ideological score 12.6 percentage-points higher than Latinos who say there is no relation
between Latinos’ overall well-being, all else being equal. Latinos who say that their personal
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belief in “doing well” depends “a lot” on other Latinos “doing well” show a coefficient of 0.06
(p≤0.001) suggesting that, all else being equal, their Ethno-Ideological scores are 1.8 percentagepoints higher than Latinos who say their “doing well” is not dependent on other Latinos.’
The core belief commonalities with other racial minorities also shows a significant increase in a
respondent’s Ethno-Ideological score. Latinos who say they share “a lot” socially with African
Americans have an Ethno-Ideological score 5.4 percentage points higher than Latinos who say
they share “nothing,” all else being equal (coefficient 0.018; p≤0.001). The effect of sharing
political commonalities is ever greater. The Ethno-Ideological scores of Latinos who think they
share “a lot” in common politically with African Americans increase by 9.3 percentage points
compared to Latinos who think they share “nothing” politically with African Americans
(coefficient 0.031; p≤0.001).
As for the three variables measuring the core American values, all are positively associated with
the dependent variable. Latinos who strongly agree with the “American Dream” show a
coefficient of 0.013 (p≤0.001) and have Ethno-Ideological scores 3.9 percentage points higher
than Latinos who strongly disagree. Strongly agreeing with the core American value of “personal
responsibility” increases the Ethno-Ideological score by 1.8 percentage points, compared to a
person who strongly disagrees (coefficient 0.006; p≤0.05). Finally, when a Latino
stronglydisagrees that the value of “equal opportunity” is “not a big deal”–indicating that he or
she considers it is a big problem that some people have a better chance in life– his or her score
will be, all else being equal, 2.4 percentage points higher than a person who strongly agrees
(coefficient 0.008; p≤.01).
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Results from the Model 2 (on page 127) confirm the expectation of the core beliefs being
associated with the development of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology, as all the values are positively
associated with the Ethno-Ideological Scale. The core belief of linked fate, consisting of two
measures has the greatest effect of all variables and among Latinos who say Latinos’ linked fate
is “a lot” connected on both variables will be reflected in, all else being equal, an increase of
30.6 percentage points. Moreover, the R2 of the core beliefs model is 0.21, or that these variables
explain 21 percent in the variance of the dependent variable.
Comparing the Baseline and the Core Beliefs Models
When adding the core beliefs (Model 2 on page 127) to the baseline demographic model (Mode
1) the effects of some of the demographic variables on the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale are
impacted. The effect of education marginally increases from 0.008 to 0.01 (p≤0.001).
The negative associations of some other variables also change. Being a first-generation Latino
now decreases a person’s Ethno-Ideological score by 1.9 percentage points (p≤0.05), while this
effect before was .04 percentage points and not significant. The effect of having a South
American ancestry also becomes more negative from -0.34 to -0.043 (p≤0.01). Being a secondgeneration Latinos is now not significant, and being Puerto Rican also loses its significance.
The coefficient of determination (R2) of the core beliefs model is 0.21, significantly higher than
the R2 of the baseline model (R2=0.02).15 This result reiterates the importance of the core beliefs
in the development of the Latino Ethno-Ideologies, particularly in fostering a pan-ethnic EthnoIdeology and how experience shapes the sense of commonality required for the production of
this Ethno-Ideology. The next section explores the relationship between the core beliefs and the

15

The significant is the result of an F-test. Results are available upon request.
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cultural traits. It specifically looks at the variation in the distribution of the cultural traits
according to differences of opinion on the core beliefs.
The Relationship between Core Beliefs and Cultural Traits
The relationship between the core beliefs and the cultural traits is that they should reinforce each
other. The core beliefs represent attitudes that are acquired through the experience of living in
the United States, whereas cultural traits indicate the commonalities that Latinos see among
themselves in shared ancestry, language, media consumption and religion. The combination of
core beliefs and cultural traits should help to develop the Latino-Ethno ideologies based on how
Latinos perceive these cultural and experiential commonalities.
Table 5.2, on pages 142-143, shows the core beliefs in columns and the cultural traits in rows.
The names of the core beliefs are shown in bold letters and each column is numbered. The first
column indicates the distribution of the cultural traits among all Latinos, while column 2 shows
the percentage Latinos who say that keeping a distinct culture is very important to them. This
summary will highlight some of the most important differences.
Importance of Identity (Columns 2-3)
Table 5.2 (on page 142) shows the differences between Latinos who say it is very important to
keep distinct culture compared to those Latinos who do not think this is very important. Latinos
who say keeping a distinct culture is important are more likely to be Catholic (73 percent vs. 66
percent) and 8 percentage-points more likely to be monolingual Spanish speakers (43 percent vs.
35 percent). The largest difference is of 14 percentage points on Spanish media consumption.
Latinos who say it is very important to keep a distinct culture are more likely to say they
consume media in Spanish than Latinos who do not think it is very important to keep a distinct
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culture. These findings suggest that the cultural traits associated with a pan-ethnic EthnoIdeology are also important to the core belief of importance of identity.
Desire to Return (Columns 4-5)
There are some substantial differences in the cultural traits of Latinos who do not desire to return
to their home country and those who want to return. Those who do not want to return are less
likely to be Catholic (69 percent vs. 74 percent). The largest difference (33 percentage points) is
language-related, as only 32 percent of Latinos who do not want to return to their country of
ancestry are primarily Spanish speakers, while nearly two-thirds (65 percent) of those who want
to return are Spanish monolinguals. Similarly, Latinos who do not express a desire for returning
to the country of ancestry are less likely to consume media in Spanish (62 percent) compared to
Latinos who want to return to their country of ancestry (88 percent). Yet, it would be important
to note that still over a majority do consume Spanish media. The differences on the core belief of
desire to return indicate that Latinos who want to go back or move to their countries of ancestry
or origin tend to have the cultural traits associated with Latino unity but are also the
characteristics of Latinos who are nostalgic about life outside America.
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Table 5.2. Distribution of Cultural Traits by Core Beliefs
Identity
(2)
(3)
Very important to
Not very important
keep distinct
to keep distinct
culture
culture

(1)

All Latinos
Cultural traits
Religion
Catholic
Family Values
Never travels
Primary Language Use
Spanish
Bilingual
Spanish Media Consumption
Spanish Media

(6)

Cultural traits
Religion
Catholic
Family Values
Never travels
Primary Language Use
Spanish
Bilingual
Spanish Media Consumption
Spanish Media

Desire to return
(4)

(5)

Does NOT want to
return

Wants to return

71

73

66

69

74

53

52

56

52

52

41
51

43
50

35
51

32
58

65
33

69

72

58

62

88

Linked Fate
(7)
(8)

(10)

Commonalities with other groups
(11)
(12)

Latinos
well-being
connected
(some or a
lot)

Latinos
well-being
NOT
connected
(little or
nothing)

Ethnic
group wellbeing
connected
to Latinos
(some or a
lot)

(9)
Ethnic
group
wellbeing
NOT
connected
to Latinos
(little or
nothing)

Share social
commonalities
with African
Americans
(some or a
lot)

DOES NOT
share social
commonalities
with African
Americans
(little or
nothing)

Share
political
commonalities
with African
Americans
(some or a
lot)

(13)
DOES NOT
Share
political
commonalities
with African
Americans
(little or
nothing)

73

68

72

66

70

73

71

72

51

54

48

55

51

54

52

52

45
50

30
55

43
50

32
54

30
60

52
43

31
58

48
46

76

54

73
57
61
Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

77

62

74

Table 5.2. Distribution of Cultural Traits by Core Beliefs
(14)

Cultural traits
Religion
Catholic
Family Values
Never travels
Primary Language Use
Spanish
Bilingual
Spanish Media Consumption
Spanish Media

(15)

Core American Values
(16)
(17)

(18)

NO Personal
Responsibility:
People who don't
succeed should
blame themselves
(strongly disagree
or disagree)

Equal
Opportunity: It is
a big problem that
some people have
better chance
(strongly agree or
agree)

(19)
NO Equal
Opportunity: It is
a big problem that
some people have
better
chance(strongly
disagree or
disagree)

American Dream:
Hard work to get
ahead
(strongly agree or
agree)

NO American
Dream: Hard
work to get ahead
(strongly disagree
or disagree)

Personal
Responsibility:
People who don't
succeed should
blame themselves
(strongly agree or
agree)

71

67

72

70

68

73

53

48

53

51

52

53

42
50

25
62

40
51

41
51

31
57

48
47

73

60

75

70

55
67
Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

Linked Fate (Columns 6-9)
Table 5.2 on (on page 142) shows significant differences on the cultural traits of Latinos,
depending on their opinions regarding the core belief of linked fate. Those who believe that all
Latinos’ well-being is connected are more likely to be Catholic (73 percent vs. 68 percent),
monolingual Spanish speakers (45 percent vs. 30 percent) and consumers of Spanish-language
media (76 percent vs. 54 percent), than Latinos who do not think Latinos’ collective well-being
is connected.
Among Latinos who differ whether their personal well-being is associated to other Latinos also
doing well, the cultural traits distribution are similar to the patterns on the other measure of core
belief. Those who think their well-being is connected to other Latinos’ are more likely to be
Catholic (72 percent vs. 66 percent), less likely to have traveled 5 years ago or more to their
countries of origin (48 percent vs. 55 percent), more likely to be monolingual Spanish speakers
(43 percent vs. 32 percent), and more likely to consume Spanish-language media (73 percent vs.
57 percent), compared to Latinos who do not think their well-being is connected to the wellbeing of other Latinos.
This means that cultural traits commonly associated with Latinos are also related to the sense of
linked fate among Latinos. This is particularly true in the case of language traits such as
everyday language use and Spanish media consumption. In this case Latinos who believe in
linked fate are the most likely to consume Spanish-language news and to speak primarily
Spanish compared to those who do not agree on this core belief. As Barreto, Manzano, Ramírez
and Rim (2009) explain, Spanish language media during the 2006 resulted as an important factor
to Latino mobilization. The media outlets in Spanish were informing about the importance of the
immigration policies and the importance of mobilizing all Latinos, not just Mexicans. It is
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possible that Latinos are more likely to feel commonalities with other Latinos when exposed to
media outlets that foster pan-ethnicity.
Commonalities with other Groups (Columns 10-13)
While Latinos who believe in a sense of linked fate are more likely to present cultural traits
commonly associated with Latinos, Table 5.2 (on page 142) shows the reverse when it relates to
the core belief of commonalities with African Americans. Latinos who share socioeconomic
commonalities with African Americans are less likely to be Catholic (70 percent vs. 73 percent).
Latinos who say they share social commonalities with African Americans are also less likely to
be primarily Spanish speakers than those who think that they do not share social commonalities
(30 percent vs. 52 percent). Moreover, Latinos who share social commonalities with African
American are more likely to be bilingual (60 percent vs. 43 percent) than those who do not share
this sense of commonality. Latinos who share social commonalities with African Americans are
less likely to consume media in Spanish than Latinos who say they do not share those
characteristics (61 percent vs. 77 percent).
Regarding the belief that Latinos and African Americans share political characteristics in
common, the pattern is similar to the responses regarding social characteristics. Once again, the
major differences in cultural traits are associated with language usage and Spanish media
consumption. Latinos who do not share political commonalities with African Americans are
more likely to use Spanish as their primary language (48 percent) than Latinos who believe they
share political characteristics with African Americans (31 percent). Latinos who believe that
Latinos share commonalities with African Americans are more likely to be bilingual compared to
those who do not see commonalties between both communities (58 percent vs. 46 percent).
People who think blacks and Latinos share political commonalities are less likely to consume
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media in Spanish (62 percent) as nearly three-quarters (74 percent) of Latinos who do not see
commonalities with blacks consume Spanish-language media.
Core American Values (Columns 14-19)
Columns 14-15 on Table 5.2 (on page 143) show the differences between Latinos who believe in
the American Dream –agree that that hard work gets you ahead– and those who do not. Latinos
who believe in the American Dream are more likely to be Catholic (71 percent vs. 67 percent)
and to report that they have not traveled recently (53 percent vs. 48 percent). Latinos who believe
in the American Dream are also more likely to be primarily Spanish speakers (42 percent vs. 25
percent) and to consume Spanish-language media (70 percent vs. 55 percent) than those who do
not believe in the American Dream.
On the core American value of personal responsibility, there are no major differences between
Latinos who believe in this core American value and those who do not believe in this value. The
largest difference is 6-percentage points in Spanish media consumption, as Latinos who believe
in this value are less likely to consume Spanish media than Latinos who do not believe in the
value of personal responsibility (67 percent vs. 73 percent).
The major differences in the core American value of equal opportunity are by language use and
Spanish media consumption and quite similar to differences in the belief of the American Dream,
although in the opposite direction. Latinos who think it is a big problem that some people have a
better chance in life are less likely to be Catholic (68 percent vs. 73 percent), less likely to be
Spanish monolinguals (31 percent vs. 48 percent), and less likely to consume Spanish-language
media (60 percent vs. 75 percent).
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These distributions of the cultural traits suggest that the traits I expected to be the building blocks
of a pan-ethnic ideology diverge on the belief in core American values. This means that beliefs
in values such as the American Dream, personal responsibility, and equal opportunity are not
embraced by Latinos with similar cultural profiles. In the case of the American Dream, those
Latinos who present cultural traits associated with being Latinos such as Catholicism, and
speaking Spanish are the most likely to subscribe to this value. This result is probably because
Spanish-language monolinguals and Catholics are more likely to be first-generation (foreign
born), who tend to be more positive toward the value of the American Dream. In the case of
personal responsibility, the profile of the cultural traits is very similar between Latinos who
believe in the value and those who do not. Finally, the Latinos who are more likely to agree on
the core value of equal opportunity have lower percentages of cultural traits associated with
Latinos: They are less likely to be monolingual Spanish speakers and less likely to consume
Spanish media.
In summary, Latinos who believe that it is very important to keep a distinct culture are different
from Latinos who do not believe in keeping culture distinctness with their different cultural
traits, in particular, on primary language use and Spanish media consumption. Likewise, Latinos
who have a desire to return to their country of ancestry are more likely to speak Spanish and
consume media in Spanish.
On the linked fate variables, in both the personal and the group linked fate, again, the influence
of language and media usage is present. Latinos who strongly feel connected to Latinos' wellbeing at a personal and group level are more likely to speak Spanish and consume their media in
this language. On the core belief of sharing commonalities with other groups the effect of
language reverses. Latinos who see more social and political commonalities with African
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Americans are less likely to be monolingual Spanish speakers (and more likely to be bilingual)
and also less likely to consume news in Spanish.
On the core American values, there are interesting results, too. Latinos who believe in the
American Dream are more likely to use Spanish as their primary language and consume Spanish
media. The core American value of personal responsibility shows that there are no major
differences by language usage, although Latinos who believe in personal responsibility are
slightly more likely to consume media in Spanish. Among Latinos who believe in equal
opportunity, the pattern reverses compared to belief in the American Dream, as Latinos are more
likely to be bilinguals, less likely to being monolingual Spanish speakers and to consume media
in Spanish.
This finding on the reverse pattern of the core American values may reflect how Latinos
experience society. On one hand, they are strong believers in the American Dream. This makes
sense because, compared to their experiences in their countries of origin, many Latinos –
immigrants in particular– feel that the U.S. is a land where hard work is rewarded. Yet, the
experience changes when the value is related to equal opportunity. Latinos perceive that there is
not an equal chance in society, because their chances are limited, even when these are better than
in other countries.
Conclusion
The analysis of the distribution of ideologies by the different core beliefs suggests that there are
two core beliefs that are highly salient as far as being associated with a pan-ethnic ideology.
These core beliefs are the belief in linked fate among Latinos and a belief in shared common
characteristics with African Americans. Latinos who agree on the other three core beliefs of

151

importance of identity, desire to return, and core American values also show a higher propensity
of subscribing to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. However, these differences are much smaller and
sometimes negligible as a majority of Latinos who agree or disagree with these core beliefs may
also subscribe to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. The fact that all these core beliefs are associated
with a higher propensity of subscribing to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology lends credibility to the
hypotheses that each of these core beliefs are building blocks of a pan-ethnic ideology.
These results are confirmed by the multivariate analysis which consisted of two OLS regression
models testing the relationship between the demographic characteristics and the core beliefs on
the Latino Ethno-Ideologies —measured using the Ethno-Ideological Scale. The combined
effects of the two variables measuring the core beliefs of linked fate are greater than the
cumulative effect of all other core beliefs. This finding implies that linked fate is an essential
aspect of a sense of commonality among Latinos that could later express itself in a pan-ethnic
Ethno-Ideology and, potentially, in a pan-ethnic political coalition; as Latinos feel that their
success in the country is a matter of communitarian impulse: that to get ahead in America is
necessary to improve the conditions of all Latinos.
When contrasted with the distribution of cultural traits the analysis shows that, consistent with
the previous chapter, language is the most distinct cultural trait for Latinos. Latinos who differ
on their agreement regarding the core beliefs almost always also vary in their language or media
usage, sometimes in contradictory ways. For example, in the case of linked fate, those who agree
with the two measures (personal and collective) of this core belief are more likely to speak
Spanish primarily and to consume Spanish-language media than those who do not agree with
linked fate. But on another core belief, commonalities with other racial minorities, Latinos who
think they share characteristics in common with African Americans are less likely to exhibit the
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cultural traits of being primarily Spanish speakers or consuming Spanish media. The differences
in media consumption suggest that while watching or listing Spanish-media works as a way of
showing that Latinos share common characteristics or interests, it may not stress the same for
other non-Latino groups. On the flip side, Latinos who solely consume English media may
perceive that racial minorities are treated in similar ways, compared to whites. In the next
chapter I will test how the cultural traits, core beliefs along with the relevant demographic
characteristics affect Latinos’ Ethno-Ideological orientation.
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Chapter 6: Predicting Latino Ideologies
The previous chapters explored the effect of the cultural traits and core beliefs on the Latino
Ethno-Ideologies. Though in those chapters I analyzed separately the cultural traits and core
beliefs, the goal of this chapter is to include both aspects, as well as the demographic
characteristics, to understand the combined effects of these aspects on the Latino-Ethno
Ideologies. In addition, I include a logistic regression analysis in which I explore how the
cultural traits, core beliefs, and demographic characteristics affect each of the three Latino-Ethno
Ideologies (pan-ethnic, co-ethnic, and ethnic).
This chapter proceeds, as follows. The first section consists of a description of the OLS analysis,
including the variables and a summary of findings from earlier iterations of the analysis
conducted in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, leading up to the analysis of the full model including all
the measures for cultural traits, core beliefs, and demographic controls. The second section
consists of the interpretation of the full model, including insights from the focus groups
conducted by Public Religion Research Institute as part of the 2012 Post-Election American
Values Survey and the 2013 Hispanic Values Survey. The chapter continues with an analysis
consisting of logistic regression models which will bring insights as far as the relationship
particular cultural traits, core beliefs, and demographic characteristics with specific EthnoIdeological subscriptions. The chapter concludes with a summary of the findings and prefaces
the discussion in the next chapter, which outlines the conclusions of the dissertation and future
research.
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The Combined Effects of Cultural Traits and Core Beliefs on the Latino Ethno-Ideological
Scale
Description of Analysis
The analysis consists of linear regression models that show the progression of how the different
aspects associated with the Latino Ethno-Ideologies affect Latinos’ subscription to these
ideologies. The data come from the 2006 Latino National Survey, a large-sample (n = 8,646),
nationally-representative survey of Latinos.
The dependent variable is the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale. The interval scale values range
from “0” to “1,” and at its extremes, the scale indicates how much in common Latinos think they
have with each other on social and political aspects. Latinos who score closer to “0” think
Latinos do not have anything in common, while Latinos who score closer to “1” think Latinos
share a lot in common on both dimensions. The scale was constructed using four questions that
asked how much Latinos think that they personally share with other Latinos on social aspects
like educational attainment and income (2 questions), and two additional questions asked how
much Latinos from their own ethnic groups share politically with the overall Latino
population.16
The independent variables consist of measures for the four cultural traits, five core beliefs, and
six demographic characteristics that are expected to be associated with the formation of Latino
Ethno-Ideologies. The four cultural traits are (1) Catholicism, (2) everyday language use, (3)
Spanish media consumption, and (4) family values. Several variables measuring these concepts
are dichotomous. Catholicism indicates whether the respondent is Catholic (1) or not (0).

16

For more information about the wording of the questions and coding of the variables used in the models refer to
Chapter 3.
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Primary language, consists of two variables: variable that indicates if the respondent is primarily
a Spanish speaker (1) or not (0), or bilingual (1) or not (0). These two variables are compared
against the reference category primary English speaker. The last two variables of the cultural
traits measure whether the respondent consumes Spanish media (1) or media only in English (0)
(Spanish media consumption), and a continuous variable about how often the respondent travels
to the country of ancestry (family values) that ranges from “never” (0) to “more than once a
year” (5).
The five core beliefs are importance of identity, desire to return (to country of ancestry or
origin), linked fate, and attitudes toward core American values. The importance of Latinos to
keep a distinct culture (importance of identity) is a variable that ranges from “not important” (0)
to “very important” (2). Desire to return to the country of ancestry (desire to return) indicates if
the respondent does NOT want to return (1) or want to (0). Two variables measuring linked fate
(whether the well-being of all Latinos or the respondents’ are connected to the well-being of
Latinos overall), and commonalities with other racial minorities (if the respondents think Latinos
share social or political commonalities with African Americans) range from “nothing” (0) to “a
lot” (3). Three variables measure core American values range from “strongly disagree” (0) to
“strongly agree” (3). These variables measure Latinos' agreement with a belief in the American
Dream, personal responsibility, and equal opportunity.
In addition to these two concepts, the statistical analysis will include controls for demographic
characteristics. These demographic characteristics are sex, age, education, generations removed
from immigration, naturalization (if respondent was born outside the United States but is a now a
U.S. citizen), and ancestry (if the respondent is of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican,
South American, Central American, or other Latino origin).
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The analysis will consist of four OLS regression analyses shown in sequence. The first
regression, known as the baseline model, consists of the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale
regressed by the demographic characteristics. This will provide a sense of how much the various
demographic differences between Latinos affect their Ethno-Ideological scores, and it is identical
to the baseline model in chapters 4 and 5. The second model (cultural traits model) explores the
effects of the cultural traits on the dependent variable similar to the second model in Chapter 4.
The third regression, known as the core beliefs model, analyzes the association between the core
beliefs and ideology and replicates the results from Model 2 in Chapter 5. Both, the cultural traits
and core beliefs models control for the demographic characteristics. The final model, known as
the full effects model, includes all variables, cultural traits, core beliefs, and demographic
characteristics. An additional small section discusses the findings of the demographic effects,
which are consistent across all three models.
Once the full model is established in a second section I analyze the Latino Ethno-Ideological
scale through logistic regression analyses. I separate the scale into dichotomous variables in
which the ethno-ideology of interest is “1” and the other two ethno-ideologies “0”. Thus, in total
there will be three dependent variables, one for each ideology (pan-ethnic, co-ethnic and ethnic).
The dependent variable in the first logistic model indicates if respondents subscribe to a panethnic ideology and was coded “1” if the Latino Ethno-Ideological scale ranges from 0.750 to 1
and “0” for all other lower scores. The second model’s dependent variable indicates whether
respondents subscribe to a co-ethnic ideology and was coded as “1” when the scale has a range
between 0.313 and 0.688, and “0” else. The dependent variable in the third model indicates
subscription to an ethnic ideology and was coded “1” for scores between 0 and 0.25 and "0" else.
The next sections consist of the interpretation of the results of the regressions analysis and its
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implications for the understanding of Latino ideology. The ways in which these variables are
associated with Latino ideologies suggests that, when controlling for the core beliefs, the cultural
traits for the most part lose a significant part of their predictive power. Instead, it is the core
beliefs, especially the core belief of linked fate, what is more strongly associated with a panethnic ideology.17
Earlier Findings
Chapter 4 shows that all cultural traits are positively associated with the Latino EthnoIdeological Scale; these associations are also statistically significant. These results mean that
having a particular set of traits associated with Latino culture (being Catholic, bilingual,
consuming Spanish-language media, and visiting family abroad) are associated with an increase
in the Ethno-Ideological Scale. One caveat of the results is that although their effects are
significant, they are not particularly substantive as far as on explaining the variance on the Latino
Ethno-Ideological scale.
The coefficient of determination (R2) for the cultural traits model is 0.03, meaning that the
variables in the model measuring the cultural traits and the demographic characteristics explain 3
percent of the variance in the dependent variable. This model represents, a marginal
improvement from a baseline model that only includes the demographic characteristics (R 2 =
0.02). By contrast, the results of core beliefs model in Chapter 5 show that these variables have a
stronger effect on the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale than the cultural traits model. The R 2 of the

17

In addition to these OLS models I also conducted alternative specifications of the dependent variable. Two
models consisting in ordinal logistic regression analysis and multinomial analysis were conducted by recoding the
values of the ideology scale and collapsing them into specific ideology categories (e.g. ethnic, co-ethnic, pan-ethnic,
see Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3). The relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable are
similar to those in the OLS models, lending robustness to the OLS model. Similar examples favoring the use of OLS
as a continuous variable with a range from 0 to 1 includes Weber et al. (2014) and Cizmar et al. (2014).
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core beliefs model is 0.21, which means that this model explains 21 percent of the variance in the
Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale.
These OLS models are presented again in Table 6.1 (page 167) including the baseline model
(Model 1) controlling only by the demographic variables. Model 2 adds the cultural traits
variables to the baseline model. Model 3 includes the core belief variables along with the
demographic variables. Finally, Model 4 is the full model with the cultural traits and core beliefs
along with the demographic variables.
Model 2 in Table 6.1 shows that, among cultural traits, everyday language use (being bilingual)
has the strongest positive effect on the Ethno-Ideological Scale. In Model 3, the two variables
measuring linked fate (overall and personal) stand out for its strongly positive association with
the Ethno-Ideological Scale. Moreover, the analyses also show that, while core beliefs and
cultural traits have, on balance, an overall positive association with the Ethno-Ideological Scale,
the effect on the scale of the core beliefs is much stronger than the cultural traits. These findings
suggest that the building blocks of a pan-ethnic ideology are not their cultural commonalities but
rather the experience of being a unique minority in the United States.
Results from the Full OLS Model (Model 4)
Model 4, the full model, in Table 6.1 shows the combined effects of the variables measuring the
cultural traits, the core beliefs, and the demographic characteristics relevant for the formation of
ideologies according to the Latino Ethno-Ideologies theory.
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Table 6.1. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression Analysis of Latino Ideology
Variables

[1] Baseline Model
Coeff. (SE)

[2] Cultural Traits Model
Coeff. (SE)

[3] Core Belief Model
Coeff. (SE)

[4] Full Model
Coeff. (SE)

Cultural traits
Catholicism
Primary language use

0.014

Spanish

-0.012

Bilingual

0.042

Spanish media consumption

0.033

Family Values (Frequency of travel)
Core beliefs

0.005

(0.006
)
(0.014
)
(0.012
)
(0.008
)
(0.002
)

*

0.009

0.007

-0.024

0.015

***

0.028

0.012

***

0.005

0.008

**

0.004

0.002

0.009

0.007

*

0.011

0.007

***

0.042

0.003

***

***

0.059

0.004

***

***

0.017

0.003

***

***

0.029

0.004

***

**

0.014

0.005

**

*

0.006

0.003

*

**

0.008

0.003

**

0.004

0.006

Importance of identity

0.011

Desire to return (Does NOT want to)
Linked fate

0.015

All Latinos

0.042

National group’s
Commonalities with African Americans

0.060

Social

0.018

Political
Core American Values

0.031

American Dream

0.013

Personal responsibility

0.006

Equal opportunity
Demographic Characteristics
Sex (Women)

0.007

(0.006
)

0.007

0.006

(0.006
)
(0.007
)
(0.003
)
(0.004
)
(0.003
)
(0.004
)

0.008

(0.005
)
(0.003
)
(0.003
)

0.004

(0.006
)

*

*

Age

-0.001

Education

0.008

Naturalized citizen
Generation

0.037

First generation

-0.004

Second generation
Ancestry

0.021

Puerto Rican

0.023

Cuban

-0.012

Dominican

0.026

Central American

-0.028

South American

-0.034

Other Latino Ancestry

-0.076

Constant
R2
Number of Observations

0.672
0.02
7090

(0.000
)
(0.002
)
(0.008
)
(0.009
)
(0.010
)
(0.011
)
(0.015
)
(0.014
)
(0.011
)
(0.014
)
(0.021
)
(0.014
)

***

-0.001

0.000

**

-0.001

***

0.007

0.002

***

0.010

***

0.017

0.008

*

0.027

-0.003

0.011

-0.019

*

0.007

0.010

0.013

*

0.021

0.011

0.018

0.011

0.015

-0.003

0.022

0.014

0.005

*

-0.023

0.011

*

-0.028

*

-0.034

0.014

*

-0.043

***

-0.066

0.022

**

-0.045

***

0.618
0.03
6928

0.016

***

0.266
0.21
5216

(0.000
)
(0.002
)
(0.008
)
(0.009
)
(0.009
)
(0.010
)
(0.015
)
(0.015
)
(0.012
)
(0.014
)
(0.022
)
(0.032
)

***

-0.001

0.000

***

***

0.007

0.002

***

**

0.008

0.009

*

-0.002

0.011

0.005

0.010

0.018

0.011

0.008

0.015

0.005

0.015

*

-0.024

0.012

*

**

-0.043

0.014

**

*

-0.043

0.022

*

***

0.259
0.21
5147

0.032

***

Among the cultural traits, being bilingual is still positively associated with the Ethno-Ideological
Scale, but compared to Model 2, the size of the coefficient decreases from 0.042 to 0.028
(p≤0.05). The coefficient of family values remains positively associated with the scale and its
effect drops slightly from 0.005 to 0.004 (p≤0.05).
Among the variables measuring the core beliefs in Model 4, results are similar in both their
positive association with the Ethno-Ideological Scale, and in their levels of significance
compared with Model 3. The variables measuring linked fate remain the strongest positive
predictors of the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale.
The coefficients of determination of both models (3 and 4) are indistinct from each other. Both
the R2 of Model and the R2 of Model 3 are 0.21 —explain 21 percent of the variation in the
dependent variable. Below, I will explain with more detail the effects of these variables on the
Ethno-Ideological Sale. These results will include quotes from the focus groups in Phoenix,
Arizona. The discussions that occurred in these groups will help provide some context to the
statistical results.
Cultural Traits and Ethno-Ideologies
The regression analysis in Table 6.1 (page 159) show that the most notable changes in the
statistical significance happen in the Catholicism and Spanish media consumption variables.
Catholicism, while still having a positive association with the Ethno-Ideological Scale, is no
longer statistically significant. The weak effect of this variable is not very surprising. The
descriptive analysis in Chapters 4 shows that the differences between Catholic Latinos and nonCatholic Latinos in their Latino Ethno-Ideological subscription are negligible. Moreover, the
descriptive analysis of the cultural traits and core beliefs in Chapters 4 and 5 also demonstrated
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that Catholic Latinos do not vary substantially in their agreement with any of the core beliefs
from non-Catholic Latinos, or that Latinos who differ in their agreement on the various core
beliefs do not vary much in their identification with Catholicism.
The lack of statistical evidence of the impact of Catholicism as a common cultural trait in the
Latino community was reflected in the focus group discussions. Latino Catholics and nonCatholics talked about their faith, or lack of it, but they had different conceptions of what it
means as part of their cultural identity of being Latino. Latino Catholics sometimes mentioned
their faith as an important part of their Latino identity, as a Catholic woman from Phoenix noted:
I think because as far back as I can remember it [religion] was always really important in our
family. I mean we had to go to church at least every Sunday. My dad went to church every single
day. You know a lot of times I felt like it was just shoved down my throat but … after a while I
just realized, and I still make my children go to church. It’s just like a Hispanic thing also. I mean
I think everybody in here probably had that experience. (Emphasis added).

But this belief in the importance of Catholicism is very different for non-Catholic Latinos of
Protestant and non-religious identities. At times they resented the assumption that they are
Catholic by default. A former Catholic Latino man from Phoenix talks about his relationship to
his former religion and how it somehow makes him less Latino:
Well, faith and religion’s very important to me, I don’t go to Catholic church. I grew up
Catholic; I went to Catholic school. But, you know, I’m a Christian now. I’m not so much
a Catholic, and I think that that kind of changed my connection with the Hispanic
community, because, you know, most Hispanics are predominantly Catholic. So, by my
religion, or my faith, actually, disconnected me a little bit [from the community].
(Emphasis added)
Nonreligious Latinos also resent the assumption that they are all Catholic. An atheist Latino from
Phoenix said:
[Non-Latinos] think that because I’m Hispanic, usually when you’re Mexican, it’s almost given
that you’re going to be Catholic, because it’s a cultural thing, it’s not really a religious thing at
this point. I was raised Catholic. I was raised, my mom took me to church, to catechism the
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whole thing, but I started reading at a very young age, and I think that’s the worst thing that you
can do to religion … education. I don’t talk about religion or anything like that out in public or
anything, but I’m proud to say I’m an atheist, 100 percent, and there’s no doubt about that.

These opinions suggest that more than a unifying force for Latino identity, religion is a
contentious issue. As the religious diversity of Latinos continues to increase, these differences
should make it harder to appeal to Latinos with messages of cultural unity based on religious
heritage. It will become harder to use the Catholic religion as a marker of Latino identity and its
weight as a cultural trait that binds Latinos together will decrease even more.
Model 4 (on page 148) finds that being bilingual has a positive and significant association with
the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale, when compared to monolingual English speakers. This
means that being a bilingual Latino is associated with an increase of his/her Ethno-Ideological
score. However, compared to the results from Model 2, the strength of the effect diminishes by
one-third from 0.042 to 0.028. This means that while in the Cultural Traits Model (Model 2)
being bilingual was associated with an increase of 4.2 percentage points in a respondent’s EthnoIdeological score, all else being equal, when the core beliefs are added to the regression (Model
4), the score increase associated with bilingualism is just 2.8 percentage points.
While I expected to find that being Spanish monolingual would have had a positive relationship
with the Ethno-Ideological Scale, this is not the case (as it was not the case in Chapter 4). The
results from Model 2 and Model show that being a Spanish monolingual is negatively associated
with the Ethno-Ideological Scale, though these results are not statistically significant. The
salience of bilingualism suggests that Latinos who are fluent and able to communicate in both
English and Spanish have a different relationship with their roots and their community.
Bilingualism can help Latinos navigate and connect with the larger pan-ethnic community, as
Negrón (2014) suggests it occurs among Latinos in New York City, when they use linguistic

164

cues such as talking in Spanglish or directly approaching a person and speaking in Spanish with
a person, who they think is also a Latino, and after assessing which language the interlocutor
feels more comfortable with speaking and switching the conversation to that particular language.
In Model 2, consuming Spanish-language media has a positive and significant association with
the Ethno-Ideological Scale, as it was associated with a 3.3 percent increase in a respondent’s
score. Model 4 shows that, while the association between the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale and
Spanish media consumption remains positive, it is no longer significant. Instead, the addition of
the cultural traits reduces the effect of Spanish media consumption by 85 percent, from 0.033 to
0.005.
Although Spanish-language media that caters to the tastes and interests of first-generation
Latinos in the United States has been instrumental in the development of a Latino market and
identity (Mora 2014), the evidence regarding the potential of these media in creating a pan-ethnic
ideology with political implications is lacking. In fact, for some Latinos, like those in the
Phoenix focus groups the Spanish-language media works against the interests of Latinos:
And I can’t believe there’s people here that have been here most of their life and they don’t speak
any English, they don’t even try. Why? Because they get home, they watch soap operas, soccer,
and the thing in the media like Telemundo they keep people ignorant, they don’t want you to
learn. If you do, you’re not going to watch their shows anymore.

This quote from a Protestant woman encapsulates the core of a discussion about language in the
focus groups. Latinos who were monolingual English speakers resented the suggestion that
Spanish is a trait that defines Latinos. In fact, they find speaking “Spanish-only” to be a limiting
quality for personal advancement.
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Contrary to expectations, Model 2 in Table 6.1 (page 167) shows that there is a positive and
significant, association between family values and the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale.
Frequency of travel to the land of ancestry or origin is associated with an increase of Latinos’
Ethno-Ideological scores: those who have closer ties to their homeland and family, this way, are
more likely to feel closer to other Latinos. Moreover, the addition of the cultural traits does not
impact the effect of family values on the Ethno-Ideological Scale substantially. Respondents who
travel more than once a year have Ethno-Ideological scores that are, all else being equal, 2
percentage points higher than Latinos who never travel. This represents a small reduction,
compared to the 2.5 percentage-point increase for frequent travelers in Model 2, without taking
into account the effect of the cultural traits.
Core Beliefs and Ethno-Ideologies
The analysis of the core beliefs shows that these components have more weight in explaining the
Latino Ethno-Ideologies. As discussed in Chapter 5 and recreated in Model 3 in Table 6.1 (page
167), the addition of the core beliefs, to the baseline model improves the explanatory power of
the model. The coefficient of determination (R2) improves from 0.02 in the baseline model
(Model 1) to 0.21 in the core beliefs model (Model 3).
Once again, the concept of importance of identity has no significant effect on the Latino EthnoIdeological Scale. Another core belief, desire to return loses its significance when the cultural
traits are added in the full model.
On the other hand, the effect of linked fate does not diminish with the addition of the cultural
traits. A person who says that Latinos doing well depends “a lot” on other Latinos doing well
has, all else being equal, an Ethno-Ideological score 12.6 percentage points higher than a Latino

166

who says that Latino’s doing well has nothing to do with the well-being of other Latinos. Among
Latinos who think the well-being of their own national group members’ depends “a lot” on how
well other Latinos do will have, everything else being equal, an Ethno-Ideological score 17.7
percentage points higher than a Latino who thinks that there is no link between his/her group’s
wellbeing and that of Latino overall. These results stress the importance of linked fate and the
ethnic consciousness the concept represents for the formation of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology.
While Latinos in the focus groups did not use the term “linked fate,” the discussions about
politics and political parties suggest that for many of them, there is a sense that Latinos’ political
future lies together.
I think the Republicans view us like a thorn in their side. The Democrats need us, but neither
party knows exactly what to do with us or what to make of us, except for the fact that about the
next 25 years, the Census shows that we will be a majority, so they need to kind of think ahead.
The Democrats have I think our betterment in mind, but they don’t know how to go about it, and
the Republicans just want to keep us where we are while we still elevate their control, their
power, whatever it is, the top one percent. We need to generate money for the top one percent.
So I think it’s—I don’t think there’s a solution, and I don’t think that they know what to make of
us, except that they both realize that they need us in some way. The Republicans I think more
negatively than the Democrats.

This quote, from a religiously unaffiliated Latina summarizes many of the sentiments regarding
political parties. Latinos’ feelings toward the Republican Party have soured in recent years as
surveys by the Pew Research Center and Public Religion Research Institute have found. Yet,
Latinos, while voting for the Democratic Party, have not really warmed up to a party that they
feel is weak (Jones, Cox, and Navarro-Rivera 2013). They feel that they have to vote for the
lesser of two evils. However, they feel that the future of the community and their well-being
depends on Latinos being able to come together.
Latinos who think they share “a lot” in common socially with African Americans have EthnoIdeological scores that are, all else being equal, 5.1 percentage points higher than Latinos who
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think they have “nothing in common” socially with African Americans. The effect of political
commonalities with African Americans is even stronger. Latinos who say they share “a lot” in
common with African Americans on political matter have scores that are 8.7 percentage points
higher than Latinos who think they do not share anything in common politically with African
Americans, all else being equal.
These commonalities may be borne out of a sense of both groups having experienced
discrimination in the country. As a Catholic Latino from Phoenix said about the 2008 Republican
National Convention:
When the Republicans had their convention and they put Sarah Palin up there on stage, her
husband was unemployed, her mother was living with them, her daughter was pregnant, the
boyfriend was there and somebody said `Could you imagine if they were either black or if they
were Hispanic what people would have said,’ and yet nobody said anything. But if it would have
been a different skin color, you, I mean, they would have ridden it to the hilt[op].

Thus, a sense of linked fate among Latinos and a sense with commonalities with African
Americans turn political as Latinos feel threatened, that the system has not been fair with them
and that there are people actively trying to bring both groups down. It is in this way that linked
fate becomes a political statement. Latinos and African Americans are judged differently, by
other standards. The effects of the core American values remain similar to the findings in
Chapter 5, replicated in Model 3 in Table 6.1 (page 167) Latinos who strongly agree that to get
ahead in America it is necessary to work hard have, all else being equal, an Ethno-Ideological
score 4.2 percentage points higher than Latinos who do not believe in the American Dream.
As Figure 6.1 (page 176) shows, the effect of the core belief of linked fate is the largest of any of
the traits and beliefs associated with a pan-ethnic ideology. The effect of linked fate is more than
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twice as larger than the effect of feelings of commonalities with African Americans, which has
the second-largest effect on ideology.
The salience of these two core beliefs: linked fate and commonalities with African Americans
suggests that pan-ethnicity as an ideology is less linked to shared identity based on common
culture and history and more often ideology based on context and circumstance. Latinos’
ideology is built on the belief that their well-being is tied to being together. Their ideology is
further strengthened by the belief that they share a lot in common socially and politically with
African Americans.
Agreement with the American core values has a positive association, with a pan-ethnic EthnoIdeology as expected (Equal opportunity and American Dream). However, the effect is modest
and not as strong as the effect of the variables related with linked fate and attitudes toward other
racial minorities. The value more strongly associated with a pan-ethnic ideology is the agreement
that Latinos should get ahead by working hard. The agreement with the belief that Latinos should
not blame the system and that there is not a problem with others having more chances to get
ahead have a similar but modest association with the pan-ethnic ideology.
Figure 6.1 (page 176) shows the relative effects of the cultural traits and the core beliefs. All of
the cultural traits are in the upper half of the chart (in gray color). The combined effect of all the
cultural traits is 6.2 percentage points. By contrast, the combined effect of the core beliefs is
nearly ten times greater (55.4) than the combined effect of the cultural traits.
The effect of being bilingual, the greatest of all the cultural traits, is only 2.8 percentage points.
Its effect pales when compared to the effect of linked fate the strongest of the core beliefs, which
is also about ten times greater (30.7 percentage points) when both measures are combined.
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Figure 6.1. Relative Effects of Cultural Traits and Core Beliefs on Ideology
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Demographic Characteristics and Ethno-Ideologies
Age and education are two of the main demographic predictors of pan-ethnicity. That the
relationship between age and pan-ethnicity is negative means that pan-ethnicity is associated
with younger Latinos. The relationship between education and pan-ethnicity is positive, meaning
that better educated Latinos are those with higher levels of pan-ethnic ideology.
There are not many differences by nationality or citizenship and generation. Regarding ancestry,
Central American, South American, and other Latino ancestry have a negative association with
pan-ethnic ideology. Central American and South American-origin Latinos are significantly less
likely to have a pan-ethnic ideology compared to Mexican Americans.
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These smaller groups have a shorter history in the U.S. than Latinos of Mexican, Cuban, and
Puerto Rican origin and as their experience in America reflects the experience of others with
longer time in the country, pan-ethnicity ideology may become more prevalent among those
smaller groups.
Of the demographic variables, being a naturalized citizen loses significance in the full model.
Age and education remain significant. Age remains with a negative association with a pan-ethnic
ideology, whereas education is still associated positively with a pan-ethnic ideology.
Predicting Ethno-Ideological Subscription
The full OLS model in the previous section demonstrated how the cultural traits and core beliefs
affect the dependent variable, the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale. The OLS models show that a
model including the core beliefs and demographic characteristics explains 21 percent of the
variance in the Ethno-Ideological Scale. A model that includes the cultural traits and
demographic characteristics explains just 3 percent of the variance in the dependent variable.
While these models tell us how the cultural traits and core beliefs influence the overall score in
the Ethno-Ideological scale, they do not say how they affect each of the ideologies.
In order to test how the independent variables measuring the cultural traits, core beliefs, and
demographic characteristics influence the each of the Ethno-Ideologies, I recoded the Latino
Ethno-Ideological Scale into three dichotomous variables indicating if the respondents subscribe
to a particular Ethno-Ideology (1) or not (0). To test the effects of the independent variables on
these three dependent variables I employ logistic regression analysis, which is appropriate for the
study of categorical dependent variables.
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Unlike the OLS regression coefficient, the coefficient of a logistic regression analysis cannot be
interpreted directly to understand its impact on the dependent variable. While it is possible to
interpret the direction of the association –positive or negative– and its significance, it is
necessary to convert the coefficients into probabilities for proper interpretation of the effect.
These predicted probabilities are based on fixed values of the independent variables. The
probabilities are calculated according to the changes in the values of the independent variables.
Interpretations are based on a set of baseline characteristics which provide the basis for
understanding the changes in probability of subscribing to each Ethno-Ideology. For example, if
the baseline model uses English-language monolingual Latinos as the default everyday language
usage cultural trait, we can measure the effect of being bilingual or a Spanish-language dominant
Latino by changing language in these baseline characteristics.
The baseline model consists of the following values of the independent variables. The
demographic characteristics of the baseline individual are: male, the means for age and
educational attainment, not a naturalized citizen, third generation, and Mexican ancestry. The
cultural traits are: non-Catholic, English-language dominant, consumer of English media only;
the frequency of travel is held at its mean. The core belief values of the baseline model are: a
person who thinks a distinct culture is important and who wants to return to the country of
ancestry; the variables measuring linked fate, commonalities with African Americans, and core
American values are held at their means.
Pan-ethnic Model
Model 1 in Table 6.2 (page 180) shows the results of the logistic regression analysis predicting a
pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideological subscription. Latinos who score between 0.750 and 1 in the Ethno-
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Ideological scale are coded as subscribing to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology (1) while those with
scores lower than 0.750 as coded as not subscribing to a pan-ethnic ideology (0).
Cultural Traits and Pan-ethnic Ideology
Of the four cultural traits, only one has a positive, statistically significant, association with a panethnic Ethno-Ideology. Being bilingual (coefficient 0.364; p≤0.01) has the greatest effect among
the cultural traits.
Compared to Latinos who primarily speak English, Latinos who are fluent in both English and
Spanish, are more likely to subscribe to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. This result is similar to
those in the OLS models discussed in Chapter 4 and earlier in this chapter.
Being a Catholic, consuming Spanish-language media, and frequency of travel (measuring
family values) have a positive association with pan-ethnic subscription, but the association is not
statistically significant. The remaining language indicator, being a primarily Spanish-language
speaker, shows a negative association with a pan-ethnic subscription when compared to
primarily English-speaking Latinos but the effect is not significant.
Core Beliefs and the Pan-ethnic Ideology
All of the measures of the core beliefs are positively associated with a pan-ethnic EthnoIdeology, but only three have a statistically significant association. The three core beliefs with a
significant association with a pan-ethnic ideology are desire to return, linked fate, and
commonalities with African Americans. One of the core American values, belief in the American
Dream, is also positively associated with a pan-ethnic ideology. The core belief of importance of
identity and two core American values –personal responsibility and equal opportunity– have a
positive effect on pan-ethnic subscription but are not statistically significant.
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Table 6.2. Logistic Regression Analysis of Latino Ethno-Ideologies
[1] Pan-ethnic Model

[2] Co-ethnic Model

[3] Ethnic Model

Coeff.

(SE)

Coeff.

(SE)

Coeff.

(SE)

Cultural Traits
Catholicism

0.059

(0.069)

-0.026

(0.068)

-0.069

(0.125)

Primary Language Use
Spanish
Bilingual

-0.153
0.364

(0.154)
(0.126) **

0.029
-0.334

(0.152)
(0.123) **

0.433
-0.129

(0.293)
(0.222)

Spanish Media Consumption
Family Values (frequency of travel)

0.066
0.010

(0.085)
(0.018)

-0.129
0.002

(0.084)
(0.017)

0.144
-0.043

(0.173)
(0.035)

Core Beliefs
Importance of Identity
Desire to return (Does NOT want to)

0.064
0.155

(0.064)
(0.077) *

-0.052
-0.179

(0.063)
(0.075) *

-0.055
0.174

(0.113)
(0.151)

0.338
0.386

(0.032) ***
(0.037) ***

-0.224
-0.129

(0.032) ***
(0.036) ***

-0.376
-0.671

(0.059) ***
(0.061) ***

0.145

(0.034) ***

-0.083

(0.033) *

-0.184

(0.064) **

0.261

(0.036) ***

-0.180

(0.035) ***

-0.257

(0.072) ***

0.123
0.050
0.032

(0.047) **
(0.030)
(0.028)

-0.113
-0.040
-0.006

(0.047) *
(0.029)
(0.027)

-0.007
-0.037
-0.079

(0.095)
(0.059)
(0.055)

-0.003
-0.007
0.067
0.176

(0.061)
(0.002) **
(0.019) ***
(0.091)

0.085
0.002
-0.050
-0.108

(0.060)
(0.002)
(0.019) **
(0.090)

-0.306
0.013
-0.041
-0.267

(0.116) **
(0.004) ***
(0.036)
(0.178)

First generation
Second generation
Ancestry
Puerto Rican
Cuban

0.025
0.053

(0.117)
(0.111)

-0.063
-0.032

(0.115)
(0.108)

0.191
-0.012

(0.228)
(0.216)

0.323
0.109

(0.119) **
(0.158)

-0.292
-0.151

(0.116) *
(0.161)

-0.115
0.099

(0.234)
(0.260)

Dominican
Central American
South American
Other Latino Ancestry
Constant

-0.146
-0.223
-0.133
-0.231
-3.226

(0.161)
(0.114)
(0.142)
(0.214)
(0.337) ***

0.220
0.128
-0.077
0.019
1.852

(0.156)
(0.112)
(0.146)
(0.218)
(0.327) ***

-0.551
0.292
0.551
0.709
-0.151

(0.436)
(0.201)
(0.230) *
(0.323) *
(0.617)

R2

0.10

0.04

0.16

Number of Observations

5147

5147

5147

Variables

Linked fate
All Latinos
National group’s
Commonalities with African Americans
Social
Political
Core American Values
American Dream
Personal responsibility
Equal opportunity
Demographic Characteristics
Sex (Women)
Age
Education
Naturalized citizen
Generation
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Figure 6.2 (below) shows the change in the probability of subscribing to a pan-ethnic EthnoIdeology depending on the effects of the cultural traits and core beliefs. The dark area of the pie
charts indicates the percentage probability of subscribing to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. A
Latino with the characteristics described in the baseline model has a 43 percent chance of
subscribing to a pan-ethnic ideology.
Figure 6.2. Predicted Probabilities of a Pan-ethnic Latino Ethno-Ideology
Baseline

43

Core Beliefs
Minimum

Cultural Traits
Minimum

Cultural Traits
Maximum

39
56

Core Beliefs
Maximum

5
79

Note: Numbers represent percentages

Effect of the Cultural Traits and Core Beliefs on Pan-ethnic Subscription
When the cultural traits characteristics are at their minimum values, for example, a respondent
who primarily speaks Spanish and who never visits family abroad, the probability of subscribing
to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology declines to 39 percent. However, if the respondent’s cultural
traits are at their maximum positive effects, such as being bilingual, the probability of
subscribing to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology increases to 56 percent. This means that the different
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between a respondent with none of the characteristics positively associated with a pan-ethnic
ideology are 17 percentage points less likely to subscribe to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology.
Latinos who reflect the minimum values of the core beliefs variables, by contrast, have a 5
percent chance of subscribing to a pan-ethnic ideology. By contrast, if a Latino’s values on the
core belief variables are set at their maximum, his or her probability of subscribing to a panethnic Ethno-Ideology improves to 79 percent, a difference of 74 percentage points.
These results confirm the previous findings in this chapter regarding the salience of the core
beliefs in the development of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology, relative to the core beliefs. Setting
the cultural traits at their maximum values improves the probability of subscribing to a panethnic Ethno-Ideology by 30 percent compared to the baseline model, from 43 percent to 56
percent. However, the increase in the probability of subscribing to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology,
when the core beliefs are set at their maximum values, is 84 percent (from 43 percent to 79
percent), compared to the baseline model.
Co-ethnic Model
Model 2 (page 161) shows the logistic regression analysis predicting a co-ethnic EthnoIdeological subscription. Latinos who score between 0.313 and 0.688 on the Ethno-Ideological
scale are coded as subscribing to a co-ethnic Ethno-Ideology (1) while those with scores lower
than 0.313 or higher than 0.688 are coded as not subscribing to a co-ethnic ideology(0).
Cultural traits
Of the cultural traits coefficients in Model 2 (on Table 6.2, page 180), being bilingual has a
negative and significant, association with a co-ethnic Ethno-Ideological subscription (p<0.05).
This means that Latinos, who are bilingual, are less likely to subscribe to a co-ethnic ideology
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compared to a Latino who is primarily an English- speaker (the omitted variable). None of the
remaining cultural traits have a significant relationship with the dependent variable.
Core beliefs
Of the variables measuring core beliefs, the importance of being distinct in America is not
significant in the model but, contrary to the cultural traits model, all the variables associated with
core beliefs are negatively associated with subscription to a co-ethnic ideology. Similar to the
pan-ethnic Model 1, the core beliefs of linked fate have the greatest effect on the co-ethnic
Model 2. However, its relationship with a co-ethnic ideology is negative. The core belief of
commonalities with African Americans has the second-strongest effect (p<0.001 for both
variables) and is also negatively associated with subscription to a co-ethnic Ethno-Ideology.
Figure 6.3. Predicted Probabilities of a Pan-ethnic Latino Ethno-Ideology
Baseline

50

Core Beliefs
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Cultural Traits
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Cultural Traits
Maximum

51

38

Core Beliefs
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Effect of the Cultural Traits and Core Beliefs on Pan-ethnic Subscription
Figure 6.3 (page 183) shows the change in the probability of subscribing to a co-ethnic EthnoIdeology depending on the effects of the cultural traits and core beliefs. Once again, the dark area
of the pie charts indicates the percentage probability of subscribing to a pan-ethnic EthnoIdeology. A Latino with the characteristics described in the baseline model has a 50 percent
chance of subscribing to a co-ethnic ideology. Changing the values of the cultural traits to their
minimum increases the probability of subscribing to a co-ethnic ideology by one-percentage
point, to 51 percent. When the cultural traits are changed to their maximum values, the
probability of subscribing to a co-ethnic ideology declines to 38 percent.
When the core beliefs values are set to their minimum the probability of subscribing to a coethnic Ethno-Ideology is 82 percent. Increasing the core beliefs variables to their maximum
values decreases the probability of subscribing to a co-ethnic ideology to 26 percent. Thus, a coethnic Ethno-Ideological subscription also shows the importance of the core beliefs in EthnoIdeological subscription, though to the reverse extent of the pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology.
Ethnic Model
Finally, Model 3 in Table 6.2 (page 180) is the ethnic model. Latinos classified as subscribing to
an ethnic Ethno-Ideology scored between “0” and 0.250 on the Ethno-Ideological Scale and are
coded as “1” in the logistic models. Latinos who scored more than 0.250 are coded as “0.”
Cultural Traits
In Model 3, none of the cultural traits demonstrate a significant association with an ethnic Latino
Ethno-Ideological subscription. This shows that culture bears little importance in the
development of an ethnic Ethno-Ideology, as expected by the theory.
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Core Beliefs
Of the variables measuring core beliefs, the variables measuring the Model 3 in Table 6.2 (page
180) shows that measure of linked fate are negatively associated with subscription to an ethnic
Ethno-Ideology (p<0.001 for both). The variables measuring social and political commonalities
with African Americans are significant (p<0.05 and p<0.001 respectively) and negatively
associated with an ethnic ideology.
Effect of the Cultural Traits and Core Beliefs on Ethnic Subscription
A Latino with the characteristics described in the baseline model has a 4 percent chance of
subscribing to an ethnic ideology. Changing the values of the cultural traits to their minimum,
increases the probability of subscribing to an ethnic ideology to 7 percent. However, when the
cultural traits are changed to their maximum values, the probability of subscribing to a co-ethnic
ideology is again 4 percent, showing that the cultural traits have no positive effect on the
formation of an ethnic Ethno-Ideology.
When the core beliefs values are set to their minimum the probability of subscribing to an ethnic
Ethno-Ideology is 49 percent, but moving the core beliefs variables to their maximum values
decreases the probability of subscribing to a co-ethnic ideology to just 1 percent. These results
provide further evidence of the importance of the core beliefs in the formation of the EthnoIdeologies.
Conclusion
This chapter explained the relationship between the cultural traits, core beliefs and demographic
characteristics with the Latino Ethno-Ideologies. The results of the regression analysis show that
the effects of core beliefs are greater than the impact of cultural traits. Language is the most
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salient cultural trait in producing a pan-ethnic ideology, but it is not associated with monolingual
Spanish speakers. Instead, it is bilingual Latinos with whom pan-ethnic ideology is associated.
Other variables such as religious affiliation and media are not significantly associated with panethnicity. The discussions in the focus groups support this assessment, particularly about
religion. However, transnational family connections are positively associated with pan-ethnicity,
contrary to expectations.
The effects of the cultural traits pale in comparison to the effects of the core beliefs, especially
linked fate. This core belief has a strong and positive association with a pan-ethnic ideology that
is greater than the combined effects of the other beliefs and traits. Another core belief strongly
associated with pan-ethnicity is a belief in social and political commonalities with African
Americans. The salience of these two core beliefs suggests that pan-ethnicity is not only an
ideology that could help Latinos build multiethnic coalitions with other Latinos but also possibly
serve as the building blocks for broader cross-racial coalitions.
Further evidence was provided by the discussion of the focus groups, particularly on the cultural
traits. The discussion on cultural aspects such as language and religion shows that Latinos have
varying opinions on how much these traits matter in their identity. An important portion of the
discussion in the focus groups was on the core beliefs and centered on the core American values.
Latinos are also conflicted about these values, which are reflected in the statistical analysis, as
the effect of core American values varies in magnitude and direction. There are also hints about
the sense of linked fate, particularly in discussions about political parties and the necessity of
unity for political purposes. Moreover, there is a sense of unity with African Americans in terms
of experience that lends credence to the importance of the sense of commonality with blacks as
an important building block of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology.
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Finally, the demographic effects were constant across the three models. A pan-ethnic ideology is
associated with younger and highly educated Latinos. Interesting, immigrant generation and
citizenship had no substantial effect on ideology. It is worth noting that, when controlling for
national origin, two groups showed a negative relationship with ideology, suggesting an ethnic
ideology: Latinos of Central American and South American ancestry. These are the minorities
within the Latino community and could suggest that among the smaller and most recent Latinos
the feelings of commonality have not developed, or that, alternatively, they do not feel welcome
by Latinos in the larger groups (Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans).In the following and last
chapter I will discuss the implications of Latino ideology for politics and the potential future
developments concerning ideology among Latinos.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions
This dissertation is a project of Latinidad and the study of Latino political behavior that
considers cultural traits and core beliefs essential to the formation of ideology among Latinos.
These cultural traits and core beliefs allow Latinos to discern how much they have in common
with each other and the potential to see Latinos as allies because they share cultural affinities and
experiences that facilitate their communication.
The question driving this project is: Does latinidad –Latinos shared cultural traits and core
beliefs rooted in experience– shape distinct ideologies informing Latinos about how to relate to
the U.S. political system? I argue that this is the case and propose a theory that explains how a
combination of cultural traits and core beliefs divide Latinos into three distinct Latino EthnoIdeologies: pan-ethnic, co-ethnic, and ethnic. These ideologies indicate how Latinos perceive
other Latinos as social equals and political allies.
The cultural traits and core beliefs are the building blocks of Latinidad, a belief in a
commonality that transcends national-origin labels and brings Latinos together as a community. I
submit four cultural traits (1) the Catholic religion, (2) Spanish language usage, (3) consumption
of Spanish-language media, and (4) family values. These traits represent the characteristics that
Latinos share based on a common colonial history and that facilitate contact among Latinos.
Additionally, there are five core beliefs –(1) the importance of a Latino identity, (2) a lack of a
desire to return to the country of ancestry or origin, (3) linked fate with other Latinos, (4) a sense
of commonality with other racial and ethnic minorities, and (5) attitudes toward core American
values– that represent the experience of living in America as a Latino. The cultural traits and
core beliefs may vary according to individual Latinos’ demographic characteristics, their national
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ancestry or origin, citizenship status, and how many generations their family has lived in the
United States.
Theoretical Expectations
Latinos with a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideological subscription share a strong sense of social and
political commonalities with other Latinos, mainly forged by their core beliefs but also affected
by their cultural traits. A co-ethnic Ethno-Ideology suggests a weaker sense of Latino
commonality –which is just political or just social, but not both simultaneously. The
commonalities co-ethnic Latinos have with other Latinos should be based more on their cultural
traits than by their core beliefs. Finally, an ethnic Ethno-Ideology indicates that they do not share
anything in common with other Latinos, even though they acknowledge their ethnic Latino roots.
In recent elections, Latinos have voted as a cohesive bloc in favor of Democratic Party
candidates, suggesting that Latinos are –or are becoming– a politically homogeneous group. But,
is this apparent homogeneity a reality, or is it a mirage? Are Latinos having debates about their
place in American society and their role in the American political system? I argue they are, and
they have attitudes about these politics that form ideologies shaped by latinidad–their shared
cultural traits and core beliefs rooted in their experiences.
The electoral environment is important for understanding Latinos’ participation in a political
system in which issues that matter to Latinos may not be a part of elite discourse. While elites
shape mainstream discourse (Hetherington 2001; Zaller 1992), for Latinos the causal
mechanisms between mainstream discourse and politics are far more complex. Mainstream elite
discourse oftentimes does not address the issues of concern for racial and ethnic minorities or
address them in ways that do not align with their preferences (Hajnal and Lee 2011). Moreover,
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even if mainstream elites address issues that Latinos care about, the discourse may be perceived
or felt as a threat to ethnic identity. In the case of immigration, Pérez explains, mainstream
discourse produces a political engagement contrary to the intended as Latinos “sense their ethnic
identity is besmirched” (2013, 172).
However, ideological thinking among minorities is often incompatible with the liberalconservative continuum of mainstream ideological thinking. When race and racial conflict is the
basis of some groups’ political alignments, excluding issues that concern groups such as blacks,
Latinos and Asian Americans implies that these groups are incapable of ideological thinking.
This view is simultaneously colonial and elitist, as it suggests that people outside of these groups
are better at understanding what issues really matter to them. Thus, Latinos’ –and African
Americans’– seemingly contradictory ideological and partisan alignments –conservatives who
are Democrats or Democrats who are not liberals– may be the result of a lack of representation
of their salient issues in the parties’ discourses, suggesting that Latinos’ skewed electoral
outcomes are not the result of homogeneity of opinion but of limited options in a two-party
system (Hajnal and Lee 2011).
This does not mean that Latinos do not take any cues. Rather than from mainstream elites, Latino
ideological cues come from the institutions of the Latino counterpublic that includes national
advocacy groups and Latino-oriented media organizations. Latino elites emerge from this
counterpublic, which functions as a forum where issues salient to the community at large are
debated, as well as actions to be taken. The Latino Ethno-Ideologies stem from those debates.
The theory of Latino Ethno-Ideologies is not only useful to understand how the usual ideological
terms and labels used in American politics fit Latinos poorly. The Ethno-Ideologies also help us
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understand why Latinos appear to behave as a political bloc. Current theories for understanding
Latino political behavior make the assumption that cultural ties help Latinos unite and form
coalitions, but these cultural claims have not been put to the test. There are also arguments
regarding the role of experiences, such as discrimination, playing a role in fostering a sense of
commonality among Latinos that may have political repercussions. The Latino Ethno-Ideologies
bring together these two aspects –cultural and experiential– and put them to the test in order to
understand how much, if any, these aspects have in bringing Latinos together politically.
Applying the Ethno-Ideologies
Using data from the 2006 Latino National Survey I conducted a series of OLS nested models that
highlighted the progress of the inclusion of cultural traits and core beliefs on ideologies. The
dependent variable was an Ethno ideological scale ranging from “0” to “1” where the highest
value indicates that Latinos believe they share a lot in common, socially and politically, with
other Latinos. The lowest value indicates that Latinos believe they share nothing in common
with other Latinos. Additionally, I tested how the cultural traits and core beliefs affect each of
the Ethno-Ideological subscriptions in a series of logistic regressions. A series of variables acting
as proxies for the cultural traits and core beliefs indicate how much these concepts impact the
feelings of commonalities among Latinos. The results show that the core beliefs have a stronger
effect on Latino Ethno-Ideology than the cultural traits. In other words, agreement with
statements measuring the core beliefs is positively and strongly associated with having a panethnic Ethno-Ideology, whereas the effect of having cultural traits that are perceived as important
to Latino identity is much smaller.
I operationalized the Ethno-Ideologies using two sets of questions which asked Latinos about
how much they have in common with other Latinos on political matters (such as political
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representation) and on social aspects (such as education and income). These two questions are
the basis of the Ethno-Ideological Scale, which ranks Latinos according to how much in common
they think they share. At the lower end of the scale are Latinos, who think they share nothing in
common with other Latinos. The higher end of the scale consists of Latinos who think they share
a lot in common. Toward the middle are Latinos, who think they share some characteristics in
common but not others.
Latinos with an “ethnic” ideology (the lower end of the scale), though they acknowledge their
Hispanic or Latino heritage, rarely feel they share any social or political characteristics with
other Latinos. Roughly one-in-ten (8 percent) of Latinos subscribe to this ideology. A “coethnic” ideology consists of the belief that Latinos share some characteristics (social or political)
in common. This ideology is shared by 39 percent of Latinos. Finally, a “pan-ethnic” ideology,
or the opinion that Latinos share many social and political characteristics is present among a
majority of Latinos (53 percent).
Cultural Traits
Among the cultural traits, only language is a strong and significant predictor of a pan-ethnic
Ethno-Ideology, and this effect is only among bilingual Latinos. Bilingual Latinos appear to be
able to move in different worlds, between Latinos who are monolingual in Spanish or in English,
and in mainstream American society. However, Latinos who primarily speak Spanish are no
more likely than Latinos who primarily speak English to subscribe to a pan-ethnic EthnoIdeology. The findings suggest that language does not follow a linear pattern depending on a
person’s linguistic proficiency. Bilingualism is the most salient cultural trait influencing the
development of a pan-ethnic ideology. However, understanding why there are no major
differences in ethno-ideological scores or ethno-ideological subscription between Latinos who
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are monolingual speakers in English or Spanish requires further research, including the
possibility that the importance of language is more social than political. As Negrón argues in her
study of Latino language use “people can employ multiple strategies and resources to affiliate
and connect with each other when trying to establish and exercise a shared Latino identity”
(2014, 103), yet these relationships may be only social and not necessarily political. While the
role of language, bilingualism, is strongly associated with a pan-ethnic ideology, the role of
Catholicism is more complicated.
Being a Catholic is not a cultural trait that greatly enhances the feelings of commonalities
expected in development of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology though, contrary to expectations, it is
more associated with pan-ethnicity than co-ethnicity. However, given the time in which the
survey was taken (nearly 9 years ago) and the rapid changes in religious identification among
Latinos suggest that the small but significant effect of Catholicism may have disappeared
already. While in the LNS sample 71 percent of Latinos were Catholic, today just a small
majority, 53 percent, is Catholic and the religion is not growing among Latinos (R. P. Jones,
Cox, and Navarro-Rivera 2013). The discussions about Latino culture in the Phoenix, AZ focus
group provide further evidence that on traits such as religion, Latino Protestants and the nonreligious resented that people constantly assumed they are Catholic and that in order to have a
connection with a Latino community “Catholicism” is part of the requirements. These findings
suggest that, as the percentage of Catholics decline and the percentage of Protestant and secular
Latinos increase, the value of stressing Catholicism should decrease.
One of the surprising findings of the analysis is that family values, measured as frequency of
visiting family abroad is associated with an increase in a sense of commonality among Latinos,
contrary to expectation. These results regarding the cultural traits suggest that Latinos who move
188

in different worlds through language or by visiting Latin America frequently realize the force of
a group identity. Maybe travel to their countries of origin make Latinos realize how much they
have in common in America, maybe because they face a double burden of discrimination —as
foreigners in the United States and as American-born (or raised). This has been the case with
Puerto Ricans as a division between those from the “island” [of Puerto Rico] and from “the
mainland” [United States], with the latter claiming to be more “authentic” or “real” Puerto
Ricans by virtue of being born in the island (Ramos-Zayas 2004).
Latinos who are not “authentic” members of their national groups due to being raised or born in
the United States may face rejection when they fly back “home,” while also being rejected at
home [the United States] as not being “real” (i.e. white) Americans.
The ability or capacity of moving between worlds by travel or by language (or both) may be the
key cultural trait(s) in the development of a pan-ethnic ideology. Language is the most salient
cultural trait in producing a pan-ethnic ideology. But contrary to expectations –or to general
assumptions in the literature– the Spanish language is not a harbinger of a panethnic ideology by
itself. Monolingual Latinos, of either language, were ideologically similar, as there are no
statistical differences in the Ethno-Ideological subscription of these groups. Instead, a pan-ethnic
ideology is associated with bilingualism.
This means that Latinos who are able to communicate with their own family and the larger
Latino community as well as the larger American society have insights from both of these
worlds. These insights provide bilingual Latinos with the knowledge of the debates in the Latino
counterpublic and what the mainstream discourse (or lack thereof) on Latinos in mainstream
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culture. The ability of putting these perspectives together may generate a sense of solidarity that
transcends cultural similarities and moves toward political action.
Core Beliefs
While culture, on balance, has a positive effect on the sense of commonality among Latinos, it is
not a particularly strong predictor. Instead, the strongest predictors of subscribing to a pan-ethnic
Ethno-Ideology and of a sense of commonality between Latinos are the core beliefs. The analysis
of the different core beliefs indicates that there are two core beliefs that are particularly salient:
linked fate and shared common characteristics with African Americans.
Linked fate is the strongest predictor of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology, while it is also negatively
associated with the co-ethnic and ethnic ideologies. This means that the stronger the belief in
linked fate among Latinos, the greater the likelihood of subscribing to a pan-ethnic EthnoIdeology. Those who do not share these beliefs tend to have a co-ethnic or an ethnic ideology. To
a lesser extent, a feeling of shared commonalities with African Americans also increases a
propensity of subscribing to a pan-ethnic ideology.
The influence of these two core beliefs in the formation of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology suggest
that a shared experience is, as expected, a harbinger of a sense of unity not only among Latinos
but also as an extension to other marginalized groups in America, as well. As we move toward a
future in which racial and ethnic minorities are expected to become the majority of the
population by the middle of this century, understanding inter-group solidarity –particularly
among racial minorities– becomes an important aspect of the future of American politics. The
analysis of the core beliefs uncovered the makings of a cross-racial coalition. In practice this is
already happening as vast majorities of African American, Latinos, and Asian Americans voted
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for Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012, as we saw in Chapters 1 and 2. This may also explain why
English-speaking and bilingual Latinos are more likely to feel connected to African Americans.
The ability of these Latinos to speak English and to consume English media may expose them to
others with similar experiences, or to identify with the experiences and portrayal of other people
of color in the mainstream media.
The findings on the core beliefs also inform why the effects of the cultural traits are so small.
Migration to new destinations is placing more Latinos from various ethnic origins in contact with
each other (Manzano and Ura 2013). While cultural traits such as language may help in
establishing connections with other Latinos and possibly forging a sense of social commonality,
it is their common experiences as “the other” that forges the sense of political commonality
necessary to the formation of a pan-ethnic ideology. Likewise, migration to new destinations also
exposes Latinos to other marginalized groups such as African Americans (McClain et al. 2006).
To the extent that increasing contact between Latinos and other groups continues to occur, and
they consider the similarities in their experiences, a pan-ethnic ideology could become a crossracial ideology.
Among the other core beliefs, the belief that Latinos should have a distinct identity does not
substantially increase the likelihood of subscribing to a pan-ethnic ideology, although it is a
positive and significant predictor. The same was the case as far as not wanting to return to their
country of origin or ancestry and belief in core American Values.
Insights from the Phoenix focus groups show that Latinos have contradictory views about the
core American values. Latinos believe in concepts such as the American Dream and personal
responsibility, but believe that there is lack of opportunity. These findings are also evidenced in
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the mixed results of these values in the statistical analysis, which vary in magnitude and the
direction of the effect. Latinos still believe that it is necessary to work hard to succeed but, even
when they work hard, there is a lack of opportunity that limits what people can achieve. The
findings confirm what Fraga et al. (2010) found regarding Latinos and their belief in American
values, that Latinos are strong believers in the American Dream but are less certain about
equality of opportunity. While their study focused on Latinos’ views of American society, the
results also suggest that Latinos’ feelings toward American values have political implications.
Latinos are feeling left behind and they are witnessing how those left behind look increasingly
like themselves.
Demographic Characteristics
Subscription to a pan-ethnic ideology is mostly associated with younger Latinos who have high
levels of education. The main negative predictors are ancestry indicators. Latinos of Central
American and South American ancestry, who are minorities within the Latino community, are
less likely to identify a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology and more likely to have an Ethnic EthnoIdeology. These findings confirm results by Masuoka (2006) regarding the lower levels of panethnic identification among Central and South American Latinos. This suggests that these
smaller groups, comprising the most recently arrived Latinos, have not developed feelings of
commonality with the larger groups. However, this can also mean that members of these groups
do not feel welcomed by Latinos in the larger groups (Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans).
These findings make unique contributions to the study of Latino politics, but also raise question
that need to be explored further.
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Further Research
This study contributes to the political science literature in two unique ways. First, it contributes
to the discussion of ideology in American politics and how to incorporate the experiences of
racial and ethnic minorities into this discussion as an extension of similar work like the ones
pioneered by Hajnal and Lee (2011) on partisanship among minorities, and Dawson’s (1994,
2001) and Harris-Lacewell’s (2004) work on black political ideology. As a diverse group of
racial minorities continue influencing American politics, all supporting the same party by
overwhelming margins, it is important to understand the nature of these political alignments.
Thus, this work is part of a wider scholarship understanding how race influences political
behavior.
Second, this work also provides an important contribution to the study of Latino political
behavior, particularly at the crossroads in which the field stands today. This dissertation
continues furthering the understanding of how Latinos think about politics in America and how
they make political decisions using cues taken from their shared identity and experiences from
the research already undertaken by Marisa Abrajano (2010), Matt Barreto (2010), and Gabe
Sanchez (2006b, 2008).
While African Americans have a long history in the United States and, as the scholarship by
Michael Dawson (1994, 2001) and Melissa Harris-Lacewell (2004) that inform this project
shows, this history informs black political thought and behavior. Many recent immigrants and
their descendants come from African countries (Gambino, Trevelyan, and Fitzwater 2014), AfroCaribbean nations where the populations have African ancestry (McCallister 2014), or even
Afro-Latinos (Latinos with African ancestry).
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The growing diversity of people with African ancestry in the United States raises a number of
questions: (1) Will the growing numbers of these new Americans form a pan-ethnic (or panracial) ideology based on perceived commonalities? (2) What type of coalitions will these groups
form with Latinos? Is the experience of an unequal society that permanently discriminates
against certain groups, the norm for a shared experience?
Some research suggests this may be the case. Nunnally (2010) finds some evidence of the
development of linked fate between African Americans and the more recent black diaspora,
however, the strongest evidence is located in the Northern United States, in areas where there is
contact between African Americans and more recent members of the diaspora. More recent work
from Smith (2014) on black pan-ethnicity argues that generational status and levels of
acculturation are also factors explaining the politics of group identification and consciousness
that affect how blacks immigrated from Africa or the West Indies feel they share commonalities
with black Americans who descend from slaves.
The fact that Latinos have ideologies rooted in shared traits and experiences opens the possibility
of studying Ethno-ideologies ideology from this perspective among other groups. One could
think about replicating this study among Asian Americans. Like the terms Latino or Hispanic,
the label “Asian American” includes a mix of nationalities and generations whose only common
denominator is ancestral in a faraway continent. Unlike Latinos, who at least share historically a
common colonial history with Spain which brought an official language and religion with it,
Asian Americans have a variety of languages, religions, and political histories.
Yet, like “Latino,” “Asian American” is an umbrella term, and this grouping may also, as it
occurs with Latinos, generate a sense of commonality with political repercussions. Recent voting
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patterns suggest that Asian Americans are a strongly Democratic bloc, as Latinos have become.
Is this the case of a pan-ethnic ideology germinating? In such case, this study could contribute to
further the work on Asian-American pan-ethnic identity and how it can become political
(Espiritu 1992; Ah Kwon 2013).
But there are also two limitations in this study that should be addressed in the future in order to
improve its applicability and potential explanatory power. The first limitation concerns the data.
The second limitation is theoretical.
The Latino National Survey is the richest and largest study of Latino political behavior, but it
was conducted in 2006. While this does not seem a long time ago, chronologically many salient
events have occurred in Latino politics and race and ethnic politics, since then. For example, in
2008 Barack Obama, the first African-American President, was elected (and reelected in 2012)
with strong Latino support. This is not captured by the LNS data, and we do not know if the core
belief of attitudes toward black Americans have shifted and potentially becoming stronger, since.
Two other events with respect to elites have also taken place. In 2009 Sonia Sotomayor, the New
York-born daughter of Puerto Rican parents, became the first Supreme Court justice of Latino
descent in U.S. history. Justice Sotomayor’s nomination was strongly supported by Latino elites
and advocacy organizations (Beltran 2010), suggesting a turning point in the development of
pan-ethnicity and pan-ethnic collaboration. On the other side of the political spectrum has been
the rise of Republican Latinos in Congress, including Texas Senator Ted Cruz, of Cuban descent,
and Idaho Congressman Raul Labrador, of Puerto Rican descent, who were elected by nonLatino constituencies. The election of these politicians, given their high profile in the Republican
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Party, needs to be explored further, as it concerns Latino political behavior and its potential
impact on pan-ethnicity and partisan choice.
Another data limitation consists of the focus groups. Although the data is very useful in helping
contextualize the findings of the quantitative data, it is drawn from a mostly Mexican-American
sample in the American Southwest. Moreover, the political of Latinos in Arizona has been
unique in many ways. The enactment of laws targeting immigrants and ethnic studies in Arizona,
make it very different from places like Connecticut where the population is mostly Puerto Rican,
that passed a state Dream Act, and where some municipalities have issues identification to
undocumented immigrants. Thus, while the data is illustrative, it is not generalizable to all
Latinos in all parts of the country.
The theoretical limitations of this work concern the small role that history and political theory
play in the development and definition of the Ethno-Ideological Heuristic. The works that most
influenced this dissertation are rich in political theory and history. For example, the works by
Dawson (2001) and Harris-Lacewell (2004) on black ideologies are rooted in black history.
Dawson’s work is also steeped in political theory, particularly Behind the Mule (1994). Cristina
Beltrán’s The Trouble with Unity (2010) is a work of political theory with historical references
that place the theory in context for many Latinos experiences in the U.S. In the case of this work,
it is rich in political behavior, as it reflects the training of its author, but also the behavioral
debates to which it responds. While the theory and the analysis (as they stand) fit this behavioral
literature well, in order to fulfill its potential, it is necessary to improve on the areas of history
and theory. Historically, it is necessary to provide more context on how the respective histories
of Latinos –their origins in the United States, the ways in which they were treated, and the
reactions to such treatments– affect the development of contemporary Latino politics, including
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the formation of the Ethno-Ideologies. Additionally, a further research agenda needs to include a
more specific theoretical account of how Latino elites shape the Latino counterpublic.
The Ethno-Ideologies reveal that most Latinos consider that they share a political destiny, which
are reflected in the recent electoral results. The partisan identification trends of Latinos show that
they have no strong attachment to the Democrats and that they increasingly distrust the
Republican Party (R. P. Jones, Cox, and Navarro-Rivera 2013). This distrust of the GOP is
rooted in its discourse against immigrants, against working Americans, against the social safety
net, messages that Latinos take personally to be against them. They are skeptical of the
Democrats, but a pan-ethnic ideological perspective makes this Party the lesser of two evils. This
is the way in which the Ethno-ideologies affect Latino political behavior. They provide a
shortcut for Latinos to discern who are their friends and foes in the political system.
The liberal-conservative continuum does not work for Latinos because they do not see politics in
those terms, as the results of the 2006 LNS show. This may be due to what Hajnal and Lee
(2011) argue that parties do not cater to the concerns of Latinos and other Americans of color.
The Ethno-Ideologies show that Latinos do think in terms of who their allies and foes are. More
research on these ideologies should expose hoe they affect Latino political behavior. The
diversity of Latino ideology ultimately lies in how the diversity of its people and their
experiences bring them together or apart politically.
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Appendices
Appendix 3.1. Ordinal Regression Models
Variables

Ordinal Probit
Coeff.

Catholic
Media Language (Spanish)

Ordinal Logistic

(SE)

Coeff.

(SE)

0.048
0.018

(0.037)
(0.047)

0.095
0.032

(0.064)
(0.081)

Spanish
Bilingual
Freq. visiting family
Imp. Of being distinct in America

-0.152
0.152
0.011
0.045

(0.083)
(0.066)
(0.010)
(0.035)

-0.247
0.270
0.017
0.069

(0.144)
(0.114)
(0.017)
(0.061)

Do not want to go back
Personal linked fate
Group linked fate
Commonalities w/Blacks
Political commonalities w/Blacks

0.044
0.189
0.267
0.088
0.146

(0.042)
(0.017)
(0.020)
(0.018)
(0.020)

0.096
0.330
0.454
0.147
0.256

(0.073)
(0.030)
(0.034)
(0.031)
(0.034)

***
***
***
***

Latinos get ahead w/hard work
People who don’t get ahead should blame
themselves
Not a problem if others have more of a chance
in life
Female

0.049

(0.026)

0.093

(0.044)

*

0.025

(0.016)

0.044

(0.028)

0.023
0.026

(0.016)
(0.034)

0.046
0.032

(0.027)
(0.057)

Age
Education
Naturalized citizen
First generation
Second generation

-0.005
0.035
0.111
0.007
0.065

(0.001)
(0.010)
(0.051)
(0.064)
(0.060)

-0.009
0.059
0.194
0.026
0.123

(0.002)
(0.018)
(0.086)
(0.111)
(0.103)

Puerto Rican ancestry
Cuban ancestry
Dominican ancestry
Central American ancestry
South American ancestry

0.096
0.016
-0.068
-0.142
-0.156

(0.066)
(0.088)
(0.085)
(0.063)
(0.079)

0.186
0.024
-0.136
-0.229
-0.251

(0.113)
(0.152)
(0.142)
(0.107)
(0.136)

Other ancestry

-0.211

(0.112)

-0.350

(0.193)

Constant
Cut 1=Ethnic
Cut 2=Coethnic

0.233
1.770

(0.180)
(0.183)

0.418
3.119

(0.312)
(0.315)

R2

0.094

0.093

Number of Observations

5383

5383

*

***
***
***
***

***
**
*

*
*

*

***
***
*

*
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Appendix 3.2. Interview Guide for 2013 Hispanic Values Survey Focus Groups (Phoenix, AZ)
Introduction (3 minutes)
Opening Question (5 minutes)
[Goal: Get basic information, establish commonalities and sense of community between the
participants.]
1. Please tell me your name and one of your favorite things to do outside of work.
Introductory Question
[Goal: Broad open-ended question designed to open the topic for discussion.]
2. Shared connections among Hispanic Americans (10 minutes). The Hispanic community
in America is certainly very diverse in many ways.
● Do you think there are any distinctive things that most Latinos hold in common that
differentiate us from white, black, or other Americans of different ethnicities?
[PAUSE for discussion]
3. Now, please take out handout #1 [PAUSE]. Please indicate on the handout how important
each item is to you personally when you think about your own connection to the wider
Hispanic community in America. Then, on the left side, please order these connections
from those you think are most important to least important--#1 being most important and
#7 being least important.
● Who would like to share what item they see as the most important connection?
Key Questions
4. Top of Mind: Political Parties and Religious Groups (20 minutes). Please take out the
index card #1[SHOW AND PAUSE]. I’m going to say the name of some groups. When
you hear the name of the first group, please write down two or three feelings that come to
mind on the front of the index card. The first group is, “the Republican Party.”
[PAUSE until writing generally stops].
Now, turn the card over and use the back to record your feelings about another group.
The next group is, “the Democratic Party.”Please write down two or three feelings come
to mind when you hear “the Democratic Party.”
[PAUSE until writing generally stops].
● Who would like to share first what they wrote down about the Republican Party or
the Democratic Party? _____________, what about you?
● As you may know Hispanic voters have increasingly been supporting Democratic
candidates for public office. In 2012, for example Barack Obama received 71% of the
Latino vote. In the next presidential election, do you think Democratic candidates will
receive a higher proportion of the Hispanic vote, the same proportion, or do you think
Republican candidates may make inroads among Hispanic voters?
● F/U: What do you think Republican leaders think about Hispanic Americans?
● F/U: What do you think Democratic leaders thing about Hispanic Americans?
5. Issue Priorities (15 minutes). Please take out handout #2 [PAUSE]. You’ll see that it lists
a number of issues that are facing the country. Now, imagine that when Congress returns
from its summer recess that it will base its decisions solely on the priorities you outline
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on this sheet. First, on the right side of the form indicate how important you think each
issue is by checking the appropriate box. Then, on the left side, please order these issues
from those you think are most important to least important--#1 being most important and
#8 being least important.
[PAUSE until writing generally stops].
● Can someone tell me about the issue you listed as the most important priority for
Congress? How did you come to rate this issue as the most important?
● What about the issue you listed as least important? How did you decide to rate this
issue as the least important?
● F/U: Is one party better than the other at handling specific issues?
6. Church and Religious Leaders (15 minutes).
Please take out index card #2. Now, we’ll read the names of two different groups. The
next group is “the Catholic Church.” On the front of the card, please write down two or
three feelings that come to mind when you hear “the Catholic Church.”
[PAUSE until writing generally stops]. Now, we’ll use the back of the card to record your
feelings about one final group.
[FOR CATHOLIC AND UNAFFILIATED GROUPS] The next group is, “Evangelical
Christians.” Please write down what feelings come to mind when you hear “Evangelical
Christians.”
[FOR PROTESTANT GROUPS] The next group is, “Atheists.” Please write down what
feelings come to mind when you hear “Atheists.”
[PAUSE until writing generally stops].
Let’s have a quick show of hands.
[FOR CATHOLIC GROUPS] How many of you think that you can disagree with Church
teachings on political issues and still be a good Catholic?
● Follow-up: Is this truer of some issues than others?
[FOR PROTESTANT GROUPS] How many of you think that you can disagree with the
teachings of your pastor and church on political issues and still be a good Christian?
● Follow-up: Is this truer of some issues than others?
[FOR UNAFFILIATED GROUPS] How many of you think that religious leaders
speaking out on important political and social issues facing your community is a good
thing? How many think it is a bad thing?
● Follow-up: Is this truer of some issues than others?
Final Question (5 minutes)
[Goal: Elicit responses about potentially missed information and to bring closure to the
discussion.]
● As we’re wrapping up, what’s the main thing you think you are taking away from this
discussion today?
Prompt: Have we missed anything important in this discussion?
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